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The final report for the Shuttle Ground Operations Efficienc_es/Technologies Study is made up of five
volumes.
Volume 1
Volume 2
Volume 3
Volume 4
Volume 5
Executive Summary
Ground Operations Evaluation
Final Presentation Material
Preliminary Issues Database (PIDB)
Technology Information Sheets (TIS)
Volume 1
The Executive Summary volume provides a brief overview of the major elements of the
Study, reviews the findings, and reflects the development of the recommendations
resulting from the Study.
Volume 2
The Ground Operations Evaluation volume describes the breath and depth of the various
Study elements selected as a result of an operational analysis conducted during the early
part of the Study. Analysis techniques used for the evaluation are described in detail.
Elements selected for further evaluation are identified; the results of the analysis
documented; and a follow-on course of action recommended. The background and rationale
for developing recommendations for the current Shuttle or for future programs is
presented.
Volume 3
The Final Presentation Material volume contains the most recent version of the charts
used in the Final Phase 1 Oral Briefing at KSC on April 6, 1987, and to the STAS (Space
Transportation Architecture Study) IPR-5 (Interim Program Review) held at MSFC on
April 8, 1987. The KSC, April 6 notation in the title block was used for both packages
because the reviews were held so closely together. This volume contains all charts in
their final form and any differences from charts presented are minor.
Volume 4
The Preliminary Issues Database (PIDB) was assembled very early in the Study as one of
the fundamental tools to be used throughout the Study. Data was acquired from a variety of
sources and compiled in such a way that the data could be easily sorted in accordance with a
number of different analytical objectives. The system was computerized to significantly
expedite sorting and make it more usable. This volume summarizes the information
contained in the PIDB and provides the reader with the caDabUity to manually find items of
interest. How that information was used in this Study is explained in greater detail in
Volumes 2 and 3.
Volume 5
The Technology Information Sheet volume was assembled in database format during Phase
1 of the Study. This document was designed to provide a repository for information
pertaining to 144 OMI (Operations and Maintenance Instructions) controlled operations in
the OPF, VAB and PAD. tt provides a way to accumulate information about required crew
sizes, operations task time duration (serial and/or parallel), special GSE required, and
identification of a potential application of existing technology -- or the need for the
development of a new technology item.
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1.O GROUND OPERATIONS EVALUATION
INTRODUCTION
STUDY OBJECTIVES: The overall objectives of this Study are to
determine high payoff, innovative methodologies and technologies
to reduce the cost of STS ground processing and manpower; and,
thereby reduce life cycle costs. These objectives shall be
accomplished through an overall analysis of the current shuttle
ground operations functions including but not limited to:
assembly, test and checkout, logistics, recovery, refurbishment,
servicing, payload integration, launch operations, operations
management, and ground systems operations and maintenance.
OVERALL STUDY CONCLUSIONS:
SHUTTLE
Analysis of the massive amount of ground processing-related
information; and documented information and reports generated
after the Challenger (51-L) loss; and management of those
activities provided the basis for the conclusions reached during
this Study. Those conclusions involve both the Shuttle ground
processing operations and the management of those activities.
All the reviewed issues and related problems were ultimately
determined to be the result of either a "design" or a
"management" deficiency.
Management: While it may be beyond the intended scope of this
Study, the basic Program problems and the idealized future
solution became evident to the Study participants. These
conclusions are described graphically in Figures I and 2 below.
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1.0 GROUND OPERATIONS EVALUATION
Continued
Ground Operations: There is no easy answer for streamlining
Shuttle ground operations. The Shuttle was not designed for ease
of operations -- by limiting front-end design costs, the vehicle
turned out to be a proof-of-concept vehicle that is not designed
to be operationally efficient. This is a fact that is generally
conceded by most everyone today. The realistic, full cost per
flight, based on I0 flights per year, is over $246 million in
1985 dollars. It is only by forecasting 24 flights per year that
the "full cost per flight" could even approach the advertised
$100 million cost figure in 1985 dollars. Since the best flight
rate achieved to date (FY-85) was 8 and with a maximum
improvement of 10% in ground operations without very major block
modifications to the orbiter systems, it is unrealistic to quote
a full cost of $100M in 1985 dollars, much less in ]987 dollars.
Analysis shows that major block modifications to make the three
Orbiters operationally efficient does not appear to be cost
effective. Only those efficiency mods that could be worked in
parallel with mandatory safety mods appear practical.
Implementation of the IMIS (Integrated Maintenance Information
System) portion of the ULCE (Unified Life Cycle Engineering)
system could, by simplifying the paperwork processing systems
used on Shuttle, potentially reduce life cycle costs on Shuttle
by better than 4%. This would, of course, require a significant
up-front investment. The investment can be shown to pay for
itself in three years at a flight rate of ten flights per year.
Section 1.4 details the analyses and recommendations for Shuttle
and they are summarized in Section 1.5.2.
FUTURE PROGRAMS
The operations and management lessons learned from the Shuttle
Program, if used in conjunction with technology advances, can
significantly reduce the operational portion of life cycle costs
for new vehicles. If maximum use is not made of all these
lessons and improved technology, program costs will continue to
rise -- life cycle costs could prevent this Country from
regaining the space leadership it once held.
ULCE/CALS (Unified Life Cycle Engineering/Computer Aided
Logistics System): The most important finding of this Study is
the requirement for NASA to immediately require some form of the
ULCE system to be included along with the new DoD standards for
data interchange (MIL-STD-]840A). Individual Centers must not be
allowed to develop data formats that are unique. Systems must be
developed that will allow full communications with other NASA
Centers, Air Force, or Contractors: for example, the "new"
Shuttle Processing Data Management System (SPDMS) currently under
development at KSC. NASA should insist that it conform to the
new standards that have been developed for data interchange. DoD
is in the process of funding approximately $685 million (for
FY-87, 88, & 89) to research and provide standards for the
ULCE/CALS mentioned above. NASA could easily participate in the
Standards committees for that development. Full use of ULCE/CALS
in future programs can bring about a six percent reduction in
total life cycle costs -- a VERY large dollar value ($1.82B for a
100 flight Shuttle Orbiter, for example).
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1.0 GROUNDOPERATIONSEVALUATION
Continued
Management Issues: A major issue stressed during the Study was
the need to accept new management concepts and practices. The
increasing demand by both NASA and DoD to drastically reduce the
cost of operations can only be met if the designed and fabricated
hardware, as delivered to the operational site, has had
supportability and maintainability designed into it from the
beginning of the conceptual study development. Advanced
management techniques are an essential part of the "new look"
required for future vehicles. The use of Design/Build Teams and
Build-to-Cost concepts, along with the use of new design tools
like ULCE (Unified Life Cycle Engineering) systems, will be
required if one is to stay in business. It may require a change
in mindset about what constitutes "good management" but cost
figures for new programs are getting so huge that inefficiencies,
of any nature, can no longer be tolerated. This subject is
discussed in more detail in Sect. 1.4.12.
Anomaly Resolution: Full implementation of the automated anomaly
resolution capabilities described in Section 1.4.6 could reduce
life cycle cost by an additional five percent.
Section 1.4 describes in detail the other recommendations and
they are summarized in Section 1.5.1.
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I.I STUDY TOOLS AND EVALUATION PROCESS
The Study Flow Diagram, Figure I, shows the management scheme
used to track progress of various tasks associated with the main
thrust of the Study. It shows the data sources inputing to the
Study the inter-relationship of various parts of the Study; and
Study products.
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I.I STUDY TOOLS AND EVALUATION PROCESS
(Continued)
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR CNJALI'r'Y
1.1.1 ENGINEERING TOOLS
Data Processing: In order to survey the very broad scope of the
Study and select material for detailed analysis in a very short
period of time, it was necessary to provide a comprehensive
computer network for the Study personnel.
Figure 2 allowed us to access NASA and
transfer text between work stations;
simultaneously work in the same database;
quality graphics. The Mac-XL and the
graphics capability, while the AT&T
operating
management.
The network shown in
commercial databases;
allow personnel to
and to do presentation
Mac-512 provided good
6300+'s with a Xenix
system provided superior data processing and database
:J_RL _ NASA/KSDN
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XEN_X_os I
1MBRAM J_
,1_ _ NAS/VKSDN
60MB HARD ORIVE I" r
I . ,,.... _... %4,
STUDY DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM
Figure 2
Preliminary Issues Database (PIDB): is described at length in
Section 1.2 and a 600 page printout is included as Volume 4 of
this Report. It includes over 2000 different descriptions of
issues or data pertinent to the Study.
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i. 1 STUDY TOOLS AND EVALUATION PROCESS
(Continued)
Expanded Automation Technology Knowledge Base (XTKB): is the
expansion of the Automation Technology Knowledge Base (ATKB)
brought to this Study from the OTV Launch Operations Study. It
includes some 23000 records of papers and documents related to
Study subjects such as automation, expert systems, artificial
intelligence, fault detection, safety, etc.
PRACA and OMRSD: arrangements were also made to access the NASA
PRACA and OMRSD databases.
Database Relationship: Figure 3 illustrates the relationship of
internal and external databases utilized during the Study.
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I PFIACA I RECON I I COMMERCIAL
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Figure 3
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l.l STUDY TOOLS AND EVALUATION PROCESS
(Continued)
1.1.2 TECHNICAL SURVEY TRIPS
Four technical survey trips were made in direct support of the
Study during Phase I:
* Boeing Seattle
* Wright-Patterson AFB (WPAFB)
* Rome Air Development Center (RADC)
* Naval Surface Weapon Center (NSWC)(ex NOL)
The survey trip to Boeing Seattle provided us with insight in new
management techniques being implemented for the next generation
of airplanes where worldwide competition is making the protection
of corporate rice bowls suicidal. Section 1.4.]2 describes the
pertinent management techniques. Technical subjects surveyed
during this trip included NDE technology including backscatter
X-ray (see Section 1.4.9); integrated fault-tolerant avionics
(Section 1.4.6) ; 767 integrated testing (Section 1.4.6);
manipulative robotic systems (led to potential use of Nitinol for
ordnance systems (Section 1.4.11) ; optical sensors and
processors (Section 1.4.6).
The trip to WPAFB was a result of an XTKB search which surfaced
extensive Air Force activity on ULCE (Unified Life Cycle
Engineering). Results of this trip and the additional research
done on this and related topics account, in large part, for our
conclusions and recommendations in the area of birth-to-death
computerized paperwork systems (Section 1.4.12).
The Rome Air Development Center trip provided an update on Air
Force research projects of Built-In-Test (BIT) techniques and the
status of recommendations to DoD on various aspects of anomaly
resolution (fault detection, fault isolation, and fault
resolution), see Section 1.4.6.
Our trip to the Naval Surface Weapons Center was for the purpose
of investigating feasibility of using Nitinol-type devices as a
substitute for certain ordnance devices. Results of this trip
were positive and are referenced in Section 1.4.11.
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1.2 ISSUES
ORIGINAL PAGE 13
OF POOR QUALITY
Issues are items impacting operational areas such as
accessibilty, cannibalization, or safety which surfaced from our
source documentation or operational analysis.
Forty different issue topics were defined at the beginning of the
Study and all issue descriptions were placed in one of these
categories in the Preliminary Issues Database (Volume 4 of this
Study). The number of description entries range from a low of 3
to a high of 750. The number of entries is indicative of the
degree of documented attention. Figure 1 lists the 40 different
issues used and the number of description entries in the
database.
ISSUES
Figure 1
The prime source of issues was documentation resulting from the
loss of 51-L. There were also numerous other sources of
documented problems independent of 51-L. These sources are
listed below in Figure 2 with the associated block of
identification numbers in the PIDB, Volume 4.
tO0
2_0-400
_OO
I_0-I_
1700
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PRELIMINARY ISSUES DATABASE CONTENT
Figure 2
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1.2 ISSUES
(Continued)
Figure 3, PIDB Information Sources provides a quantitative look
at source documentation origination.
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1.3 STS OPERATIONS ANALYSIS
1.3.1 INTRODUCTION
Objective: The objective of the operations analysis was to first
identify current Shuttle operations that historically require
excessive time to complete; then to analyze these operations to
evaluate suitability as candidates for reduction by applying new
technology. The candidates selected have been identified as
"tentpoles".
Approach: The entire ground operations spectrum of the current
Shuttle system was reviewed to identify operations causing the
time between flights. It was immediately apparent that the
Orbiter operations was the area of greatest potential reduction
in turnaround time. In all flows studied, both the SRB's and the
ET was stacked on the MLP; awaiting orbiter mate. Each Orbiter
operation was investigated, and timelines evaluated to see if the
time required had the potential of reduction through application
of technolgy. Note that the emphasis of this study was on
technology in order to avoid duplicating the concentrated effort
of the Shuttle Processing Contractor on straightforward flow
improvement after the 51-L incident.
There were several prime sources of information was used to make
the "tentpole" determinations. These sources were:
I. 160-hour Ground Operations Plan
, As-Run schedules from previous flows with emphasis on
the 51-L(the latest) and 61-B (the shortest) flows.
, STS-XX OPF flow (a composite flow reflecting the
best-to-date performance).
4. OMI's used to perform all operations.
, Discussions with personnel from NASA, the SPC' and
Rockwell International.
, Personal experience of Study participants in Shuttle
processing.
Rationalization: The 160-hour turnaround was used as a
comparison baseline because it is still the NSTS 07700 design
goal for the program. This |60-hr turnaround goal is recognized,
at all technical and management levels of the program, as
unobtainable (by a factor of several times) with the current
hardware. Nevertheless, it provided a stable baseline for the
study against which all ground operations growth could be
measured. As a reference, the best composite turnaround time is
1040 hours.
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High Payoff Technology Potential: Figure I depicts the growth of
processing time from the original 160-hr design goal to the
pre-51-L goal of 680 hours and the pre-51-L capability of 1040
hours which combined the best as-run vehicle times for the OPF,
VAB, and PAD. It should be noted that this capability will be
significantly impacted by additional safety-related test and
inspection requirements resulting from 51-L. High potential
payoff examples from the OPF and Pad processing provide a total
of 1085 hours of potential serial or parallel time improvement
(through the use of technology) to meet the initial design goals.
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1.3 STS OPERATIONS ANALYSIS
(Continued)
1.3.2 160-Hour Turnaround vs 51-L As-run
This is a comparison between the 160-hr turnaround and the actual
processing schedule for the 51-L mission. This includes both the
timelines and functions for processing of the Orbiter from
Roll-in at the OPF to Launch.
Level I directed that the Shuttle be designed so that it could be
launched within 160 working hours after landing of the previous
mission. This would be on a two-shift workday, five-days a week.
Level II then divided this 160-hrs into time to be spent in the
OPF, VAB, and at the Pad. All designs were to support these
requirements, but due to both money and weight constraints, the
operation times have been lengthened by several times. Figure 2
is the original Level II Schedule with the time allotted to
perform each task. Following are sheets giving the 51-L
comparison.
Letters A through W are used for each operation identified on the
Level II Schedule. The Title of the block on the original
schedule, with time originally allocated is used for the heading.
A list of the actual operations, with timelines, will show what
was required (by the ORMSD and equipment failure, repair and
retest) to process 51-L.
TURNAROUND TIME (HRS.)
160-HR. TIMELINE ALLOCATION
(PAYLOAD INSTALLATION AT PAD)
Figure 2
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(Continued)
A. LANDING AREA 1.0 HR
WAD TITLE
VS001 SLF OPS/TOW TO OPF*
* Previous mission landed at DFRF and was
ferried to KSC.
HOURS
10.5 hours total
B. SAFING AND DESERVICING 8.0 HRS
WA___DD TITLE HR___SS
VSO01
VI184
V1091
V1158
V5012
V5012
VI078
N/A
VIOl8
VI196
TOW ORB INTO OPF/JACK & LEVEL/POWER UP PREPS 17,5
SAFING PATCHES/LOAD MMU 3.0
PRSD CRYO VENT 40.0
OMS TRICKLE PURGE & OMS/RCS DESERVICING 96.0
NOSE LANDING GEAR THRUSTER REMOVAL 8.0
PYRO WIRE HARNESS R&R RESISTANCE CHECK 48.0
APU LUBE OIL DESERVICING 24.0
MPS/SSME PROCESSING (ENGINE DRYING) 71.0
WATER SPRAY BOILER DESERVICING 24.0
APU POST FLIGHT FUEL SYSTEM OPS 85.0
TOTAL 416.5
C. PAYLOAD REMOVAL PREPS. 8.0 HRS
WAD TITLE
V3512 INSTALL PAYLOAD ACCESS
V5006 PAYLOAD STRONGBACK INST/OPEN PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
HRS
8.0
17.0
TOTAL 2 5.0
D. MISSION UNIQUE PAYLOAD ACCOMMODATION EQUIPMENT
REMOVAL/INST. 24.0 HOURS
WAD TITLE HRS
N/A
Vl175
V5R03
N/A
N0533
AFT FLIGHT DECK/PAYLOAD BAY DECONFIG/RECONFIG. 240.0
RMS TURNAROUND VERIF. 16.0
PRSD H2/O2 TANK SET 4 REMOVAL 120.0
PCP/CIU INSTALLATION 48.0
PCP/CIU CHECKOUT 5.5
TOTAL 429.5
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(Continued)
E. ORBITER SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE 24.0 HRS
WAD TITLE
V6002
VI026
V5017
VI084
V5056
VI134
VI007
VI076
VI062
VI008
VI200
V6005
V6018
V6012
V1217
Vl178
Vl184
V1005
VI086
V5069
VI016
VI097
V5069
V1026
VI153
VI099
V1042
V5010
V1003
Vl180
VI080
VI098
V6034
V1005
VI183
VI078
VI041
V9023
VII80
VI037
VI055
VI017
V9002
VI048
V1065
V1060
V6034
V5050
TPS
V9001
VI131
V1161
ORBITER POST FLIGHT INSPECTION
REMOVE WASH & WASTE FUNCTIONAL
DESTOW FCE
CAUTION & WARNING SYS VERIFICATION
REMOVE GAS SAMPLE BOTTLES
WATER DRAIN (HORIZONTAL POSITION)
PV&D VENT FILTER/INSTL.
WCCS FUNCTIONAL CHECKS
AIR DATA SYSTEM
MSBLS TESTING
RECORDER DUMP
STARTRACKER CLEAN/INSPECT
CABIN AIR/RECIRCULATE MAINTENANCE
HYD INSPECTION
ECLSS ARPCS FUNCTIONAL TEST
KU BAND TURNAROUND C/O
LOAD MMU
VTR C/O
MEC PIC TEST
TRANSFER TO AFT 999 JACKS
VENT DOOR FUNCTIONAL
ET DOOR FUNCTIONAL/LATCH FOR FLIGHT
TRANSFER TO AFT 570 JACKS
REMOVE WASTE COLLECTION SYSTEM & WASTE FLUSH
APU WATER SERVICING
STARTRACKER DOOR FUNCTIONAL
SMOKE DETECTION & FIRE SUPPRESSION FUNCTIONAL
INSTALL B/C/ELBOW CCTV
POWER SYSTEM VALIDATION
FRCS FUNCTIONAL C/O (LPS)
MULT CRT DISP SYS C/O (LPS)
LANDING GEAR FUNCTIONAL
CREW MODULE SEAT FUNCTIONAL
CCTV SYSTEM TEST
ORBITER ELECTRICAL SYSTEM VALIDATION (LPS)
APU LUBE OIL SERVICING
N2 SERVICING
CLOSE/OPEN PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
AFT OMS/RCS FUNCTIONAL
NH3 SYSTEM SERVICING
POTABLE WATER SERVICING
WATER SPRAY BOILER SYSTEM LEAK & FUNCTIONAL
BRAKE FILL & BLEED
NOSE WHEEL STEERING
BRAKE/ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEM TEST (LPS)
AEROSURFACE CHECKOUT
GALLEY FUNCTIONAL
FLIGHT CREW EQUIPMENT STOWAGE/CEIT/DESTOWAGE
FLIGHT CREW EQUIPMENT INFLIGHT MAINT. WALKDOWN
STOW KU BAND ANTENNA
HYDRAULIC ACCUMULATOR CHECKS
ORBITER BUS REDUNDANCY
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TOTAL
HRS
24.0
16.0
16.0
8.0
8.0
8.0
104.5
176.0
8.0
8.0
8.0
8.0
120.0
16.0
12.0
8.0
12.0
4.0
44.0
3.0
II .0
8.0
3.0
24.0
48.0
5.0
4.0
8.0
23.0
14.0
4.0
4.0
8.0
3.0
12.0
66.0
8.0
11.0
96.0
24.0
24.5
25.0
4.0
5.0
8.0
5.5
8.0
19.0
3.0
8.0
8.0
19.0
1132.5
1.3 STS OPERATIONS ANALYSIS
(Continued)
F. PROPULSION SYSTEM SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE 24.0 HRS
WAD TITLE HRS
V9002
V5043
V1009
Vl011
V5058
TPS
V5E06
V5E06
V5E29
V5057
V5005
V1063
VI011
V1001
V9019
V5057
V5043
HYDRAULIC POWER UP PREPS & POSITION SSME'S 49.0
REMOVE HEAT SHIELDS 20.0
MPS LEAK & FUNCTIONAL 176.0
SSME LEAK & FUNCTIONAL 176.0
REMOVE SSME #2 5.5
NOZZLE WELD INSPECTION (VAB) * 240.0
SSME #I HIGH PRESSURE FUEL TURBOPUMP R&R 37.0
SSME #2 HIGH PRESSURE FUEL TURBOPUMP R&R (VAB) $ 40.0
SSME #2 GIMBAL BOLT R&R * 32.0
DISCONNECT SSME TVC'S/INSTALL STIFF ARMS 4.0
INSTALL SSME #2 20.0
SSME TVC FLIGHT CONTROLS 3.0
SSME FLIGHT READINESS TEST 13.0
SSME ELECTRICAL INTERFACE VERIFICATION 8.0
MPS VJ LINES CHECK 4.0
REMOVE STIFF ARMS/CONNECT SSME TVC'S 8.0
HEAT SHIELD INSTALLATION 57.5
TOTAL 893.0
* These operations were accomplished in the engine shop in the VAB.
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G. UNSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE & SYSTEM REVERIFICATION 5.0 HRS
WAD TITLE
N5230
V1053
V7253
N/A
IPR
V5R01
IPR
PR
Vl165
PR
V5U01
V5011
V5079
VI164
V5U01
V5016
PR
TPS
V1165
TPS
V1225
V5R01
Vl165
Vl177
TPS
IPR
V5079
Vl180
PR
V1226
V1053
IPR
PR
VS011
V1224
V1226
Vl161
ORBITER POST FLIGHT TROUBLESHOOTING
REMOVE CABIN SENSOR
WINDOW POLISHING
ORBITER POST FLIGHT TROUBLESHOOTING
TANK #I H2 CRYO CONTROL HEATER TROUBLESHOOTING
FUEL CELL #I REMOVAL
MSBLS TROUBLESHOOTING
REMOVE MSBLS
LANDING/BRAKE INSTALLATION
R&R LAUNCH CONTROL AMPLIFIER
REMOVE APU #3
R&R RH OMS POD
OMS ENGINE HEAT SHIELD REMOVAL
ELEVON LOWER COVE SEAL PRESS LEAK RATE
REINSTALL APU #3
TRANSFER RIGHTHAND OMS POD TO HMF
R&R HEADS UP DISPLAY UNIT
AMMONIA TANK PURGE
LANDING GEAR BRAKE INSPECTION & BRAKE R&R
NH3 LEAK & FUNCTIONAL
RIGHT OMS INTERFACE TEST
INSTALL FUEL CELL #I
INSTALL NOSE LANDING GEAR TIRES
HEADS UP DISPLAY CHECKOUT
MATE APU FUEL LINES
LEAK IN APU FUEL LINE "B"NUT
LEFTHAND OMS ENGINE HEAT SHIELD INST'L R/T & LK CK
AFT OMS/RCS FUNCTIONAL
INSTALL THRUSTER & RETEST
OMS POD MATING
CABIN SENSOR INSTALLATION & RETEST
REMOVE BREAK OUT BOXES
LEFT OMS CROSSFEED LINE PROBLEM
R&R LEFTHAND OMS POD
OMS POD ELECTRICAL CONNECT & RETEST
LEFTHAND OMS CROSSFEED CONNECT
BUS REDUNDANCY LEFTHAND OMS POD
TOTAL
HRS
64 0
8 0
112 0
32 0
48 0
64 0
3.0
1.0
24.0
3.0
31.0
29.0
16.0
24.0
16.0
2.0
8.0
16.0
23.0
16.0
32.0
11.5
8.0
3.0
13.0
16.0
16.0
4.0
8.5
16.0
8.0
2.0
22.5
26.5
12.5
5.0
9.0
753.5
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H. TPS REFURBISHMENT 40.0 HRS
WAD TITLE HR___S
V6028
V9024
N/A
V9022
V6035
ORBITER POST FLIGHT TPS INSPECTION N/A
ORBITER TPS MAINTENANCE/OPERATION N/A
ORBITER TPS WATERPROOFING N/A
ET DOOR CYCLES/TPS OPERATIONS 120.0
RSI PRE ROLLOUT INSP & UPPER SURFACE WATERPROOFING 71.0
TOTAL 191.0+
NOTE: The 5]-L as-run schedule shows the first three above
operations starting as soon as the orbiter is rolled into the
OPF, but does not identify how long they continue. The STS-XX
schedule allows 60 hrs for both the inspection and maintenance
operation and 168 hrs for waterproofing.
I. ORBITER INTEGRATED TEST 10.0 HRS.
NOTE: The requirement for this test has been deleted from
OMRSD.
the
J. PREPS FOR MATING 10.0 HRS.
WAD TITLE
V5012
V5012
V5012
V5012
V5012
V6034
V1032
V1032
V6003
V9021
V1176
V5018
V9002
AFT SEP HARNESS/ET UMB GSE & PLUG INSTALLATION
FWD ET BEARING & YOKE INSTALLATION
PRE-OPS SET UP
POWER DOWN ORDNANCE INSTALLATION
POWER ON PIC TEST
PAYLOAD BAY SHARP EDGE INSPECTION
ORBITER CLOSEOUT
ORBITER AFT CLOSEOUT
PAYLOAD BAY CLOSEOUT/INSPECTION
DEACTIVATE TRICKLE PURGE
PAYLOAD BAY CLEANING
CLOSE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS & REMOVE STRONGBACKS
HYD OPS/POSITION AEROSURFACES FOR ROLLOUT
V3555 DISCONNECT ORBITER PURGE AIR
V3515 REMOVE LH2/LO2 CARRIER PLATES
V5101 JACKDOWN WEIGH & CG/PREP TO TOW
TOTAL
HRS
8 0
32 0
16 0
8 0
8 0
4 0
104 0
85.5
20.0
8.0
27.5
16.0
4.5
5.0
5.0
8.0
359.5
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(Continued)
K. TOW ORBITER TO VAB NO TIME ALLOTTED
WAD TITLE HRS
S0004 ORBITER TOW & MATE
TOTAL
.5
.5
L. TRANSFER AISLE ORBITER PREMATE OPS 5.0 HRS
WAD TITLE HRS
S0004 ORBITER TOW & MATE
TOTAL
18.5
18.5
M. ORBITER MATE AND INTERFACE VERIFICATION 15.0 HRS
WAD TITLE HRS
S0004
SOOO8
S0020
ORBITER TOW & MATE
SHUTTLE INTERFACE VERIFICATION
SRB TESTING
103.0
36.5
5.5
TOTAL 144.0
N. SHUTTLE INTERFACE TEST 19.0 HRS
NOTE: The requirements for this test have been removed
from the OMR and is no longer being accomplished.
O. MOVE TO PAD 7.0 HRS
WAD TITLE HRS
A5214 TRANSFER & MATE TO PAD B 13.5
TOTAL 13.5
P. MLP MATE TO PAD & LAUNCH PAD VALIDATION 3.0 HRS
WAD TITLE
S0009 LAUNCH PAD VALIDATION
N/A POWER UP PREPS
HRS
9.5
30.0
-18- TOTAL 39.5
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Q. PAYLOAD INSTALLATION IN PCR 13.0 HRS
WA___DD TITLE HRS.
NO133 CARGO INSTALLATION IN PCR PAD B 35.5
N/A WIND DELAY IN INSTALLING CARGO IN PCR 33.0
N/A IUS SCU PROBLEM 32.5
N1533 TDRS PROPELLANT LOAD 33.5
N/A IUS POWER UP/DOWN TEST 21.5
N/A IUS STANDALONE TEST 18.0
TOTAL 174.0
R. FUEL CELL DEWAR LOADING 10.0 HRS
WAD T__[TLE HRS
V2303 DEWAR LOAD 6.5
TOTAL 6.5
NOTE: The 160-hr Turnaround Schedule has this activity to occur
prior to the arrival of the vehicle at the pad. During the 51-L
flow, it was accomplished just prior to hyper load which caused
another pad clear in the pad operation.
S. SHUTTLE LAUNCH READINESS VERIFICATION 6.5 HRS
WAD TITLE HRS
S0009 LAUNCH PAD VALIDATION WITH APU HOT FIRE *
V1202 HE SIGNATURE TEST
TOTAL
* This time includes 4.5 hrs. for emergency power down if
orbiter cooling was lost to the vehicle.
40.0
17.5
57.5
the
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(Continued)
T. PAYLOAD INSTALLATION AND LAUNCH READINESS VERIFICATION
9.0 HRS.
WAD TITLE HRS
N0133 CARGO PAYLOAD BAY OPERATIONS 80.0
S0017 TERMINAL COUNT DEMONSTRATION TEST 55.5
V9023 OPEN PAYLOAD BAY DOORS 1.5
S0009 1ST MOTION CHECKS & SRSS HOLDFIRE CHECKS 6.0
N/A HOT GAS SYSTEM TROUBLESHOOTING 15.0
V1202 HOT GAS POI'S 7.5
Vl149 AFT CAVITY PURGE 9.5
PR PDI R&R AND RETEST 5.0
B1500 R&R SRB AFT IEA 8.5
N0433 IUS TDRS IVT/ETE 25.0
IPR R&R HIM 6893 2.5
PR IEA ELECTRICAL CONNECT & RETEST 12.5
N/A POD TOTALIZER CONNECT & RETEST 13.0
PR UPS 40 TROUBLESHOOTING/CARD CHANGE/RETEST 8.5
N/A CHARGE CARGO BATTERIES 15.5
V1077 FUEL CELL _1 SERVICING 8.0
TOTAL 273.5
U. CABIN CLOSEOUT 1.0 HR
NOTE: No serial time was allotted durinE pad operations to close
the crew cabin prior to propellant loadinE.
V. HAZARDOUS SERVICING/SERVICE DISCONNECTS
WAD TITLE
8.0 HRS
HRS
S0024
T1401
N/A
PR
PR
S0009
N/A
$5009
SI005
PRE LAUNCH PROPELLANT LOAD 202.5
ET BLANKING PLATE REMOVAL 5.5
PAYLOAD DISCONNECT/ PLB CLOSEOUT/PLB DOORS CLOSE 7.0
R&R RJDA #2 & RETEST 9.5
R&R QD & RETEST OMS REG. LOCK UP TEST 8.0
ORDNANCE INSTALLATION 37.0
CARRIER PANEL INSTALLATION 37.0
ORBITER AFT CLOSEOUT 75.0
ET PURGES 12.0
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(Continued)
V. HAZARDOUS SERVICING/SERVICE DISCONNECTS (Continued)
The following operations were performed during this block of time
but were part of the original timelines.
N/A CARGO STANDALONE OPS 88.0
VII03 EMU INSTALLATION & TEST 16.0
V9002 SSME VALVE CYCLES/FRT'S 32.0
VI184 MMU FLIGHT LOAD 14.0
TOTAL 543.5
W. LAUNCH FROM STANDBY 2.0 HRS
WAD TITLE HRS
S0007 LAUNCH COUNTDOWN 121.5
TOTAL 121.5
NOTE: The length of countdown for the 51-L mission was much
longer due to several delays caused mainly by weather. The first
one was bad visibility at the transatlantic landing site (dust
storm in North Africa). Possible adverse weather at the launch
site then caused a 24 hour delay, and on the third attempt, high
cross winds caused a scrub at T-9 minutes. A normal countdown is
now scheduled for 56 hours.
-2]-
1.3 STS OPERATIONS ANALYSIS
(Continued)
POOR QuALrr_'
1.3.2 SUMMARY
The following summarizes the results of this timeline analysis.
These are:
, A comparision of the allocated 160-hour timelines (in
24 categories) of the actual time required to
complete all the tasks included under each of these
categories for the 51-1 flow (preceding list).
•
,
A chart showing the time allotted in the 160-hour
Turnaround Ground Operations Plan broken down into
serial and parallel operations. (Figure 3)
The 51-L As-Run Schedule with tasks included under
the different categories of the 160-hour turnaround
broken down into serial and parallel operations.
(Figure 4)
• A comparision of the 160- hour timelines vs the 51-L
operations, per 160-hour categories, showing both
serial and parallel operations• (Figure 5)
The analyses summarized on Figures 3 through 5 served to
highlight the operations timeline growth by procedural/hardware
areas. This enabled selection of high potential savings areas by
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(Continued)
This resulted ,in the identification of seven tentpoles that were
candidates for investigation for improvement by applying new
technology and five candidates for improvements by incorporating
operational efficiencies. When the Preliminary Issues Database
was queried and the operational issues matched with the
tentpoles, the following new technology candidates evolved:
A. Orbiter systems that could be redesigned to include fault
detection and anomaly resolution
B. Window Cavity Conditioning System (WCCS)
C. Window Polishing
D. TPS Inspection
E. Fuel Cell Operations
F. Ordnance
G. The paper system used to control the ground operations
The timeline improvements using existing technology and
operational efficiencies evolved the following candidates. Those
selected are considered representative and popped out of our
analyses eventhough they were not a targeted goal as explained
previously.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
SSME Repair Shop
Payload Bay Deconfiguration/Reconfiguration
Crew Cabin Air Recirculation System
Orbiter Weight & C.G. Determination
Payload Bay Cleaning
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1.4 TENTPOLE AND RELATED ISSUES ANALYSIS
S_ARY
The tentpole and related issue analysis uses the Operations
Analysis and Preliminary Issues Database to define the selected
efficiency technology study targets. Figure I is a "funnel
chart" which shows pictorially how the Ground Operations task was
managed. The scope of the Study was so broad, and the
information available so vast, it was necessary to quickly funnel
the information, using computerized methods, into pertinent
specific buckets (issues). Simultaneously, the Operations
Analysis was conducted using KSC data elements shown in the
figure. The resultant high-payoff operations issues were then
researched for potential technology to increase efficiencies as
shown in Figure 2.
KSC
DATA ELEMENTS
GROUND OPERATIONS TASK MANAGEMENT
Figure 1
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TECHNOLOGY AND EFFICIENCY CANDIDATES
The Operations Analysis surfaced five tentpoles (Figure 3) in the
.area "of "timeline improvements"; that is, efficiency items that
do not require new technology to implement. Because this type of
improvement is being vigorously pursued by NASA and the Shuttle
Processing Contractor with literally hundreds of people, we
directed our prime study effort to new technology. Nevertheless,
we have included several serendipitous items as timeline
improvement not related to new technology , but which need an
extra push.
The main thrust of our effort centered around tentpole activities
that could be made more efficient through the use of new
technology. Our Operations Analysis identified seven tentpoles
(A - G), Figure 3, which, when matched with related issues,
provided promising candidates for technology improvement.
Tentpoles A through E occur in the OPF. Tentpole F, Ordnance
Operations, occurs in the VAB and at the Pad. Ten,pole G,
Paperwork & Operational Requirements, occurs throughout the total
vehicle processing; in fact, throughout the entire life cycle.
The Tentpole Issue Summary, Figure 4 below, provides a matrix of
timeline improvement, ten,poles, and technology application
tentpoles versus the major issues, shifts of work, and technician
manhours. This provides a quick look at the scope of each
ten,pole selected for detailed investigation.
_Lrrs _ DNGRI
ISSU_S
Des_ _s. l,qaJ.n-..a_n. Cast (_ MHRS
X X X X 4_ 3_92 ./_
X X X _ i_
X X X X 12 _4
X X z z2s
X X ].s xu
X X X X 4B w_
X X X X 23 _o
X X 24 _4
X X _ ua
X X X 2x.s ./^
X X X X ./^ ./_
X X X ./^ NJA ./^
TENTPOLE ISSUE SUMMARY
Figure 4
-27-
1.4 TENTPOLE AND RELATED ISSUES ANALYSIS
(Continued)
TENTPOLES CONSIDERED, BUT NOT INCLUDED IN STUDY
There are four significant tentpoles that are not analyzed in
this study. They are SRB Processing, Facilities, Adverse
Weather, and Weather Forecasts.
SRB Processing
SRB processing is not addressed because of the intensive effort
being expended by others in this arena as a result of the
Challenger loss. This has not been a significant on-line
tentpole since it is primarily an off-line effort. However, from
an efficiency manhour and cost standpoint, there is substantial
improvement potential. Nevertheless, an efficiency study of
expendable vs recoverable, recoverable refurbishment at KSC, etc.
would be a superficial duplication of effort already underway.
Facilities:
While the subject of facilities was not addressed in Phase 1 of
the Study, they provide a significant contribution to the
"operational" portion of the overall life cycle costs for a
program. Facilities are one of the significant "tools" provided
to the workforce at the launch site. Initial facility costs may
be kept low by modifications to old facilities; however, any
inefficiencies forced on the operators is not a "one time thing".
It is repetitive in every flow for the entire life of the program
so even a relatively small item can become large from an LCC
standpoint.
The Shuttle program, for example, has had to modify available
facilities at KSC. Only recently has solid rocket booster
processing been moved from the VAB so that those hazardous
operating conditions do not have to be imposed on other VAB
located operations. Many of the Shuttle workers remain in
improvised office facilities (boxcars) located a considerable
distance from the VAB. Workers located in close proximity to
their work stations are happier and more productive than workers
that have to "check in" at one location and then go some distance
to get to their work station. Facilities involved with the
various operations at KSC are widely separated so any joint
operations requires that at least management personnel have to
travel between facilities.
Operationally efficient facilities, designed to provide the right
support capabilities at the right location for the processing
crews, must be provided if processing costs are to be lowered.
Adverse Weather
Modifications have already been made at the Launch Pad to
minimize effects of adverse weather. Literature searches were
made using the XTKB for advances made in weather control (i.e.,
silver iodide cloud seeding, etc. ), but to no avail. Further
potential does exist at this time for improvement in the area of
facility design for future vehicles. This should be considered
in follow-on study effort.
1.4 TENTPOLE AND RELATED ISSUES ANALYSIS
(Continued) •
Weather Forecasts
It has been suggested that weather forecasting should be used in
the processing scheduling to provide additional efficiency in
routine work schedules. No evidence has been found that current
weather forecast capability can improve current scheduling
techniques. This also applies to capability in the foreseeable
future. For example, the schedule of the launch of 51-i was
affected several times due to weather forecasts. The following
is a list of schedule changes and the reason for the changes.
Each of the weather forecasts is assessed for accuracy:
Tuesday, January 14, 1985 Launch date set for January 25
Wednesday, January 22
At 1330 hrs Launch slipped to January 26 due to dust forecast at
the TransAtlantic Landing site. Forecast was accurate.
Saturday, January 25
At 2200 hrs Launch slipped to January 27 due to possible adverse
weather at KSC. Forecast was inaccurate because weather at
previously scheduled T-0 was excellent.
Monday, January 27
1230 hrs Launch attempt was scrubbed with the count holding at
T-9 minutes due to crosswinds at the Secondary Landing Facility
being out of launch commit criteria. This condition was not
forecasted (inaccurate).
Tuesday, January 28,
1138 hrs 51-1 Launched even though the temperature had been below
freezing for several hours and the temperature was in the high
thirties at launch. The forecast for that morning was for
freezing temperatures, clear skies and light winds. This
forecast was accurate.
TENTPOLE ANALYSIS SUMMARY
The Tentpole Analysis Summary, presented below in tabular format,
is divided into two parts: Timeline Improvements Summary and
Technology Applications.
Timeline Improvements: The Summary presents a brief description
of each element evaluated for the Tentpole-Related Issues, Issue
Sources, Related Schedule Data, Todays Methods, Timeline
Improvements, Operational Evaluation, and Recommendations.
Technology Applications: The Summary presents a brief
description of each element evaluated for the Tentpole-Related
Issues, Issue Sources, Related Schedule Data, Todays Methods,
Technology Requirements, Cost Trades, and Recommendations.
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1.4.1 SSME PROCESSING (Tentpole I)
1.4.1.1 Summary
At the completion of the sixth flight of the shuttle the program
was declared to be operational. This would be all systems of the
orbiter including the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSME). Based
on the continuing technical issues and the resulting
modifications on the SSME's, the engines are still not fully
operational. To perform all of the required inspections,
repairs, and modifications with the engines installed in the
orbiter causes many operational problems.
Due to the limited space in the aft section of the orbiter, the
amount of work that can be accomplished at one time is very
restricted so any work on the engines precludes any other work to
be worked in parallel. Also work on the engines requires the
support of almost all of the orbiter systems which means that
work on these systems cannot be done at the same time. With the
limited access to the engines operations require more time to
complete.
To alleviate this situation, the present engine shop should be up
graded to provide space, equipment, and facilities to support
total engine maintenance and modification capability. Rocketdyne
has submitted a plan to accomplish this which would approximately
1.2 million dollars.
Much time could be saved if ready spare engines were provided so
that all maintenance and mod work could be completed off line.
Engines would be ready for installation as soon as a mission is
completed. Then only seria] flow time would be required in the
OPF for engine R&R and interface retest.
1.4.1.2 Related Issues
1. Operational status of the SSME's. SSME's were designed to be
used for I0 flights before they would require any maintenance.
So far no engine has been used for more than one flight
without some work being performed. Modifications are also
being incorporated to correct technical problems. The engines
will not be fully operational until the maintenance is reduced
and modifications completed.
2. Accessibility of the SSME when installed in the orbiter. The
aft section of the orbiter is a plumber's nightmare. So much
equipment is installed in a small volume that access is a
problem for working on any equipment. This also means that
only limited systems can be worked in parallel. Damage to
electrical connectors is a result of the close quarters and
people entering and leaving the area.
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(Continued)
,
.
Serial schedule time during OPF processing. Any engine
operation performed while installed on the vehicle requires
support of many of the Orbiter systems. This means most
engine work requires serial schedule time to complete.
Systems that are needed to support engine operations include:
EPD&C, GN&C, PV&D, HYD, OPS and INS. (Electrical Power
Distribution and Control, Guidance Navigation and Control,
Purge Vent and Drain, Hydraulics, Operations,
Instrumentation).
Cost of manhours required to inspect, maintain, and modify
SSME's. During processing of 51-L in the OPF, 47 shifts of.
work were used to service on the SSME's. This required 3792
technician manhours plus support of other systems, engineers,
QC and other support groups.
Following are some examples taken from the Issues database:
LD: < 506.00> Issue(s): LOGISTICS/SPARES :
Issue(s) cont,: : :
Issue Source: (ASAP > JAN. '85 ANNUALREPORT,P.37
Description:
CONCERNEIPRESSEDFORLACKOF SPARES
"NASASHOULDCONTINUETOOIVEHIOHPRIORITYTO ACQUISITIONOF SPAREPARTSANS
TO UPORADETHE RELIABILITY(PLANNEDLIFE)OF HARDWARE,ESPECIALLYITEMS
ASSOCIATEDWITHSPACESHUTTLEMAIHENOINE,'
ID: <3106,00> Issue(s): LOOISTICS/SPAEEH :
Issue(s}cont.: : :
IssueSource:(SHMEOSE REVIEW> 7166TEAMA4 PHESTO STS OSE REV BD
Description:
HARDWAREREVIEWSUMMARY
: NO NEW CRITICALSINGLEPOINTFAILURESWEREFOUND
$ STRUCTURALITEMSRELYON PROOFLOADVERIFICATIONFOR HAZARDELIMINATION
- OMI'SNEEDUPDATE
! PNEUMATICSYSTEMOSE DEPENDSON INTERFACEFILTERAND RELIEFVALVE/OAUGE
CALIBRATIONTO CONTROLCONTAMINATION/O_RPRKSHURIZATION
- OMI'HNEHDUPDATE
- NEW FILTERREQUIREDFORC70--908 FLO_ETER USE
! FLIOHTHARDWAREDAMAOEIS LIKELYD_ TO INADEQUATEACCEHHD_IWO
LRUOPEHATIONS
- A?O--6H3ENOINEHERVICEPLATFORM
- ATO-O885OPF HWIWOPLATFORMS
I HHMENOZZLETHEHMALPROTECTIONINHULATION(TPS}IS DAMAOEDHI HTO-OSH8
HORIZONTALINSTALLER
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1.4.1 SSME PROCESSING (Tentpole I)
(Continued)
1.4.1.3 Schedule History
Design goal for SSME's allowed 24.0 hours for propulsion system
scheduled maintenance (reference the 160 hour turnaround level II
schedule). During the 51-L precessing a total of 893.0 schedule
hours were expended. This included 581.0 hours with the engines
installed on the vehicle and 312.0 hours accomplished in the
engine shop (See Figure I for OPF work performed.) The shortest
processing flow to date was the 6I-B flow and 394.5 hours were
expended on engine work, all of which was done with the engines
installed on the orbiter.
I
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SCHEDULE
Figure 1
1.4.1.4 Current STS Methods
All engine inspections, most repairs and modifications are
accomplished with the engines installed on the orbiter. To gain
access to the engines the base heat shields must be removed.
Thompson rails are installed to remove and replace the high
pressure turbopumps and support must be provided by several
orbiter systems to position, power-up and test the engines. This
is very costly in both time and manpower and prevents other
activities being accomplished on the supporting systems while
engine operations are being performed. Engines are removed for
major repairs and modifications. Some of this work is performed
in the current engine shop but configuration of the shop prevents
many tasks. Problems include: I. Engine stands not designed
for total access to the engine 2. Shop is not a clean area 3.
Lighting is not adequate 4. Space is limited 5. No office space
is available 6. Access to area is not easily controlled.
The following is a list of procedures currently being used:
VlO01 -- SSME ELECTRICAL INTERFACE VERIFICATION
OBJECTIVE: Provide standard instructions to test all Engine
Interface Unit (EIU) and SSME controller copper paths after
engine installation, after electrical LRU replacement and
after engine hot firing.
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(Continued)
VIOl1 -- SSME DRYING AND FUNCTIONAL
OBJECTIVE: .01 - Perform post flight drying of High Pressure
Fuel Turbo Pump (HPFTP) and Main Combustion Chamber (MCC)
using heated GN2.
.02 - Perform internal/external inspection of major
SSME components post flight.
.03 -
working
flight.
Verify operational integrity of internal
parts of all turbopumps required after each
.04 - Verify operational integrity of hex fluid
systems.
.05 - Verify operational integrity of SSME HGM, LOX
and LH2 fluid systems. Interface leak checks post
installation.
.06 - Perform pneumatic checkout and leak checks and
routine module checkouts of the SSME's.
.07 - Verify operational
SSME/orbiter fluid and
following 10 engine starts.
integrity of all
electrical interfaces
VO043 -- SSME HEAT SHIELD REMOVAL
OBJECTIVE: Provide instructions for installation and/or
removal of SSME-mounted and orbiter-mounted heat shield
segments.
VSE02 -- SSME LRU (Line Replacable Unit) COMPONENT
REMOVAL/INSTALLATION HIGH PRESSURE OXIDIZER TURBOPUMP
OBJECTIVE: To provide procedures to remove SSME high
pressure oxidizer turbopump (LRU) in the OPF (hor.) and VAB,
PAD (vert.). SSME engine shop.
NOTE: (Under the new method this would be performed in the
engine shop.)
V5E06 -- SSME LRU COMPONENT REMOVAL/INSTALLATION HIGH
PRESSURE FUEL TURBOPUMP
OBJECTIVE: To provide procedures to remove or to install
space shuttle high pressure fuel turbo pump (LRU).
NOTE: (Under the new method this would be performed in the
engine shop.)
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(Continued)
1.4.1.5 Timeline Improvements
Rocketdyne has made a survey of the present engine shop and the
adjacent space in cell 6 in the VAB and has made a proposal to
modify and enlarge the present shop so that all but complete
engine overhauls can be done off the vehicle at KSC (see attached
sketches). They have submitted 16 Engineering Support Requests
(ESR's) to accomplish the modifications. Lockheed has estimated
the job to cost $1,213,092.
Estimated saving in the process time to change a High Pressure
Turbopump is approximately two days of overall time and four days
of serial time in the vehicle processing. This is based on the
following:
l. The as-run data shows the average time required to
change a high pressure turbopump, while the engine is
installed in the vehicle, is six days
2. To remove and replace an SSME requires two days
maximum
3. Pump removal and replacement in the shop with adequate
accessibility could be accomplished in 7-8 shifts
1.4.1.6 Operational Evaluation
The processing of the SSME's is rapidly becoming one of the long
tentpoles in vehicle flow. In the current environment this will
only get worse. Operation time on the vehicle is affected by
SSME processing and will be increasing due to additional
requirements. Flow time in the OPF will grow drastically. To
avoid this, and to improve later flows, improved capability of
the engine shop appears to be a must.
Savings will be 4 serial days in the orbiter processing flow for
a pump change and a cost savings of 2 days of shop time due to
improved in accessibility.
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(Continued)
1.4.1.7 Conclusions and Recommendations
CONCLUSIONS
Timeline improvements and cost savings can be immediately
realized in this area with modification to the engine shop.
Money spent to accomplish the mods will be repaid from savings in
the serial processing time reduction of each vehicle, and the
overall simplification in maintaining the SSME's.
RECOMMENDATIONS
I. Approve the 16 ESR's that have been submitted by Rocketdyne
and accomplish the work in time to support processing of the
second flow of each vehicle through the OPF after program
restart. Status: Cell 5 improvements have been approved at
$400K with a BOD of October 1987. $400K for FY-88 and $400K
for FY-89 are in the approval cycle.
2. Provide enough spare SSME's to support engine changeouts as
required for flight problems and modifications.
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1.4.2 AFD/PLB RECONFIGURATION (Tentpole 2)
Aft Flight Deck & Payload Bay Reconfiguration
1.4.2.1 Summary
To satisfy the Cargo Community and to attract more space business
for the Space Shuttle Program, as much flexibility as possible
has been designed into the payload bay/cargo interfaces. This
flexibility has caused the time required to reconfigure the
payload bay from one mission to the next flight, to become one of
the longest tentpoles in the Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF)
flow. A total of 37 shifts were required during the OPF
processing of 51-L to reconfigure and test the Aft Flight Deck
(AFD) and Payload Bay (PLB), plus 8 shifts to prepare for
installation of the cargo.
The original concept was to locate all cargo in a limited number
of positions in the payload. The center of gravity of the
vehicle would be adjusted without weights being added or
subtracted in the aft section. Due to growth of the vehicle
weight and its effect on the available weight for cargo, this
method was discarded and provisions were made to locate cargo to
allow for center of gravity (CG) adjustment. This also required
that provisions be made so electrical interfaces could be located
to support different locations of cargo.
The only feasible approach for the present orbiters would be to
provide a strongback that could be used to remove or install all
of the payload bay bridges and cargo fittings simultaneously.
With two strongbacks and an extra set of bridges available, the
configuration of the next mission could be established and ready
prior to the landing of the previous mission. This could reduce
time for this operation by 50 to 60%. Any other change would
require a complete redesign of the payload bay and very costly,
time consuming modifications.
A much more standard approach to the installation of cargo is
needed if the time is going to be reduced in reconfiguring the
payload from one mission to the next.
1.4.2.2 Related Issues
I. Time required on the vehicle to reconfigure the payload bay
2. Cost in manhours to support the reconfiguration operation
3. Design criteria that dictate the amount of work required to
reconfigure the payload
4. Final design of the payload bay and aft flight deck that
requires reconfiguration and retest between every flight
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(Continued)
Below are excerpts from the Preliminary Issue Data Base of papers
that have been prepared giving examples of findings from other
groups to support the recommendations for standardization and
simplification of cargo-to-vehicle interfaces.
ID: ( 500.00> Issue(s):COMMONALITY : INTERFACE
Issue(s}cont.: : :
IssueSource:<ASAP > JAN. '85ANNUALREPORT,P.38
Description:
REPORTRECOMMENDSTHATWHEREVERPOSSIBLETHERESHOULDBR AN INCRHASlNG
EFFORTTO PREPAREAND CARRYPAYLOADSINA STANBARDIZEDFASHION,
ID: < 714.00>
Issue(s)cont.:
IssueSource:<NSTS
Description:
" LOGISTICSYSTEM
COSTDRIVER
_: COHT/MANHOURS
> DRAFTDATED5/88,TABLEG-I
OPERATIONALCONCEPTS : SYSTEM
: REQUIREMENTS
PAYLOADACCOMMODATIONS
- MISSIONUNIQUEMODS
- IN-LINEFUNCTION
VERIFICATION
- ON-BOARDSERVICES
z MINIMIZEPAYLOAD
UNIQUEFEATURES
Z P/L TO BE AUTONOMOUS
FROMLAUNCHVEHICLE
$ P/L TESTINOOFF-LINE
PRIORTO LAUNCHVEHICLE
INTEGRATION
ID: (1725.00> Issue(s):ISOLATION : INTERFACE
Issue{s)cont.:SHCUR!TY : STANDARDS :
IssueSource:<AFSC/NSIA > (P,O74)COSTREDI CREDWORKSHOP9/18/86
Description:
"TOREDUCEPAYLOADTO VEHICLEINTERFACESTO THE ABSOLVEMINIMUM,PAYLOADSWILL
PROBABLYBE ENCAPSULATBDINSOMEHINDOF MODULEAT AN OFFLINBFACILITY.THE
MODULEWILLTHHNBE INSTALLEDON THB LAUNCHVEHICLE.DEPENDINOON VSHICLECON-
FIOURATION,THE MODULESHELLMAY FUNCTIONAS THEPAYLOADFAIRINOASON CURRENT
EXPENDABLEVEHICLES.ON VEHICLESWITHINTEGRALPAYLOADBAYS,THE MODULEMIGHT
PERFORMA THERMALSHIELDINOFUNCTIONAND SERVBASCLEANLINESSPROTECTION,LIHB
THE CURRENTPAM HEATSHIELDS,AS WELLAS ENSURESECURITY.PROVISIONSFORMOUNT-
INC THE MODULETO THE VEHICLEMUSTBE STANDARDIZEDASSUMINONLY POWERAND AIR
CONDITIONINGARE PROVIDEDAS BASICSTANDARDSERVICES.THISIS TO AVOIDTHE
CURRENTPROBLEMSOF RHCONFIGURINGTHE PAYLOAD/VEHICLEINTHRFACEH.PAYLOAD
CONTROLAWP DATALINESMUSTBE INDEPENDENTOF LAUNCHVEHICLEINTERFACESOTHER
THANA SIMPLBANTENNACONNBCTION,IFREQUIRED.SECURITYWILLBE ENHANCEDBY
SUCHA SYSTEMBECAUSEALL ENCAPSULATEDPAYLOADSHAVESIMILARAPPBARANCHAND
HANDLINC.
ORIGINAL PAGE iS
OF POOR QUALITY
1.4.2 AFD/PLB RECONFIGURATION
(Continued)
(Tentpole 2)
_f _OR QUAL/TY
ID: <I_ZS.00> Issue(s}:INTERFACE : COSTIMAWHOURS
Issue{sI cont,:STANDARDS : MODULARIZATION :
IssueSource:<AFSC/NSIA > (P,O75)COST| CREDWORKSHOP9/18/88
Description:
POTENTIALAREASOF PAYLOADPROCESSINOCOSTREDUCTIONS:
ACTION:PROVIDEELECTRICALi FLUIDINTERFACEPLATES,
COMMENT:MINIMIZETHE NUMBEROF INTERFACECONNECTORSTO HE HANDLED:z LESS
CHANCEOF DAMAGE S REDUCTIONINPROCESSINQCOSTS.
ACTION:STANDARDIZESPACECRAFTHARDWARE. ¢INCORPORATRSTANDARDINTER-
FACEFORMATTINOINTOUPPERSTAGEOR LAUNCHVEHICLE, I MODULARIZRFOR
GROWTHAND REDUCINGCOST, s REDUCESINTRGHATIONCOSTS.
ID: <IT31,O0> l_sue(_):D_SIONCRITERIA : MODULARIZATIOW
Is_ue{sJcont.:INTERFACE : STANDARDS :COST/MANHOURS
IssueSource:<AFSC/NSIA > (P.O?I)COSTi CRRDWORKSHOP9/18/88
Description:
---PAYLOADCOMMUNITIRECOMMENDATIONS---
DEVELOPMENTOF DESIGNSTANDARDS
PAYLOADENCAPSULATION
PROVISIONOF ON ORBITSERVICING
AND REPAIR
! USEOF FEWER'UNIQUE'COMPONENTS
APPLICATIONOF NEW AND INNOVATIVE
DHSIGNAND MANUFACTURINGCONCEPTS
AND TECHNOLOGIES.
DRSIONFORNAIrMUMAUTONOMY
SIMPLERINTERFACES
OREATERPERFORMANCEMARGINS
DESIGNPERFOHMAWCEMARGINS
ALL LAUNCHVEHICLESCONTAINEDIN AN
ARCHITECTURE,
IIIIIl_IIlllllllIlllIllllll$11111111[lll¢$11111111¢lllllll¢IIl¢lil¢lllIllllllll
ID: <I739,00> l_ue{_}:PLANNING : INTEGRATION
IssueIs} cont.:INTERFACE : STANDARDS : DESIOWCRITERIA
IssueHource:<AFSC/HSIA > (P.IZIJCOSTRED & CREDWORKSHOP9/[8/8_
Description:
......SISPAYLOADINTEGRATION/INTERFACE......
ESTABLISHCOMMONORBITER/PAYLOADINTERFACES
+ STANDARDIZELECTRICALAND ATTACHPOINTFITTINOS/DEVICES
+ POWERAND CONTROLWIRINGON STARBOARDAND PORTSIDESOF THE CARO0BAY
+ ATTEMPTTOMINIMIZEOR BLIMINATEACTIVEHBATINOREJECTIONR_QUIREMENTS
WHILEINTHE PAYLOADBAY
+ DESIGNPAYLOADSTOFUNCTIONIN NODAL ORBITERENVIRONMENT(AVOIDS
SPECIALATTITUDEAND THERMALCONSTRAINTS)
AUTONOMOUSIS PAYLOADS
+ STANDARDIZETT_CPACKAGESON ALLSPACECRAFTWITHACTIVEDOWNLINK
+ ORBITER/PAYLOADCOMMUNICATIONE_UIPMENTSHOULDBESEGREGATED
+ SEPARATECOMPUTERFOR PAYLOADINTERFACE
+ SELF-CONTAINEDPOWERAND COOLINOCAPABILITYFOR PAYLOADS
CARGOINTEGRATION
+ I_CREASEDUSEOF TELECONS(SECUREi NON-SECURE)FOR LA MEETINGS
+ ONE LAUNCHSUPPORTINTEGRATIONCONTRACTOR
÷ EARLYJSC/PAYLOADCONTACT
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ORIGINAL PAGE rS
OF POOR QUALrT'Y
[D: <]788,00> Issue(s): INTERFACE : STANDARDS
Issue(s} cont.: MISSION : REQUIREMENTS :
Issue Source: (AFSC/NSIA > (P.3Oi)COSTRED& CBBDWOBKHHOP9/18/86
Description:
ItIOPHHATION8I HUPPOHTFOE NEXTGENERATIONSTStt= (SAWAYA/FEASTHE/ETALE
....KENNEDYSPACECHNTEEOUIDANCR....(PAYLOADACCOMMODATION)
s ACCOMMODATIONSFOH PAYLOADS/CAROOHSHALLBE DEHIONHDFOB EASEOF INSTALLA-
TION,REMOVAL,AND INTEHFACEVERIFICATION.
t SIMPLIFY,MINIMIZE,AND STANDAHDIZEINTERFACEHgQUIHEMENTSBETWEENPAYLOADS
/CAEOO8AND LAUNCHVEHICLHH.
z SIMPLIFYMISSION-TO-MISSIONCABO0BAY RECONF[OUBATIONREQUIREMENTS.
n=l_z=z=:1:ns=I=zzz**s:=t_s_=ztztttz:zsz:z:nt_z=z.zz=z===t_==z=_,z=nt_sn_
ID: (1790.00) [uue(J):DESIGNCRrTEHIA : MISSION
Issue(s)cont.:STANDARDS : INTERFACE : TRA[NINO/CERTIF
IsadeSource:(AFHC/NSIA > (P.3OS)COHTBED _ CERD WORKSHOP9/18/8H
Description:
=I=OPEEITIONSI SUPPORTFOENEXTGENERATIONSTSI== (SAWAYA/FEAHTEB/ETAL)
.....JOHNSONSPACECENTERGUIDANCE....
= SPACECRAFTBHSIONHESHALLBE PROVIDEDSTANDARDHAEDWAHEINT_HFACEDEFINI-
TIONANDSTD OPERATIONSPROCEDURESKAELYINTHE SPACECRAFTDESlONCYCLE.
I OPERATIONSOBBITSSHALLHH STANDARD--INCLINATIONANDATTITUDE.
! FLIOHTPHASHSSHALLBE STANDARD:ASCENT/PROXIMITYOPERATIONS/DEPLOYMENT/
SPACECRAFTHANDLING-EMS/SPACHCRAFTSEPARATION/THERMALPBOFILES/BRNDHZVOUS/
ENTRY.
z SPACECRAFTDEPLOYMENTSYSTEMSAND PROCEDURESHALLBE STANDARD.
THE PAYLOADMISSIONREQUIREMENTSDOCUMENTATIONPROCESSSHALLBE STANDARD.
! PAYLOADHARDWAREI OPS INTHRFACEDESIONREQUIREMENTSSHALLBE STANDARD-POWER,
COOLINO,COMMAND,DATA,INTEORATIONHARDWARE,RMH,OOCKINOMECHANISMS,CRHW
INTERFACES.
HPACHCEAFTSHHVICINOFUNCTIONS,INTHEFACEH,I PROCEDURESHALLHE STANDARD.
FLIOHTCONTROLCHNTHRFLIOHTEHCONF[OURAT[ON:
+ DATAREQUIREMENTSHALLBEMINIMUMAND STANDARD,+ OENHRATION| VERIFI-
CATIONPROCEHSSHALLHH STANDARD.
FLIOHTAND OEOUNDCREWTRAININOAND SIMULATION:
+ BAHHDUPONSTD FLIOHTPROFILES/PHASES.+ SIMULATIONDATASHALLBE MINI-
MUM i STANDARD.+ BASEDUPONSTDSPACECRAFTINTERFACES| OPS PROCEDURES.
NECESSARYCABO0MIX FLEXIBILITYSHALLBE INDUCEDBY STD F/L INTERFACES,OPS
PROCEDURES,AND STANDARDACCOMMODATIONALLOCATION.
ID: (4111.00> luue(_):DESIGNCHITEEIA : INTERFACE
lasue(s)cont.:STANDARDS : :
I_sueSource:(KSCO0-MPO > NOI WILEY -- OCT '85
Description:
.................OHOLQIDTESTINGAND CHECKOUTPHILOSOPHIES......................
DESIONFORNO DEHERVICINODUB[NOT_NAROUND.
I ACCOMMODATIONSFOE PAYLOADSICAROOSSHALLBE DESIONRDFOB EASEOF
REMOVAL,AND INTERFACEVERIFICATION.
SIMPLIFY,MINIMIZE,AND STANDARDIZEINTERFACHREQUIEEMHNT8BETWEHNPAYLOADS/
CAHOOSAND LAUNCHVKHICLHS.
SIMPLIFYMISSIONTO MISSIONCABO0HAYEHCOHFIOUEATIONREQUIREMENTS,
+ PROVIDEVARIOUSATTACHMHNTLOCATIONS. + PROVIDHMULTIPLEINT_EFACH
+ FLYSCABWT INPANeLS/CABLES/FLUID PANELH/CONNHCTIONLOCATIONS.
CONNECTIONSi ATTACHFITTINOSTO REDUCETURNAROUNDEECONFIOUBATIONEEQ.
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1.4.2.3 Schedule History
For a mission that would require cargo to be installed in the
orbiter while at the PAD, the Level II 160 hour turnaround design
goal allowed a total of 32 hours to remove the down cargo and
remove and install the mission unique payload accommodation
equipment during OPF operations. Nine hours were alloted at the
PAD to install and perform a launch readiness verification test.
Actual schedule hours used to support the 51-L flow was 454.4
hours in the OPF and 273.5 hours at the PAD. Payload
installation into the PCR was predicted to take 13.0 hours and
the actual time used for 5]-L was 174.0 hours. See Figure I.
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SCHEDULE
Figure 1
1.4.2.4 Current STS Methods
Nondeployable payloads are retained by passive retention devices,
whereas, deployable payloads are secured by motor driven, active
retention devices.
Payloads are secured in the orbiter payload bay by means of the
payload retention system or are equipped with their own unique
retention systems.
The orbiter payload retention system provides three-axis support
for up to five payloads per flight. After the initial orbiter
development flights, the payload bay was modified to accommodate
attach fittings for five payloads.
The payload retention mechanisms secure the payloads during all
mission phases and provide for installation and removal of the
payloads when the orbiter is either horizontal or vertical.
Attachment points in the payload bay are in 9.9-centimeter
(3.933-inch) increments along the left- and right-side longerons
and along the bottom centerline of the bay. Of the potential 172
attach points on the longerons, 45 are unavailable because of the
proximity of spacecraft hardware. The remaining 127 may be used
for carrier/payload attachment; of these, 111 may be used for
deployable payloads. Along the centerline keel, 104 attach
points are available, any of which may be used for payloads.
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There are 13 longeron bridges per side and 12 keel bridges
available per flight. Only the bridges required for a particular
flight are flown. The bridges are not interchangeable because of
main frame spacing, varying load capability, and subframe
attachments.
The longeron bridge fittings are attached to the payload bay
frame at the longeron level and at the side of the bay. Keel
bridge fittings are attached to the payload bay frame at the
bottom of the payload bay.
The payload bay trunnions are the interfacing portion of the
payload with the orbiter retention system. The trunnions that
interface with the longeron are 8.2 centimeters (3.25 inches) in
diameter and 17.78 or 22.22 centimeters (7 or 8.75 inches) long,
depending upon where they are positioned along the payload bay.
The keel trunnions are 7.62 centimeters (3 inches) in diameter
and vary in length from 10.16 to 29.21 centimeters (4 to 11.5
inches), depending upon where they fit in the payload bay.
The orbiter/payload attachments are the trunnion/bearing/journal
type. The longeron and keel attach fitting have a split,
self-aligning bearing for nonrelease-type payloads in which the
hinged half is bolted closed. For on-orbit deployment and
retrieval payloads, the hinged half fitting releases or secures
the payload latches that are driven by dual redundant electrical
motors.
Payload guides and scuff plates are used to assist in deploying
and berthing payloads in the payload bay. The payload is
constrained in the X direction by guides and in the Y direction
by scuff plates. The guides are mounted to the inboard side of
the payload latches and interface with the payload trunnions and
scuff plates. The scuff plates are attached to the payload
trunnions and interface with the payload guides.
The guides are V shaped with the forward part of the V being 5.08
centimeters (2 inches) taller than the aft part. This difference
enables the operator monitoring the berthing or deployment
operations through the aft bulkhead TV cameras to better
determine when the payload trunnion has entered the guide. The
top of the forward portion of the guide is 60.96 centimeters (24
inches) above the centerline of the payload trunnion when it is
all the way down in the guide. The top of the guide has a
22.86-centimeter (9-inch) opening. These guides are mounted to
the 20.32-centimeter (8-inch) guides that are a part of the
longeron payload retention latches.
The payload scuff plates are mounted to the payload trunnions or
the payload structure. There are normally three or four longeron
latches and a keel latch for on-orbit deployment and retrieval of
payloads. These latches are controlled by dual redundant
electric motors with either or both motors releasing or latching
the mechanism. The operating time of the latch is four seconds
with both motors operating or eight seconds with one motor
operating.
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The latch/release switches on the aft flight deck display and
control panel station control the latches. Each longeron latch
has two microswitches sensing the ready-to-latch condition. Only
one is required'to control the ready-to-latch talkback indicator
on the aft flight deck display and control panel station. Each
longeron latch also has two microswitches to indicate latch and
two to indicate release. Only one of each is required to control
the latch or release talkback indicator on the aft flight deck
display and control panel station.
The keel latch also has two microswitches that sense when the
keel latch is closed withe the trunnion in it. Only one of the
switches is required to operate the talkback indicator on the aft
flight deck display and control panel station. The keel latch
also has two microswitches that verify if the latch is closed or
open, with only one required to control the talkback indicator on
the aft flight station display and control panel station.
It is noted that the keel latch centers the payload in the
payload bay; therefore the keel latch must be closed before the
longeron latch is closed. The keel latch can float plus or minus
6.9 centimeters (plus or minus 2.78 inches) in the X direction.
This flexibility requires that the electrical interfaces also
have the option of location in the vicinity of the mechanical
attach fittings. This is done by providing a Standard Mission
Cable Harness (SMCH) that plugs into one of two interface panels
on either side of the orbiter, then routed to appropriate bay
where a Standard Interface Panel (SIP) is installed. This SIP
provides pass-through connectors and the cargo interface cable is
connected to the other side. In some cases the cargo requires a
special panel which must be installed. The Inertial Upper Stage
(IUS) is a cargo that requires a special panel. This operation
is time consuming and requires a great deal of manpower because
all the panels must be removed and reinstalled; the SMCH
tie-wraps must be cut loose, repositioned and retied; and
retested.
Depending on the power requirements of the cargo, the fourth
Power Reactant Storage and Distribution (PRSD) tank set is
installed or removed from the payload bay. If the cargo requires
a lot of power, then more reactant propellants are needed for the
mission and tank set 4 is installed. To save weight on missions
not requiring as much power to the cargo, the tank set is
removed. This is both time consuming and labor intensive.
The requirements for fluid services to a cargo can also change
from one cargo to the next. Again providing this service to the
cargo community greatly effects the processing time and cost of
preparing the vehicle for launch.
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1.4.2.5 Timeline Improvements
A major redesign of the payload bay would be required to change
the present orbiters to a system that would accept only standard
cargos. The only minor improvements that could be made to reduce
the processing time would be to:
I , Provide spare payload accommodation equipment so that all
required parts could be adjusted and kitted prior to the
landing of the previous mission.
, Design and build ground support equipment that would allow
all bridges and fittings to be installed at the same time.
, Control the frequency of reconfiguration by assigning
similar cargos to successive flights of the same orbiter.
To enhance the ground operations of future programs,
standardization of the cargo must be one of the design criteria.
Requirements imposed on cargo should include the following:
]) All cargo interfaces, both electrical and mechanical, should
be standardized,
2) Power supplied from the vehicle and instrumentation through
the vehicle should be kept to a minimum,
3) Containerized cargo would provide the following advantages:
A. contamination control
B. better security
C. reduce ground transportation problems
D. fixed and standard interfaces.
1.4.2.6 Operational Evaluation
If all the present problems with the orbiter are solved (or even
reduced), the payload bay reconfiguration and cargo installation
would become the long tentpole. A very costly redesign and
modification of the payload bay would be required to completely
solve this problem. Providing the strongback and the spare
bridges and fittings should reduce the time required for payload
bay reconfiguration by 50 to 60%. Improvements should be made in
the initial design of the next generation of Space Transportation
Vehicles so that it will accept standard cargo with a minimum of
interfaces and services required. This could reduce the
processing time and cost of preparing a vehicle for launch.
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1.4.2.7 Conclusions and Recommendations
Based on the extent of redesign and modification required to
change the present orbiters _o accept standard cargo, and the
cost to change cargos now designed and built, it is not feasible
to change any flight hardware. Future cargos could be restricted
in their requirements to improve ground operations.
ST__%S
The area of highest payback potential would be to provide ground
support equipment that could reconfigure all payload fittings at
the same time. This would still be labor intensive, but could be
a big saving to the processing time for each flow.
FUTURE VEHICLES
Make the design criteria for standardized cargo interfaces a
primary requirement for the next generation of vehicles. Extra
cost during the design and build phases of the vehicle would have
favorable paybacks for the duration of the operational phase of
the program.
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1.4.3.1 Summary
Accessibility of the filters in the crew module cabin air
recirculation system is very poor. Little thought was given in
the design phase to the operation and maintainability of the
system. After every flight the debris screens and filters are
removed, pictures taken and samples collected from the avionics
bays, cabin fan/avionics bays and Internal Measurement Unit (IMU)
screen. In each case, equipment must be removed to access the
screens and filters. Since the fans must be off during this
operation, power must be removed from the vehicle and no
troubleshooting can be accomplished on any other Orbiter system.
After all the hardware is reinstalled, all electronic boxes that
were removed must be retested.
Present operation is to power the vehicle to support safing and
deservicing activities then power down as soon as possible to
clean the screens and filters. If processing of the vehicle
requires more than two months to finish, then this operation must
be repeated. Approximately 80% of the lint collected to date has
been blue lint; the same shade as the blue astronauts suits.
A redesign of the system could provide accessibility to the
screens and filters and reduce the time required for this
operation. Also if better control of contamination in the crew
cabin was maintained the requirement for this operation could be
reduced.
1.4.3.2 Related Issues
I. Very poor accessibility to debris screens and filters. It
would appear that no thought was given to accessibility in the
initial design of the crew cabin.
2. Maintainability was not considered during the initial design.
3. On line schedule time serial to other operations. Other
systems must be shut down because power must be removed any
time cooling is off in the cabin. This makes this operation
serial to almost all orbiter electrical testing.
4. Contamination control procedures in crew module.
Contamination control was not a factor in the original design
of the crew module which has resulted in quicker build up of
lint and dust on the filters.
5. Retest of removed and replaced parts. Retest of the
electrical boxes that have to be removed to gain access to the
screens and filters adds time to the overall schedule.
-50-
1.4.3 CABIN AIR RECIRCULATION SYSTEM (Tentpole 3)
(Continued)
1.4.3.3 Schedule History
A total of 24 hours were allotted in the 160- hour turnaround for
all scheduled maintenance on the orbiter. During the 5I-L flow,
V6018, Cabin Air Recirculation Inspection and Maintenance,
required 120 hours to complete. See Figure 1. Of this time 24
hrs. were performed with power off the vehicle and the remainder
of the time with power on. The preferred method to perform this
operation is to conduct all of the operations with the power
removed. If time is not available for this the procedure may be
accomplished by working around other activities in the crew
module. This method is very hard to track and presents the shop
many problems in maintaining records and supporting with manpower
at the proper time.
1.4.3.4
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51-L OPF PROCESSING
Figure I
Today's Methods
-- CABIN AIR RECIRCULATION INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE
OBJECTIVE: To perform routine maintenance on the cabin
fan, IMU and avionics bay 1, 2, 3 debris screens. In
addition, the condensing heat exchanger will be inspected
for corrosion and biological growth. Water samples will
also be obtained from the condensing heat exchanger and
analyzed for biological growth. Air cooled avionics will
be inspected for cleanliness and vacuum cleaned as
required.
OPERATIONS: To gain access to the debris screens and
filters, close out panels must be removed. In some cases
electronic boxes must also be removed. After the access
is available, photos are taken of the screens and
filters. If any lint or debris is present it is
collected, labeled and sent to Johnson Space Center
(JSC). The area is vacuumed, close out photos are taken
and the panels are reinstalled.
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1.4.3.4 Today's Methods (Continued)
This operation is repeated for the following equipment:
I. Avionics Bay 1,2,&3 inspection and cleaning
2. Cabin Fan/Avionics Bay 1,2,&3 debris screen
inspection and cleaning
3. IMU screen inspection and cleaning
4. Condensing Heat Exchanger inspection
5. Flight Deck Air Cooled Avionics inspection and
cleaning
1.4.3.5 Timeline Improvements
Two improvements can be made that would reduce the amount of time
that is required to support this operation. The first would be
to redesign the air recirculation system so that the screens and
filters are accessible without removing panels and equipment
boxes. If spare screens and filters were made available, the
operation on the vehicle could be limited to a simple change out
of the screens and filters. The photo's (if still required) and
cleaning could be accomplished off line in the shop.
The second improvement would be to change the fabric of the
astronaut's suits to a lint-free material or require that they
change into cleanroom garments before entering the crew cabin.
1.4.3.6 Operational Evaluation
With improved accessibility to the screens and filters and' the
availability of spare hardware, the time required to complete
this operation should be reduced to approximately 4 hours from 36
hours.
Requirements could also be reduced so the system would not have
to be inspected after every flight. This would be acceptable if
lint could be diminished so the build-up on the screens and
filters would not restrict the air flow cooling the electronic
equipment. This operation could be performed on every fifth
flight or less.
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1.4.3.7 Conclusions and Recommendations
CONCLUSIONS
There are two factors that affect the requirement and length of
operation. First is the amount of lint and dust that collects in
the crew module to clog the screens and filters. The majority of
this contamination (approximately 80%) is being generated by the
fabric used to make the astronaut's jump suits. Secondly, design
of the system adds time to the operation by installing the debris
screens and filters behind other equipment that makes
accessibility very poor.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Redesign the air recirculation system to provide better access to
debris screens and fi]ters. The modification would have to be
installed during a block mod period on each orbiter.
Change
free.
the material of the astronaut's suits so they are lint
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1.4.4.1 Summary
A weight log is maintained for every orbiter to account for all
changes to the vehicle during processing in the Orbiter
Processing Facility (OPF). Just prior to rollout to the Vehicle
Assembly Building (VAB), it is weighed to verify accuracy of the
log; requiring 4 to 8 hours of serial time. The actual
weighings will be discontinued when the data compares favorably
with the log book totals. To date these have not compared, so
weighings have continued.
Weighing is presently done in the OPF using portable scales.
With the limited clearance between the OPF work stands and the
orbiter, many observers are required any time the orbiter is
moved. This causes the weighing operation to be costly and adds
serial time to the processing flow.
A better method must be developed in maintaining the weight log
so this operation can be eliminated. If the weight log is tied
to the new paper control system, the computer could maintain the
log more accurately. Until this is accomplished, load cells
could be designed into the OPF jack stands so a separate
operation would not be required.
1.4.4.2 Related Issues
I. Serial time to accomplish task. Four to eight hours are
required to complete this task and it is serial to rollout of
the Orbiter from the OPF.
2. Manpower required to support the operation. Sixteen
technicians are required as observers for the jacking and
leveling operation.
3. Ground support equipment design (not including load cells in
OPF jack stands). If load cells were incorporated in the OPF
jack stands, the weight could be obtained any time the orbiter
was in the proper attitude.
4. Inadequate method of maintaining a weight log. Current
methods to maintain the weight log do not have adequate
controls to track all equipment and hardware removed and
installed on the vehicle.
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1.4.4.3 Related Schedule History
The Level II design goal for the close out and preps to transfer
the orbiter allowed I0 hours to accomplish all work. 51-L
required a total of 359.5 schedule hours of which 8.0 hours of
serial time were used for the jacking and weighing operation.
See Figure I.
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51-L OPF PROCESSING
Figure I
Current STS Method
-- Orbiter weight and center of gravity determination
using platform scales and OPF platform lifting system
OBJECTIVE: This Operations and Maintenance Instruction
(OMI) will configure and perform a three point orbiter
weighing utilizing model A70-0544 electronic portable
platform aircraft weighing system. The orbiter will have
been previously supported on the fwd and aft body jacks
with orbiter facility fluid and electric lines
disconnected.
OPERATIONS: As soon as the orbiter is closed out and
ready to be rolled over to the VAB, it is transferred
from the OPF jacks to the aft jack set. The portable
scales are then placed on the OPF jacks and the vehicle
raised to the weighing position. Since the orbiter is
still in the confines of the OPF work stands, 16
observers must be used every time the vehicle is raised
or lowered.
A weight log is maintained, but there are so many
modifications and equipment changes to the vehicles that
it is impossible with the current paper system to track
the weight accurately.
At the present time there is no way at KSC to calibrate
the portable scales. The normal way to test them has
been to ship them back to the west coast. This has
normally resulted in some kind of damage to the scales in
transit and has been a real problem. A request has been
submitted to provide a 20,000 pound weight set used to
calibrate the scales but has not been made available yet.
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1.4.4.5 Timeline Improvements
This operation could be completely eliminated once a method for
maintaining the weight log is proven. Since there is an effort
under way to track and close out requirements by bar codes and
computers, the weight data could be added to the system and have
the computer maintain the log.
Until the computer log system can be verified there are two
things that could be done to reduce the cost and time to support
this operation. The first would be to provide the test weight so
that the scales could be maintained locally. Secondly if there
is a chance the computer aided log will not be available soon,
load cells could be designed into the OPF jacks. This would
reduce the time required during this serial operation.
1.4.4.6 Operational Evaluation
Elimination of the weighing operation completely is the preferred
answer to this tentpole. It has been the experience of both the
missile and aircraft industries that as the program matures that
weight logs are adequate for any data required for mission
planning. This method would by far have the highest payback over
the remainder of the program.
Both of the other proposals would only be recommended as stop gap
measures until the computer log is total operational. Providing
the test weight would be less costly than installing load cells
in the jack stands, but would still save the overall program time
and money.
1.4.4.7 Conclusions and Recommendations
Insure that provisions are made to include the weight data in the
new computer-controlled paper close out system now being
implemented for Operational Maintenance Requirements and
Specifications Document (ORMSD) requirements satisfaction. To
fill in the gap until the computer log system is verified, the
test weight should be provided.
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1.4.5.1 Summary
Design criteria for the Space Shuttle was to make the operations
as much like an. airline as possible. This called for no special
cleanliness requirements. All facilities were to be "Good Shop
Practice" only. The first thing that happened when the first
orbiter arrived at KSC was to build a crude tent around the crew
ingress hatch to prevent dirt from entering the crew module.
Over the life of the Shuttle Program the requirements for
contamination control have become more demanding. The cargo
community has imposed some very tight requirements on the payload
bay. Design of the Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF) did not
provide for any contamination control, Some movable curtains
have been installed on the work platforms and control is
maintained on people allowed into the area.
With the current requirements and facilities, several shifts
(3-I/2 during 51-L processing) are required to clean and inspect
the payload bay prior to cargo installation in the vehicle.
If the operational timeline is to be trimmed, one of three things
must be done. The first is to modify the OPF to the standards of
a clean room. Another approach would be to require cargo to be
designed to accept the current conditions; or the cargo could be
containerized, providing its own controlled environment.
1.4.5.2 Related Issues
I , Prior to installing cargo the payload bay must inspected and
cleaned. Cleaning is performed on every mission and is
requiring an average of 3-1/2 shifts per flight.
, Payload bay is closed out during cleaning. Since people and
activities generate contamination, all activities must be
complete and all personnel except the inspectors must be out
of the payload bay.
, Requirements of some payloads are very demanding on
contamination control. After a blackbox failed on the second
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) while at the Pad a
decision was made to to return the Spacecraft to the Vertical
Processing Facility (VPF) so it could be cleaned while the
box was being replaced. One DOD spacecraft would like to
have a cover installed on it while in the Payload Changeout
Room (PCR) and Payload Bay (with doors open) to protect it
from contamination.
. Many manhours are spent on cleaning. 144 technician hours
are required to support the cleaning operation.
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Below are some examples extracted from the Issues database:
¢_¢¢¢_¢zct¢¢¢¢¢:¢¢¢¢¢¢lcx¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢s:¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢s¢¢:1¢¢¢z¢¢¢¢:¢¢z¢¢¢
ID: (1730,00) Issue(s):MAINTAINABILITY : ACCESSABILITY
Issue(s}cont.:MODULARIZATION : REQUIREMENTS :
IssueSource:(ASFC/NSIA > (P.OTS)COSTRED i CEEDWORKSHOP9/18/86
Description:
POTENTIALAREASOF PAYLOAOPROCESSINOCOSTREDUCTIONS:
ACTION:DESIONFOR MAINTAINABILITY.
COMMHNT: z PLACHCRITICALOR LOW MEAN-T[MH-BETWEKN-FAILURE9COMPONENTSIN
ACCESSIBLEAREAS- DO MOT REQUIRE"MAJORSUROEEY"TOREMOVEAND
REPLACEA COMPONENT, tBUILDINNODULARFASHION.
ACTION:ESTABLISHCLEANLINEHSRERUIREMENTE.
COMMENT:ENCAPSULATEOR USE BAOSAND LOCALPUROESWHENEVHRPOSSIBLETO
REDUCEDEMANDSON FACILITIES,
¢s:¢s::I¢:¢z:x:z:I:s:z_z¢::_::z¢zls¢z¢z:z:s::¢_:ssz¢l:t¢z:zstls:s:z::sz¢¢sz:Ixl
LD: <1847.00> Isgue(6):DESIGN :
Issue(s}cont,: : :
IssueSource:<NB-PBOMOD LIST> (POST51-LPRELIM,MOD LISTINO}
Description:
DESIONBNOINEERINO-- JIM PHILLIPS
STUDY/ESR/MOD
'PCRCEILING - PAD A: NEEDTO REPLACETHE PERFORATEDPANELSWITHSOLID
ONESAND RTV IN PLACE,TO KEEPDEBRISFROMABOVETHECEILINOFALLINOONTO
THE PAYLOADS.(30/6)"
ID: (Zl4O,OO) _s_ue(_):DRSION :
Issue(s)cont.: : :
IssueSource:<NR-PHOMOD LIST ) (POST51-LPRELIM.MOD LISTING)
Description:
PCR -- ROWLANNORRIS
STUDY/KSR/MOD
'IMPROVECONTAMINATIONPREVENTIONOF PAYLOADCHANOEOUTROOM,E.Q.,SIDE i DOORS
B_O PROOFING{RAINENTRY). {1/1}
LD: <2445.00> Issue{s):MAINTAINABILITY :
Issue{s)cont.: : :
IssueSource:(DERTN FLT MODS> I6-JUN-86
Description:
CATEOORY3 (DESIRABLE)
'PCEPGHMWHITEPAINTPADSA i H : THE EXISTINGEPOXYPAINTCHIPSAND
CONTAMINATESTHE PCR AND PAYLOADS.{19/13}'
llStll_lllllll_ll111$11;lll;Itl;lllll$111tl_l{l¢l;l¢l;l¢Itl¢lll¢l_lll¢l;lil¢lll
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1.4.5.3 Related Schedule History
Since there was no requirement for contamination control in the
original design criteria, no.time was allotted in the 160 hours
turnaround for this activity. For the 51-L OPF processing 27.5
hours were spent in cleaning and inspecting the payload bay. See
Figure 'I. During this time other operations in the payload bay
were restricted. The same amount of time was used on the 61-B
flow for cleaning and the cargo was two PAM's, which are the
simplest cargo.
* lllllilll lllllllllillll
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51-L OPF PROCESSING
Figure 1
1.4.5.4 Current STS Methods and Timeline Improvements
CURRENT STS METHODS
VI176 -- PAYLOAD BAY CLOSEOUT CLEANING (STANDARD, SENSITIVE/
HIGHLY SENSITIVE) - OPF
OBJECTIVE:
A. To clean accessible Payload Bay (PLB) surfaces to one
of three cleanliness level options as required to support
turnaround and mission requirements.
B. To qualitatively
various contaminants
contamination controls.
assess the types and levels of
with the intent of improving
OPERATIONS: Design of the OPF was based on good clean
shop practice. No provisions were made for a class
I00,000 clean facility. The only environmental control
is a standard air conditiqning system. After more
requirements were imposed by the cargo community, a
curtain was added around the upper platform and control
is maintained on the personnel allowed into the area.
Before cargo is installed in the Orbiter, or the payload
bay is closed out prior to transfer to the VAB, an
inspection and cleaning is performed. The entire midbody
is inspected for one of the following specifications:
Visual Clean I - (VCl) (standard)- Absence of all particulate
and non-particulate visible to the normal unaided eye at
a minimum light level of 50 ft. candles at a distance of
5-I0 ft.
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Visual Clean IA (VCIA) (sensitive)- Absence of all particulate
and non-particulate visual to the normal unaided eye at a
minimum light level of 50 ft. candles at a distance of
2-4 ft.
Visual Ciean 2 (VC2) (highly sensitive)- Absence of all
particulate and non-particulate vissable to the normal
unaided eye at a minimum light level of I00 to 200 ft.
candles at a distance of 6-18 in.
After the cargo bay doors are closed, the contamination is
controlled by the orbiter purge air, which is maintained as class
5000, and the payload changeout room, which is maintained as
class I00,000.
TIMELINE IMPROVEMENTS
If the proper facilities are provided, the time to perform the
inspection and cleaning could be reduced by 90 to 95 per cent. A
change in the cargo requirements to accept the original criteria
of good shop practice could eliminate this timeline completely.
1.4.5.5 Operational Evaluation
Contamination control has always had a big effect on the
operational timelines in processing spacecraft and launch
vehicles. The initial requirement to eliminate this was an
attempt to reduce the processing time between flights. When the
requirements of the cargo community were accepted and no
provisions were made to the facilities to maintain control of
contamination, it added an extra amount of time to the flow.
Only a modification to the facility or a change of
can result in a reduction of time to maintain
cleanliness level of the payload bay.
requirements
the proper
1.4.5.6 Conclusions and Recommendations
STS
To support the present shuttle configuration and the cargos that
have been designed and manufactured, the only practical solution
would be to design a modification to the OPF. This design would
have to provide the required contamination control plus access to
the payload bay for installation of horizontal payloads in the
OPF.
FUTURE VEHICLES
Future requirements for new cargo should include a provision that
the cargo must be containerized to maintain the level of
contamination control required by the cargo.
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1.4.6.1 Summary
In the context of this study, Anomaly Resolution is considered to
be the entire range of actions beginning wi£h fault detection and
including fault isolation, spares available for replacement,
retest and reverification.
In today's STS ground processing environment, there is an
unreasonable amount of time involved in troubleshooting
anomalies, repairs, cannibalization, and system recertification.
The reasons for this are based on Program decisions made during
the early Orbiter design phases: (I) The state-of-the-art used
fifteen years ago; (2) design compromises from the 160-hr
turnaround design criteria because of funding, cost, weight,
schedule, etc. (3) ignorance of operational requirements; and
(4) disregard of the impact of operations manhours and on-line
time on life cycle costs.
Traditionally, anomaly resolution for complex launch vehicle
checkout has been a complicated, labor-intensive, time-consuming,
costly task requiring extensive effort from large numbers of
highly-trained system support technicians.
With on-line time costing in the neighborhood of $30K/hr during
ground operations, it is imperative that the available technology
be exploited to produce cohesive tools and results. This has not
been done and the result is reflected in ground operations where
the technician is furnished a myriad of tools and documentation,
which are confusing and often contradictory. The end result of
this is lengthy repair times and a significant waste of manpower
and dollars.
Since the initial Orbiter design, the development curve of
built-in-test(BIT) and built-in-test-equipment(BITE) has been
almost vertical. It is necessary that these concepts, and
available hardware be incorporated in future vehicle design
requirements -- otherwise, just the ground operations portion of
the life cycle costs will drive us out of the Space business.
The advisability of incorporating extensive mods of this type for
the current shuttle is questionable from the standpoint of cost
effectiveness and require specific and detailed cost trades.
Weapon system development in DOD has provided the funding for
this fast technology advance and NASA must take advantage of its
availability. Our technology search readily revealed over I00
very pertinent papers and reports. Typical of these is the
"Proceedings of the Joint Services Workshop: Artificial
Intelligence in Maintenance" which includes 513 pages of relevant
papers. Study recommendations for this topic of Anomaly
Resolution draws heavily on these rich sources of documentation
and describes the basic technology available.
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During the analysis of available documentation, it became readily
apparent that the technology required for a quantum jump in
Anomaly Resolution (fault detection; fault isolation; fault
resolution; fault-tolerant computers; fault-tolerant software;
data-fault toleranc6; fault-tolerant system hardware;
replacement without shutdown; and spares selection) is here
today with applications development proceeding at a remarkable
pace. However, caution must be observed in assuming that the
application of "Artificial Intelligence" is a panacea for the
immediate future. Much of the applicable AI technology is still
in development and not yet available for incorporation into
systems; this is especially true of specific applications work.
This rapid advancement is being driven by the requirement to
reduce life cycle costs -- resulting in R & D maintainability
funding by the Air Force, Navy, Army, and Commercial companies
for equipment and aircraft such as the F-16 and the Boeing 767
and 7J7. This technology is readily available so that NASA and
its contractors do not have to reinvent the wheel, but can
readily build on the in-progress development funded by DOD and
the commercial airplane companies.
A complete discussion of anomaly resolution includes the topics
of spares, cannibalization, and adequate line replaceable unit
(LRU) repair facilities.
1.4.6.2 Related Issues
The STS problems and inefficiences in the process of fault
detection, fault isolation, and fault resolution (all of which
are combined here under the title of ANOMALY RESOLUTION) have
been repeatedly documented by our Issue source documentation in:
The specific ANOMALY RESOLUTION issues related to STS
documented in Volume 4 of this report under the categories of:
* 51-L Findings
* Presidential Commission Report on 51-L
* Rockwell Maintenance Technology Study
* Air Force Operational & Test Evaluation Center Reports
* AFSC/NSIA Space Transportation Panel (Cost Reduction &
Cost Credibility Workshop)
are
* Automation
* Techology
* Cannibalization
* Fault Detection
* Design
* Design Criteria,
* Expert System
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The following related issue descriptions from the study database
are typical:
I • "Approximately 24 OMI's (Operations & Maintenance
Instructions) are currently required to troubleshoot problems
and retest systems during each turnaround processing of the
Orbiter in the OPF."
,
,
"System downtime could be decreased by incorporation of both
anomaly detection and fault isolation."
"Provide increased built-in-testing
detection/isolation."
for automatic fault
, "Provide the capability for ground systems to perform
diagnostic monitoring and checkout of on-board systems."
,
"High leverage technology areas for Operations & Logistics
include expert systems/artificial intelligence in the areas
of fault detection & isolation, vehicle checkout & launch;
automated software generation; and fault tolerant avionics.
• "High leverage technology areas applicable to future
architectures for Launch Operations: Expert systems &
artificial intelligence for use in subsystem fault detection
& isolation, vehicle checkout & launch. Avionics system
improvements such as on-board fault detection, isolation, and
diagnosis.
,
"The logistics support for Challenger in the 51-L ground
processing was inadequate, since it created a need to remove
parts from other orbiters to continue operations. For 51-L,
45 out of approximately 300 required parts were cannibalized.
These parts ranged from bolts to an OMS TVC actuator and a
fuel cell. The significance to operations of cannibalization
is that it creates: (1) significantly increased efforts to
accomplish the same work due to multiple installation and
retest requirements, (2) schedule disruption due to added
work and normally later part availability, and (3) orbiter
damage potential due to increased physical activity in the
vehicles• These efforts make cannibalization operationally
unacceptable•
,
"Spare parts are in critically short supply. The Shuttle
program made a conscious decision to postpone spare parts
procurements in favor of budget items of perceived higher
priority. Lack of spare parts would likely have limited
flight operations in 1986."
Additional detail of related ANOMALY RESOLUTION issues can be
obtained from VOLUME 4 of this report: ID numbers 1194, 1703,
1722, 1743, 1358, 1748, 1752, 1753, 1755, 1773, 1774, 112, 119,
158, 200, 412, 602, 608, 620, 626, 1000, 1707,2734, and 4102.
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1.4.6.3 Schedule History
The troubleshooting and system recertification as-run schedule
for 51-L is shown here as Figure 1 because it is typical, most
recent, and best documented. It shows that 51-L processing
during November and December of 1985, anomaly resolution involved
some 48 shifts and 964 technician manhours plus engineering, QA,
and support manhours. There were approximately 24 OMI's required
to accomplish the troubleshooting and system recertification.
_FICIENCIES/TECHNOLOGIES NOVEMBER lllS" " OECEMIIER lllS "
111Z I_l 4 1S 11_ 11 le II) _C _rt _23 F4 M _i #, :N n X t1 _1214 | S ? i ti I1 12 13 14 15 Ill
TECHNOtOGY
|AMOMAJI. ¥ li|IOLUlION)
All tJm_ars _ncL_cate 3 shift/day opeEations
51-L OPF PROCESSING
Figure I
1.4.6.4 Current STS Methods
The inefficiency of todays methods of anomaly resolution in the
Orbiter turnaround processing is, of course, a direct result of
the Orbiter design not meeting the 160-hr design criteria.
Because of cost, weight, and schedule compromises and the low
priority of operational requirements and lifecycle cost, during
the design phase of STS, even the self-test and fault tolerant
technology available in the early seventies was not utilized in
the design. Consequently, the 50-hrs serial time allocated in
the 160-hr schedule has grown to typically 384-hrs. Whereas the
original design concept relied heavily on self-test, the actual
design makes it necessary to brute force the troubleshootingwith
poor access to test points and a requirement to remove and
replace equipment with the result that extensive retests are
required.
A typical example of extensive retests, as a result of
inaccessibility, is in the design of the air recirculation
filters and debris screens. After each flight, these screens and
filters must be removed and cleaned. To gain access to these,
several electronic modules must be removed, then reinstalled and
retested. This is not only a time consuming operation, but also
requires power be removed from the orbiter with the result that
access to the crew module is restricted during this time period.
ORIGINAL PACE
POOR QUALn'Y
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There is very limited capability to analyze anomalies that occur
in flight so that fault isolation procedures can be scheduled and
completed within the time frame of the next turnaround.
Of course, no anomaly resolution can take place efficiently
without adequate LRU spares, replacement parts, and local KSC
maintenance and repair shops. Lack of these has led to extensive
cannibalization, multiple remove and replace activity, and the
resulting multiple retests required. During the STS-33 flow, for
example, there were extensive cannibalization actions to and from
Challenger (099). Examples are listed below:
(I) Engine mounted heat shields and attaching hardware (to 102)
(2) Fuel Cell #1 (from 103)
(3) Plunger on flipper door (to 102)
(4) R/H wing duct (from 104)
(5) Engine mounted heat shields & attaching hardware (from 104)
(6) Thermal barrier (from 103)
(7) NLG tires (from 103)
(8) WSB liquid sensor (from 103)
(9) ET/Orb purge system line (from I04)
(10) PDI (from I03)
(II) WCS (from ]04)
(12) ME #2 SSMEC (to 102)
(13) 12 MPS tamp transducers (from I02)
(14) Spare MDM (from 102)
(15) Champ experiment camera (from 102)
(16) Gas sample bottle pyro plugs (from 102)
(17) EVA hatch cover (from 104)
1.4.6.5 Technology Application Requirements
It was an unfortunate compromise that the original STS design had
to forego the available self-check and fault-tolerant capability
available in the early 1970's. Since that time, the progress
curve in these technical areas has been almost vertical because
of DOD requirements and funding.
Even today, the full cost of Operations is not recognized by the
NASA Design organizations; particularly, the fact that Design
typically represents only 3 to I0 percent of the Life Cycle Costs
and that it is in the Design Phase that Operational
considerations can provide order-of-magnitude payoffs.
The competitive international environment and the need for a
dependable, airline type schedule to meet immediate and
forthcoming NASA and DOD launch requirements make it mandatory to
provide fully automated anomaly resolution during the Design
Phase of future vehicles and to provide where cost effective,
through block changes, advanced capability for STS in the 1990's.
The Technology to accomplish this exists today with the
techniques of EXPERT SYSTEMS, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, SMART BIT,
BITE, REDUNDANCY, FLY-BY-WIRE, EMBEDDING, TRANSPARENCY, -- only
application development is required in the areas of: * FAULT
DETECTION * FAULT ISOLATION * FAULT RESOLUTION * FAULT-TOLERANT
COMPUTERS * FAULT-TOLERANT SOFTWARE * FAULT-TOLERANT SYSTEM
HARDWARE * LRU REPLACEMENT WITHOUT SYSTEM SHUTDOWN (WHERE LRU
REDUNDANCY EXISTS) * SPARES SELECTION & AVAILABILITY
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FAULT DETECTION: A process which discovers or is designed to
discover the existence of faults; the act of discovering
existence of a fault. One or more tests performed to determine
if malfunctions or faults are present in a unit.
FAULT ISOLATION: Where a fault is known to exist, a process
which identifies or is designed to identify the location of that
fault within a small number of replaceable units. Tests
performed to isolate faults within the unit under test.
FAULT RESOLUTION: Where the defective replaceable unit has been
identified, repaired or replaced, and system satisfactorily
retested.
FAULT-TOLERANT COMPUTERS, SOFTWARE, AND SYSTEM HARDWARE: Where
the computer, software, or system hardware does not fail because
of an individual fault.
FAULT-TOLERANT DATA: Transient data errors must be absorbed
without causing false alarms or inappropriate action.
REPLACEMENT
capability
system down.
WITHOUT SHUTDOWN: Where redundancy exists, have the
to replace an LRU and retest without shutting the
SPARES SELECTION AND AVAILABILITY: Spares must have high funding
priority and be selected through a thorough technical selection
process.
1.4.6.6 Technology Evaluation
After determining the anomaly resolution technology application
requirements, a technology search was performed using the XTKB
(Expanded Technology Knowledge Base) developed for this Study and
the NASA RECON database. Approximately 200 technical papers and
document abstracts were screened from various "anding'_ of
available secondary search keys in RECON including:
AEROSPACE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE, ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE, AUTOMATIC TEST EQUIPMENT, B-I AIRCRAFT, BLOCK
DIAGRAMS, BOEING AIRCRAFT, CHECKOUT, CYBERNETICS, DATA
ACQUISITION, DIAGNOSIS, ELECTRICAL FAULTS, ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
TESTS, EMBEDDED COMPUTER SYSTEMS, EXPERT SYSTEMS, F-15 AIRCRAFT,
F-16 AIRCRAFT, FAILURE ANALYSIS, FAILURE MODES, FAILURE, FAULT
TOLERANCE, GLASS FIBERS, GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT, GROUND TESTS,
IN-FLIGHT MONITORING, INTERFACES, ISOLATION, LEARNING,
MAINTENANCE, MALFUNCTIONS, MICROPROCESSORS, ON-BOARD DATA
PROCESSING, ON-LINE SYSTEMS, PATTERN RECOGNITION, R & D, SPACE
MAINTENANCE, SPACE MISSIONS, SPACE SHUTTLE BOOSTERS, SPACE
SHUTTLE ORBITERS, STANDARDIZATION, STATISTICAL TESTS, TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, and TRADEOFFS.
Where the abstracts appeared promising, actual documents or
papers were obtained and studied from an application standpoint.
The results of this effort were 42 papers with direct application
to this technology requirement. These are listed in the
bibliography at the end of this topic.
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Improvement of FAULT DETECTION, FAULT ISOLATION, and FAULT
REROI,UTION technique_ is based on the rapidly developing
technology of COMPUTERS, SOFTWARE, EXPERT SYSTEMS, and ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCF applied to TESTABILITY. EXPERT SYSTEMS, with a
number of commercial successes demonstrated and many military
developments are currently underway. Maintenance expert systems
are currently difficl,lt to imp]ement, but there appear to be
approaches that avoid the knowledge engineering bottleneck.
Hetarules and machine ]earning have the potentia] t_
substantially reduce cost, development time, and best of all --
Life Cycle Costs. Expert systems with ability to understand
circuit tune, rico and malfunction are expected within the next
three years. To have a common understanding of terms it is
necessary to differentiate between EXPERT SYSTEMS and ARTIFICIAl.
T_TEI.[.IGE_CF.
EXPERT SYSTEHS (ES}-- Store the knowledge of an expert. The
system is able to retrieve and process the stored knowledge to
p_rform s_i_-h functions as diagnosis, monitoring, prediction, and
planning. Currently, all expert systems are "rule based", that
i>., the kn_,wledge is stored in the form of if-then or
mituation-aet i(_n rules. These rules (also called production or
meta rules} form a network of inferences that are used to perform
the expert functions, Section 1.4.6.9.
ARTIFICiAl. INTELLIGENCE (AI) -- Automated reasoninK, which is the
pro(_ess of dra_in_ conclusions from facts.
Our survey inc]uded the fol lowing six
improvement areas with a potential for
_.ith, or as part of, at, AI approach:
possible
near-term
testability
application
i . £e_f-improvin_ diagnostics
2. >l_re effective fault detection and isolation
Discrimination between false alarms and intermittent
faults
4. Reduction of skills required for maintenance
5. Integrated diagnostics
6. D_sign for testability
OFtlGINAL PAG_ _
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Potential AI solutions for these six testability areas
adapted to eight basic applications:
can be
Computer-aided Preliminary Design for Testability
(CAPDT) provides a testability assistant directly
available during preliminary design phases.
Smart Built-ln Test. (Smart BIT) used in boxes or
cards can identify intermittent faults and reduce
false alarms.
Smart System Integrated Test (Smart SIT) is a system
level Smart BIT which performs testing while the
system is operating.
4 Maintenance Expert - Box (ME Box) provides offline
test management with self-improvement of functional
tests.
Maintenance Expert - System (MF SYS) describes thp
kind of capability that can be expected in the
immediate future.
Maintenance Expert - Smart (ME Smart) incorporates
the benefits/risks of including learning capabilit}
in the maintenance expert system and its ability to
access to Smart BIT information.
8 ,
Automatic Test Program Generation (ATPG) would be
able to understand circuit functional operation;
however, this application has the lowest, payoff.
Smart Bench is a maintenance expert system developed
for use with bench test equipment controlled by an
engineering work station.
Figure 2 is a matrix
potential AI Solutions.
of Anomaly/Testability Problems vs.
TESTABILITY PROBLEMS / ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SOLUTION,'
OTTm..'T_,% ,n,_.T _ . L,_A.A_IUr.,
x ;c x z
x •
x x x
x x
x x x
x x x
x
x
z x
x x
x
x x
x x •
x x x 1[ x
Testability Problems/Artificial Intelligence Solutions
Figure 2
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COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT EXAMPLE: To remain competitive in the
internationnl market, BOEING is pursuing a reliable,
low-maintenance design philosophy for its new 7J7 airplane. Use
of avionics incorporating large-scale integrated circuits to
provide multiple function capability is expected to reduce th_
number of LRU's in the 7J7 by 30-50% compared with 757/767
airplanes.
In addition to size, weight, and power requirement reductions,
this approach is expected to yield MTBF 3 to 20 times better than
today's equipment and reduce the cost of spares by 20 to 50%. An
on-board maintenance system will interface 6 or 7 DATAC
high-speed data buses to the central maintenance computer. EaoE
data bus wi]] communicate with several avionics subsystems, earl,
containing one or more LRU's and associated BITE. Critical
subsystems _,i] I inlerface to 3 data buses to assure redundancy in
case c,f sy_t(_m failure_, while less critical sub-systems will be
linked wilh only I or 2 buses. The central maintenance computer
l'_r" the ol:-board system wouid display subsystem status ano fault
information on a printer or control disp]ay unit located in the
aircraft, or send it to a ground maintenance center by means of"
an Arinc CommuniPations Addressing & Reporting System ACAR5)
VHF.
A fl
Ph_cko_lt
provided
of the
equ i preen t
Fi _Hro ? .
equi pm_nt
example of todays, state-of-the-art commercial a rplane
is thr- Bneing 757/767. %n "on airplane" data system i_
that _,ppnrt._ validation of the system-level operation
Flight Nanagement System (FNS) with built - in - test -
(PTTF). The BITE test support equipment, is shown in
Figure -I shows the relative locations of personnel and
durin_ test. and validation. The Study Team observed
this. sy._t_-m t,_in_ u_f,d fnr a 7R7 airplane overall test conducted
.j_l_; p',io;' _:: r'ollc_u_ . A semi-automatic Flightline Tester Van
(.qAFT \anl _4a._ c, onnect.ed to the 767 data bus and flightdeck
tc)ur_h_c'reerl c-entre]. The flightdeck technician, utilizing the
_.o_ehs.creet_ and a radio int.ercom was able t.o test, tare
c',_rr_-('t i __ ac._ i on and retest on command. All data was stored on
a flop[y dis!: in the SAFT van which provides a data trail for QA
and (:lr,s_,c_ut. Q4 was not required during testing; the floppy
disk data trail was used after-the-fact for this purpose. The
test was accomplished by 6 technicians over 3 regular 8-hour
shifts f_r a total of 144 manhours. While not directly
comparable to Orbiter checkout, Figure 4 makes an interesting
point _<hen compared to the OPF checkout of the Orbiter.
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Technology Breakthroughs: Three major breakthroughs have
occurred that will have wide reaching effect on the productivity
of maintenance expert system applications and on both developer
and user interfaces. These are: (]) the comprehensive
development, of diagnostic meta-rules (highly organized special
rules) for expert systems; (2) the proliferation of engineering
work stations; and (3) the recent announcement of "Universal Pin
E]ectronics"(UPE) developed by Giordano Associates under contract
with the Army Electronics Command, Ft, Monmouth, N.J.(This UPE
integrates analog and digital stimulus / measurement capability
by using VLSI chips and extending that capability to every ATE
pin eliminating the need for ATE switching.
Typical useful expert systems have required more than 5 manyears
to de\e]op. In order to create maintenance expert systems
quickly, they must be built from generic components so that a
large portion of the software can be reused on each
implementation. Corporate developments, such as those at GE and
DEC have created expert systems using these techniques which
jnte}li[e_tly mana_ test sequences and can bp adapted t_ a n=_:
system.
The engineerin_ ,Cork station provides a common host for
develnpmenl of all the recommended AI applications. Used in
conjur:r't]on with the rule structure of expert systems, it permit_
a syn_r¢i_tic de\elopm_nt of the requirements common to many of
the app|ica_ ions (diagnostic rules, network understanding,
graphical display, etc.).
Engin_erir,_ work stations have gained widespread acceptance in
the aerospace industry. There are multiple sources for bo.th
hardware and s_ftware that make work stations big enough, fast
enough, and cheap enough t_ be really useful. They provide
direct, p_rsona] access to AT applications by the electronic
designprs. As a result, the majority of end users wi I] be able
to make use of applications ]n engineering work stations.
These basic applications, using developing technology, and the
read)" availability of" engineering work stations provide the
capability to drive hiVE CYCLE COSTS down significantly --
Provided NASA and AIR FORCE Program Management insist on
contractual requirements to put $$$ and effort into forcing
OPERATIONAL DESIGN CRITERIA (Figure S) in the area of ANOMALY
RESOLUTION.
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1.4.6.7 Cost Trades
There are two basic justifications for expending funds to improve
the automation of ANOMALY RESOLUTION. These are:
1. Reduction of LIFE CYCLE COSTS (LCC)
2 , SCHEDULE IMPROVEMENT -- The tangible improvement of
reducing vehicle turnaround time by eliminating _r
reducin_ anomaly resolution tentpoles, thus allowing
more flights per vehicle in a given time period.
There are numermJ_ Air Force funded studies in the areas of
exp_rt system_ / maintenance technology / testability / and
artificial in_elli_enc-e. While these studies were performed for
AF fighter activities, the maintenance function involved for fast
turnaround and low LCC apply equally we]] to STS type activities.
There are two Air Force sponsored reports which are comprehensive
in their co_t-trad_ snalys_m. One of these reports was sponsored
by the WriKht-Patterson Avionics Laboratory and the other by the
_c_m_ _ir Devel_[_ment Center (RADC). These two reports form the
ha_i_ for Ibis: Study's cost-trade analysis:
'" nt_grat_d Testing and Maintenance Technologies",
Fnel Technical Report for Period 25 Sept 81 - 15
Sept 83, prepared by Boeing Aerospace for Avionics
[.aborat_>ry, Air Force Wright Aeronautical
I.ab_ratorie_, AFSC, Wright-Patterson AFE. RECOX
84N22528.
"Artificial Intelligence Applications to
Testability", Fina_ Technical Report, Oct 19_4,
prepared by Boein_ Aerospace Company for Rome Air
l_evelopment Center, AFSC, Griffiss AFB, NY. RECON
85N2-1839.
Tcb asse_4s
for anoma t 5
._t uc].v :
the I.CC impact of improvement on testability factors
res_iution, seven criteria were used in the RADC
1 Test time reduced
2 Hard fau|t detection
3 Hard fault isolation
4 Intermittent discrimination & isolation
5 False alarm reduction
6 Experience Level Reduced
7 Reduced removals
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A discussion of each of these factors is appropriate as a basis
fop understanding how improvement lowers life cycle costs.
Test. Time Reduced: Many test programs must run through the
entire test sequence every time, while providing the
technician with no capability to make gross tests of entire
sections, loop on a particular test sequence, or slowly
accumulate test information to diagnose intermittents. The
use of maintenance expert, systems is not necessary to make
the testin_ more flexible and hierarchical, but their
incorporation produces this effect. A reduction in test
time benefits LCC by increased utilization of test equipment,
and th_ tpst technicians for ATE (Automatic Test Equipment)
bench and system tests. Large benefits in this area could
also result in fewer ATE systems being required at depot
repair sites.
Hard Fault Detect. inn: At every level of testing it is desirable
_o ha-e the best fault detection coverage for hard faults
pos._ibl_. Thi._ is r_lati\'e]y _asy for digit.a] circuits, but
is much mope difficult for circuits or systems which have
p_c.:' P..F'T (De._.i._IL for Testability), use analo_ circuits or
mirroFrc_c'e_er_. Tmprovin,_ testability durin¢ the design
phas.e of the electronics provides the greatest benefit for
the eff_;t expended, beeau.%e improved fault detection in the
uni_ ha_ _r_at_r" I.CC benefits than improved fault detection
so,]ely based on ATE. Only by improving testability is it
po._._.ihl(_ tn det_el all hard faults.
Hard Fau]t Isolation: Because it is a more difficult task and a
less mature capability, there is more opportunity for
improvement in hard fault isolation than in their detection.
Both (-an be improved through the use of DFT (Design for
Testabilit? ) techniques and by a maintenance expert system
that can learn the_ isolation strategies for real world
faults. H()wever., it takes a greater level of DFT t.o locate
a fau] _, inside a complex network that to detect a fault at
its out put .
Intermit.refit Discrimination and Isolation: Intermittent
discrimination and isolation is an immature field which
could provide benefits to many types of systems. The test
system must allow a fuzzy description of the state of a
circuit (i.e., a description covering a range of states:
good, most likely good-may have suspected as intermittent,
degrading-but-not-yet-bad, and bad). Products which
accumulate information about an item's marginally bad
performance during the time it is running provide much more
help in detecting and isolating intermittents than a single
slow tegt of performance on an ATE system. That approach
also prnvJdos thP basic capability nepded to discriminate
between intermittents and fa]se alarms.
-7:,-
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False Alarms Reduced: Causes of false alarms are most easily
eliminated using CAD tools to help reduce false alarm cau_e_
through better designs. CAD can provide the ability t_
simulate fu].] system operation with BIT and software running
and to simulate various hard and soft faults. The
simulation results interpreted by the designer allow him to
find and then eliminate many of the causes of false alarms.
Additiona]ly, methods to acquire and record fault
information during circuit and system debug (in full scale
development), will find many real world/environmental causes
of false alarms. This information is most easily acquired
by some form af BIT that has non-volatile memory after it's
fielded, hard,<are becomes virtually unalterable; however,
the BTT test software can still be changed (under
c_mf'iguratic_r, control). Smart BIT with reprogrammable
features allows experimentation with proposed modifications
and would also ease their incorporation.
F,:perienc'e T.ovol Ned_p_d: M_h _f commercial and military
electronic testing has gone from bench to ATE so as to
increase the reliability of testing and to reduce time. The
military ATV _oft,eare, h_wever, has greatly limited the
technician in what he can do. The technician is rarely able
t.a modify the test sequence or test. limits to diagnose a
prob]em. As circuits become more complicated, especially
microprocessors, there tends to be little or no information
available te the test technician on their operation. ATE
has also become very complex to operate and each one is
different. It requires 6-12 months of training for
technicians t_> be_'ome familiar with operations of complex
ATE, and learn how to compensate for its limitations to
perfnrm _he tes_ in_ and diagnosis required.
Skill level reduction is, based on the reality of military
servi_e experien_:e, better expressed as "experience level
reduc:tir_n. B_cau_e of thi_, it has been the conclusion in
segments of the military community that ATE should be
changed so as to require less training for use in performing
maintenanc:e. .\_ a corollary, ATE must. be configured to work
_it.h the _.echnician, rather than just having him serve as a
"butt.or, pusher". Instead of having a computer-guided probe,
where the technician is told where to place a probe so that
the computer can make a test., there should be interactive
diagnosis where both the human and the computer can suggest
areas of the circuit to be tested. This is already being
done with sophisticated software in some commercial
card-testing ATE. At. KSC, where the technician skill level
is more experienced and stable, the interactive diagnosis
capability is even more important.
Reduc_ Rem_\'als: Removing an item from a system causes a whole
chain of costly actions to occur. Field maintenance data
exists showin_ that 40% of the avionics equipment removed
from an aircraft is fault-free. Using better DFT t.o provide
less isolation ambiguity reduces removals directly.
Tmpr_\_d fault isolation decreases the need f_r spares.
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Redue_ Removals (Continued): Shotgun substitution methods break
spares -- typical Boeing experience is that. with a printed
circuit board with 5 or more layers, there is a 50-50 chance
of a layer interconnection being destroyed if the board is
removed twice.
The above definitions provide a basis for understanding how the
Operations and Logistics Support portion of LCC can be reduced.
By lookin_ at the distribution of costs against the DOD Life
Cycle Phases, Figure 4, and identifying the element in such a way
as to support cost analysis, the typical distribution of DOD is
shown below:
* Design
Total Weapon Sys ATE Type Sys
3% 10%
* Fabrication 21%
* Operations Personnel 7%
* _upport Spares 7%
* Replacement Spares 10%
* Maintenance Personnel 35%
* Replacement _]aterJa] 5%
* Other 12%
100%
30%
60%
100%
Note: It should be noted that designers are often not aware that
detailed design phase is typically only 3-10% of the total life
cycle cost.
Cost Analysis: Specific cost analysis cannot be provided
without defining the system and its operation and support
concept. It is the intent of this section to provide
insight into the scope of cost savings to be gained by
implementation of automated anomaly resolution.
Figure 6: illustrates the distribution and time relationship of
the contr]bui ions to the life cycle cost of a typical
s>-_t.em.
Vigur'e 7 h R:
coal .
further dalai] the operation and maintenance
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Figure 9: illustrates the LCC savings that could be realized by
developing integrated testing and maintenance
state-of-the-ar_ . Shown are cost deltas to current
implementation of onboard test and maintenance methods.
Figure ]0: shows that testability incorporation
preliminary desiCn has the largest potential impact
on life cycle, cost_.s
during
70_)
2]$ 4.5I
/\
Peqom'_ M_.
7S O.ZS
i j
10%
7S T,_
IS
DISTRIBUTION OF LIFE CYCLE COST
Figure 6
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Source: Program Management for Functional Managers,
The Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir
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TYPICAL SYSTEM LIFE-CYCLE COST BREAKDOWN
Figure 8
From Program Management for Functional Managers
The Defense Systems Management College, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
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The bottom line is that by developinE and incorporating anomaly
resolution techniques in the early desiEn phases, Life Cycle
Costs can be reduced by at least 5% -- a siEnificant amount when
you are dealing with $billions on STS or STAS.
Indirect Benefits: while not as apparent as the direct savings,
can provide even greater benefits. Reduced proce_ing time
leads to more flights/year. Based on a 3-orbiter fleet and
12 total flights/year, an improvement in processing time
sufficient te provide one additional flight of pay]oads
would be an S I/2 percent gain in use of a multi-bJ Ilion
dollar national resource.
Anoma] y Resolution technology would make a
contribution to this end. This improvement could
direct, manhour saxin,_s. DOD analyses for aircraft
cost._ dn not include this type of factor.
significant
dwarf the
life cycle
COST ANALYSIS EXAMPLE
OF ANOMALY RESOLUTION TECHNOLOGY APPLIED TO 51-L
Since neither the SPC Contractor or NASA were able to provide
significant manpower/manhour vs. OMI data, we have extrapolated
any data available to create the following 51-L cost. analysis for
_noma]y Re_olutien wild a confidence factor of 1.5. The
followin_ table provides a cost estimate from the best data
available.
OMI ItO[RS TEClt(M/It)
V1003 23,16 234
\'1005 3,4,2 40
VIOO8 _ 32
VIO2Z 432
V102R 16
V1034 ?
VI04R 5 40
Vl053 8 40
V1060 6 60
V1062 8 40
V1065 8 56
V]080 4 32
V10£4 8 64
V1086 44 220
V1098 4 40
Vl103 16 64
Vl123 16
Vl161 19,9 112
\'1t73 15
V1177 3 12
\:1178 8 56
V1200 8 4O
V3500 ? ?
TOTALS: 222+? 1211+?
SUP:)ORT M/H @ 33% 400+'?
TOTAL bl/H 1600+?
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OM_'s not required on 51-L had the potential of another 100
online hours and 500+ manhours plus 150 direct support (enRr, QA,
etc. } manhours.
Also not included in the above figures are the additional hours
brought about by lack of spares and the resulting cannibalization
with its resultant time and manhours for reinstallation and
retest.
1.4.6.8 Conclusions and Recommendations
I , Because of the significant investment required to develop the
hardware, software and techniques in the areas of EXPERT
SYSTEMS and ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE for testability, NASA
should join the DOD/Industry team who have been funding and
developing the early progress in this area. Specifically,
for the ST£ and RTAS design agencies to develop direct
c:oKlta('t with tie'> \FSC personnel at the Rome Air Development
Center and the WriKht~Patterson Avionics Laboratory.
2 ° With .qTS activity planned for another ]5 years, serious
c_onsideral ion should he Riven to incorporating some deRree of
]mpro\'ed anomaly resolution via block changes in the early
l.qg0'._: t.'}l_-n the improvements now under intensive development
he_in t.o reach fruition. Cost effectiveness would be most
like]> when Jmprovemenl.s are combined with mandatory safety
mod£. Pre_£ e£ e,_neept mod._: to the current Orbiters may a!so
be a hi._h pvi(_rity for f_Jture vehicle development. Systems
which should be considered include:
* Eleptrica] Pc,car Distribution & Control (EPD&C}
* Power Reactant Storage & Distribution (PRSD)
* En.. ir()nm,_ntal Control & Life Support System (ECLSS)
* Data g-'rotes sing .qys, tem (DPS)
* Communications (Coma)
* Guidance, Navigation, & Control (GN&C)
* Main Propulsion System (MPS)
* Au>;iliary Power Unit (APU)
* }{,vdrau]ic System (Hyd)
3 . Tn June 1984, an Artificial Intelligence Applications
Committee with ten DOD and Industry members and chaired by
Anthony Coppo]a, Chief of the Reliability & Maintainability
Engineering Techniques section of the Rome Air Development
Center developed four major recommendations in this area for
DOD. Allowing for very minor changes in the past two years,
these recommendations are sti]] valid and have been
implemented by DoD. The results of these actions are
avai]ab]e for use by the NASA design agencies. Because of
their comprehensiveness and currency, these recommendations
are quoted helo_c:
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ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE APPLICATIONS COMMITTEE
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
"Despite the fact that the members of the committee worked
completely independently, there Js only one area of significant
disagreement in the position papers. This is the recommended
language in which AI programs should be written. An area of
genera] agreement was that expert consultant systems can, and
should, be applied to maintenance now. There was even a general
consensus of th_ d_ve]opment resources required far an expert
system: twe }'ears time, $200,000 in computer costs, and five to
ten man-years per year. However, discussions after review of the
position paper= would cause thes_ to be c_nsidered minimum
projections, with perhaps double the computer resources and five
years of time required. The following recommendations are the
chairman's consolidation of the position papers, discussions with
thP RADC contributors, and his derivations from the information
given above.
RFCOMMENDATION NO. 1
The D,,_D _:lu,nu] d take advantage of the relative maturity of
t, echrlolr_y for' er_atin_ expert systems. Specific applications of
maintenan(.p expert systems should be started immediately, and
mul I i-aI_i:l i<.al ion ma intenanoe experts developed and standardized.
The Dod should immediately develop expert systems for existing
m_:J nl_nanc,_ app] i c_a.iion. _: whF, re mai nt enancp is particular] y
troublosom_. As an example, th_ AFTT-RADC-WRALC program would
attempt t_ create a system to work with the F-15 analog printed
circuit bnar_] te._.t station. It. wou]d first be programmed with
the kno_,]_dge required to troubleshoot only one board, th_ most
trm_blesomf_ _f tho_e - the ATE handles. This would show the
xaJur. ¢_f the approach and permit debugging of the system. .Here
kno_.]ed<_ _.(_u]cJ be added incremental ly until the system hand[ed
every b()ard assi._ned to the original ATE. At this point, it
wo',J]d hop_,f_! !v L,:. c,o_t effective to scrap the original system.
If not, th_ _,:p_r-1 system wou]d still earn its keep by its
._up_.rio_' handling of problem boards. Each service could pick a
pr',',._i._.ing c'andidat_ (a system which is not handled well by the
ATE, an(] for which expert maintenance personnel are both
available and willing to cooperate in creating the expert
maintenance system). As it builds and refines the maintenance
expert system, th_ service would improve the Operational
readiness of the candidate system while it gains experience and
confidence with the AI technology. No risk would be involved,
since the existing ATE would still be in place. Resources would
be two to five years calendar time, 10-20 manyears of effort and
$200,000 to $500,000 in computer costs for each system. Each
system would pa} for itself in short order, by reducin. _
maintenance time as much as 50%. However, the real value of
t, hes_- fJr._,i _fforts would be in the knowledge gained.
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To permit immediate application, the first. AI maintenance systems
should be built in the language and architecture most convenient
to the builder and user, with a blanket exemption from any
current policies on languages. The only exception would be that.
any test sequence generated by the system for outside use would
be in ATLAS. No cost involved. Will cause a proliferation of
languages for first systems, but will permit ear]fief
implementation, by years, and provide information needed for
ultimate standardization. (Chairman's recommendation based on
conf]ict, ing inputs in position papers.)
To improve <_mt-effpcti\eness in the longer term, the DoD should
develop \'er_ati]e maintenance experts for specific domains, such
a_ digital electronics, which are used in many different systems
They would contain the necessary theory and diagnostic strategies
for their specific domains. They must be user friendly (interact
in a subset of Fng]ish, explain their actions, and adapt to the
skill of the user), and, presuming progress in computer aided
lrl_fr'u{-tinn (C\T) t_chnique_, each _ystem oo_lld ultimately s_rv_
as an int.egrated ATE, maintenance trainer and training aid. One
ha_i_ sF_t,_m (for (ill_ domain) could be built in two years _ith 10
ma_y_ar_ e_fort . System speei fic data base_ would bP
incorporated during the development of the systems to be tested.
RefJnemente would be added as developed. Benefit would be the
el imin_1 i_n nf the, need for reinventing the engine for every
application, easily worth millions in development and training
savings. Technical risk is moderate.
Further improvements in cost-effectiveness would be made possible
hy developing a system building tool to automate the creation of
t.hP system specific data required by the expert system discussed
in the preo_din_ paragraph. The too] would extract the needed
kno_c]edg_ whether from a human expert, or, ideally, from a
description og the s}'stem to be tested. This _<i]l minimiTe one
of the major costs of the expert system. Cost. would be about
$200,090 a 5e:{r irl c.r_mpuler costs and ten manyears per' }-ear'. A
prototype could he available in two years, but it. might take a
fi\'e year program to complet._ a supportab|e product. Benefit
w_:]d he _i_nifi(':_nt savings Jn time and elimination of errors
for every ne<< system to which it is applied. No more than five
app]ioations, if that much would repay the costs with a dividend
in ear']ier test system availability and easier modification as
the design of the system under test changes. Technical risk is
present ]y considered high.
Note: The expert systems would eliminate the long test programs
no_." used in conventional AT_ systems. To do so the DoD could
prohibit aI] net< ATF systems to use inflexible sequential test
pro_edure_. Instead, require the use of segmented test programs.
which ;_'_ called out in the order needed for most. rapid fault
_s_lation usinz the _trategies no_." avai]ablo in I.OG'HOD, STAHP,
and FIND. Co_t _,'il ] be a significant increas_ in effort required
ta pr_ran: the- _.TF and some additional memnr>'. Zil] probably
permil t.,h_ elimination of one maintenance shift, paying for
itself' in _ne year or t_<o. (Chairman's recommendationl
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RECOMMENDATION NO. 2
Develop "smart" BIT for digital electronic system to minimize
false alarms, identify intermittent failures, improve coverage of
BTT. An RADC proposed FY-84 effort hopes to provide design
concepts which could be used by individual designers to construct
smart BIT in their particular applications. A complete series of
studies leading t.o the design of an on-board knowledge based
monJt.oring system or the design and test of experimental BIT
system_ c,_u]d run two t n four years and one to s]× million
dollars. Benefits are incalculable since they include the work
of reduced mission aborts due to false alarms. More tangible
ben_,fits could be a 90% reduction in false alarms, and the
decrease of the portion of units sent to repair which test good,
from the pres_r:t 30% to perhaps 10%. A successful application
should pay for itself in two years of operation on one system,
and provide a measurable improvement in the ready rate of the
system using it.
RECOMNENDATIOK NO. 3
Fund applied R_seareh and Development of AT For maintenanee, both
to improve lh_ capabilities of maintenance expert systems and to
apply A] to other maintenance applications. Some specific topics
ar'_:
0 Aut.omat ]ne the creation and presentation of Technical
Manua]_.
2. Applying AI to Maintenance Information Systems and
data_ase_.
Dev_]opin_ crisis alertin_ systems.
4 . For expert maintenance systems, developing requirements for
]anguaI<eb and computer systems, techniques for improving
user f'riendline.=.£, and more sophisticated approaches (e.g. ,
mearl£ of forming rules from the circuit itself rather than
from aa expert familiar' with the circuit.)
Developing &T systems for Automatic Test Program Generation
(ATPG) . The current AI programs used to develop test
patterns for digital combinatorial logic should be extended
to sequential logic and analog circuits. Systems should
work from the circuit description and provide test vectors
in ATLAS.
6 . Applying AI techniques to VLSI, VHSIC design
tolerance and testability. This should be
into the \'|{SIC phase three study plans.
for fault
incorporated
D_x'e]opin_ knowledge based computer aided instruction (CAI)
system_ for maintenance training. Notp: this <curd
ultimately be incorporated into the ATE itself.
De\e 1 op_ n_ self-improving diagnostics and test program
el_
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Other topics will be identified by the FY-83 studies begun by
RADC, NAEC, AFHRI.. Recommend 6.2 programs be started by all
throe services, funded at one million dollars per service per
year, tn begin wor.h. Promising developments should De followed
by 6.3 projects with appropriate higher funding.
RECOMMENDATION NO. 4
Foster an integrated DoD-industry approach.
Coordinate th_ various efforts of DoD agencies through a
tri-servJee group on AT applications to maintenance. Recommendpd
group would be a committee under the JLC Automatic Testing Panel.
It could also be under JDL working group for AI, hut seems more
appropriate f(_r the Autornati_, Testing Panel b_c:au,_ e of its
]nt_rfac_ with other committe_._. Participants would include all
serxic_ a_oncies involved to share responsibilitie_ and avoid
d,Jpl if'at ;,_ c>'i" _Ffort_. Tt wol_]d al_n provide a oontra_-t point
for DoP and indus, try. (Chairman's recommendation)
Enc, oura_p pr'ix'ale avenues of development of AI applications, to
maintenanc, p: cc_ntinuo lo support industrial IR&D in the area,
oxpress l)_,!; interest at. appropriate meetings, provide copies of
thi.¢ r'_pc_t _r_ ]ndu._try. Th_ N.qlA Testability Commi_te_, whic-h
paral lo]_ the Jl.C pan_] , should be encouraged to creat_ a
subgroup on AT applications to serve as an industry focal point.
Tho clo_ _,orkin_ relationship of the NS/A committee and the JL(
pa_el _4r,',_ld b_ a natural avenue for creating a dialog on AT
appl i_a_ ions:. (Chairman's recommendat i on ) "
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1.4.7.1 Summary
The Window Cavity Conditioning System (WCCS) is designed to allow
the cavity between inner and outer windows to "breathe" to
prevent condensation during flight. The current system is made
up of eight assemblies, each with a desiccant assembly and two
check valves with interconnecting tubing. The eight are:
I. command module inner
command module outer
right hand forward inner
right hand forward outer
]eft hand forward inner
]eft hand forward outer
]eft hand aft outer
right hand aft outer
The active elements in the desiccant are buff colored with random
blue beads that change to buff when the moisture limit is
reached. Ear]}" in the program the designer lost confidence in
the indicator beads and the units were changed after each flight.
The (=_rren! proc.ed_re inspects them every flight and changes them
every other flight. The units are not readily accessible even
for inspec:tion because the initial design did not properly
addre_ maintainability. The leak check and flow test setup has
a number nf flex hoses that are susceptible to damage during
testing.
Althou_h th_ _ initial 160-hour schedule did not allow any time for
this activity it took 152 hours for 51-L.
Future programs must have more consideration of maintainability
in _ar]y st.a_es of design. Maintainability and accessibility
must be "designed in", not. merely "tacked on" at the end of the
program.
It i_ rpeommended that the desiccant/check valve assembly be
redesigned s]ight]y to allow for "quick changeout" operation and
spare_ be stc_-ked so serial time impact be minimized. Desiccant
materials should be researched to be sure that we are still using
the most effective product.
1.4.7.2 Related Issues
I. Accpssibility of the units for inspection or removal/
replacement.
. Removal of some assemblies require disassembly of other
orbiter components.
3. .Need tc, have spares available.
4. Ne_'d a po_itix'e reliable indicator.
5. ReCl_Jir'ement_ are not in line with frequent flight
philosophy.
1.4.7 WCCS Functional Checks (Tentpole B) ORIGINAL PAGE IS
(Continued) _ POOR QUALITY
6. Success rate of components is not periodically factored into
test rate.
T. Test set-up and tear-down cycles are wearing out flex hoses.
The fo]low_ng are examples from the Issues database:
H,%;55
lss_e_.s co_t.: : :
9e_:rSr'i',:
CA%GOlF _ iDEH[RA£LR:
L_M.,....r_oW 2_ O_F AREA FOR WCCS HEFURBISHME_T. (I/!_I'
"w_r:_ W_, TC HA_DLI_H THE SfHTRM AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. THE EIISTI_G
L,P_O_R_PEN_!V£_FLU HO£_ ARE DAMAGED _EA_L_ _VER_ FLOW (I/9.[)
l;llllllI*lllllllllIllllllllIllllllltllltllllllllllllllllllllilllllllilllllllll
1.4.7.3 Schedule History
1. N_ time was allotted Jn the original 160-hour
this task.
2. The STS-XX schedule allotted 92-hours.
turnaround for
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4.
The 51-L flo_ required 152-hours to complete. See Figure I.
Quick-change modules without sampling could be done
hours.
in 3
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Figure I
1.4.7.4 Current STS Methods
CMI VI076 -- ORBITER !gCCS FUNCTIONAL TEST
OBJECTIVE: To provide procedures to verify
of the orbiter _,'indo_,- cavity conditioning system.
function
OPERATIONS: The current procedure inspects them every flight
and changes them out every other flight. OMRSD requires
retest of" all portions of the system that have been opened.
The units are not readily accessible, even for inspection.
Forward reaction contro] system (FRCS) access panels 21-27
and 21-2S must be removed to access the forward inner and
fomvard outer dPsiccant assemblies. The right hand pay]oad
support avionics (PSA} beam must be removed to access the aft
outel' c'a_ity desiccants. The desiccant assembly is then
remox'_d from the orbiter. On alternate flights the desiccant
cartridge is removed from the assembly and sent to an
off-lin_ clean room facility for refurbishment. The check
valves are tested while the desiccants are being refurbished.
The cartridge i_ then replaced in the assembly and the
assembly reinstalled. A leak check and flow test is
performed and dew point samples are taken.
-90-
1.4.7 WCCS Functional Checks (Tentpole B)
.... ('Continued)
ORIGINAL PAGE
OE_ POOR QOALITY
1.4.7.5 New Technology Requirements
A lon_ life desiccant with reliable indicators that would require
less frequent change-out.
A desiccanl that can be recharged in place.
Research through RECON and other databases have not uncovered
anything promising in either area.
1.4.7.6 Technology Application Requirements
A rechargeable nitrogen blanket system in place of the
desiccants. This could probably be accomplished with no weight
penalts.
A simple, and perhaps the most practical, solution would be to
r'td_si'._:, ti_t- a._.s.em'_,]Y t_ _ [,t quick _5 and easily c:hang_c out with
spare unit._. The desiccant could be replaced off-line, the
assembly t e._ted, and put in stores. A simple design with flat
f_ce._ and a rubber-type sealing surface and easy to install
f'a_teners could substantially reduce the chan._e-out time. Thi._,
m_thed could even be performed every launch and still save flow
time if _Jl]its _e:-p te_t_d prior to returning them to stores.
1.4.7.7 Technical Evaluation
Thr: initial de.=.i__n did not properly addres- _. maintainability.
Four ._hift_ could be saved if the units cou]d be accessed without
removal of other orbiter parts. Relocating the desiccant
assemhli_._ to an aoce._sib]e location (such as t.o the pa_ load bay)
could help here. If th_ initial design had been a quick-change
module an:J _pare._ had been provisioned to allele for off-line
refurb the current test length could be reduced to a minimum.
The Shuttle Prc_ces. sin_ Contractor (SPC) system engineer feels
that chan__p_Jt of desiee.ant _very fnur or five f]iKht._ would be
more reasonaL]e than the current every other f] ]ght procedure.
Sef_ Fj g_re 2 below for an example of one of the present
assemb] ie._.
_,_ _acD. ely
LR/RH OUTER AFT DESSICANTS
Figure 2
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The desiccant assembly could be replaced with a small GN2
container and reKulator to maintain a pressure slightly above
external orbiter pressure. The container could be recharged in
place. Since the unit is recharged in place and doesn't have to
be removed accessability should not be an issue.
1.4.7.8 Shuttle Cost Trades
IHPLEHENTATION DESCRIPTION:
assembly to be accessible
unit from spares.
Redesign of desiccant/check valve
and to allow for quick changeout for
M,..e .... I C'_sment
De_i_n i Quz!. Te_'_
cost fcr 3 vehicles
eo_t for 3 vebicie_
-r'"," "7- _.zT S_.,7!;3i 717. [L7,7[ - _;: rv_-'_wV':"r:'"
:b_rrer:" _e_ Deltz
IMPLEMENTATION DESCRIPTION: Revise
flights between changeout of desiccant
requirement
cartridges.
to al 1 o_,"
-vt:-w.......'.,'",_:,., e'=- =.'",:':, ?[i_ a'cuid _ xr ._[T =a-_: change .-:7
:':.7 ..........................
":: o[,_ P_}i MIT OTH3 D_ DT OTHL DMH MAT OTHg
IgPLg_E_TATICNCgST ESTIg_TE
it_ M_h_ur_ M_:.eri_l! Commer2
_:ii:'::_tl-r £ 3_,_'_!_3".-7
co_t for 3 vehz:}es
te,,l_a..
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I t4f hrE. <_ te_: time has beam removed since it will be -_ , ope,.o.m.e off-line.
GROUND OPERATIONS SAV/NG._ FOR FUTURE VEHICI.E._: The cost savin_ _:
for future vehicles is approximately equal to cost avoidance of
the current STS costs.
$$ COST ANALYSIS :
TRADF. SILHHARY .
This data is presented in Section 1.6.3, COST
1.4.7.9 Conclusions and Recommendations
STS
The Shx,ttle Program needs to reevaluate the philosophy of
OHRSD'._. This particular example is one instance where the task
time i._ unreasonable for an operational vehicle. We need to
provide the potential for "learning curve" reduction of manual
tasks. Re-evaluation of the "change out every other flo_" whether
it: needs it or nr_t" priteria presently being used should be
r_ v i awed .
Red_sign of the desiccant/check valve assemblies to allo_ each
unit to be quick]y chan_ed is the recommended solution for this
problem. Once incorporated this modification could save well
over 100 hours p_-r flow. This mndification should include
r_locati_r, ._, that lhe desiccants could be inspected x.'ithout
removal nf otheY Shuttle components or assemblies. During the
redes]_e,n, the designer should verify that we are usin_ the bast
available desiccant material for this application.
FUTURE VEHICLES
Future programs should avoid this kind of maintenance problem by
considering operations at the time of initial design. Any
component _it.h a visual indicator should be designed for
inspection "at a glance". Any component, that is designed for
periodic changeout should be easily accessible with fasteners
designed for quick replacement. Both future and current programs
could benefit from a more reliable longer-life desiccant,
therefore, the search should continue.
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1.4.8.1 Summary
During SRB (Solid Rocket Booster) separation a haze of
contamination forms on the Orbiter front windows. Since the most
critical use of the windows is during landing this has become a
plaguing problem. The requirement to clean (polish) the windows
was not anticipated in the initial 160-hour turnaround schedules.
The 144 hours required to prepare for 51-L launch is an
unreasonable amount of time for an operational vehicle so this
task is a candidate for improvement (Operations and Maintenance
Instruction [OMI] V7253). The placement of the protective tent
required during the cleaning operation precludes or impedes
parallel work for some jobs performed at the nose of the vehicle.
A second reason this problem should be addressed is because
cleaning (polishing) the windows cannot be accomplished prior to
landing when it is most needed. Cleaning back on the ground
merely precludes accumulation from more than one launch.
The solution therefore needs to allow the windows to be clear at
the time of Orbiter landing. Redirecting the SRB separation
motor exhaust would solve the problem but that would cause more
problems than it solved, i.e., re-design and retest. The more
logics] solution then would be a non-stick surface for the
windows or a 3ettisonable overlay. The chemical vapor deposition
(CVD) of a diamond film on the outer pane appears to be a
potential solution.
Future programs can avoid a similar occurrence by profiting from
the lesson we have learned on the STS by careful design
requirements. The data and experience gathered during the
Shuttle flights provides a new baseline for future programs.
1.4.8.2 Related Issues
I • This is a slow, labor intensive operation. It is a "hand"
operation that cannot be performed as precisely by any
mechanized method.
2. Window contamination occurs during SRB separation and the
need for clear windows is during landing. The cleaning
(polishing) is accomplished after the actual need.
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The following is a quote from document 84XI0356, Space
Orbiter Thermal Protection System Flight Experiences:
ORBITER WINDOW CONTAMINATION
"The Shuttle Orbiter windows must meet normal
aircraft requirements for pressure redundance and
provide optical clarity and freedom from
distortion to allow for operation typical of
standard aircraft and other operations. In
addition, the windows must have multimission
capability to survive entry heating, insure
single-flight safety after a micrometeoroid
strike, and endure pressure stresses for at least
]00 7-day missions. To satisfy these
requirements, the window configuration consists of
a three-pane construction: an outer fused-silica
thermal, an inner alumino-silicate pressure pane,
and a center fused-silica pane to serve as a
redundant pressurP pane.
Contamination of the outer surface of the
windshie]ds' thermal pane has occurred after each
STS flight. This deposit or haze is most
pronounced on the two center windshields, and
efforts to remove this deposit with standard
window cleaning agents (i.e., isopropyl alcohol,
deionized water) have been unsuccessful. The
source of this deposit has not been specifically
identified, but the prime candidate appears to be
the gasses from the plume generated by the solid
rocket booster separation motors. Since this
buildup of haze reduces pilot visibility, each
window has been evaluated for acceptability prior
to each flight. A hand polishing procedure, using
cerium oxide, has been developed and used after
each f]ight starting with STS-5. However, this
polishing does not remove all the deposit and
still requires an evaluation of each window's
acceptability for the next flight."
Shuttle
1.4.8.3 Related Schedule History
I ,
,
3 o
No time was allocated for this task in the original I60-hour
schedule.
60-hours are allocated on the STS-XX integrated operations
assessment.
144-hours were required to accomplish this task during 5I-L
processing. See Figure I.
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Figure 1
The placement of the protective tent required during the cleaning
operation precludes or impedes parallel work for some jobs
performed at the nose of the vehicle. Although this activity has
not yet been a "show stopper" as the flows become shorter it
could easily become a real problem.
1.4.8.4 Current STS Methods
OMI V7253 -- WINDOW POLISHING FOR CONTAMINATION REMOVAL
OBJECTIVE: This OMI is to polish the orbiter window surfaces
for contamination removal. It will polish windows 2 thru 5
(L/H and R/H forward and mid). See Figure 2. It will
photograph an Air Force resolution chart through windows I
thru 6. See figure 2 below.
forward
A
/ : ,' \
/ :: 3 : : 4 :: \
__ / 2 ::__/ \_:: 5 \
\\ / \ //
1 \\_/ \_// 6
/ \
m/ \__
Window Layout
Figure 2
OPERATIONS: A tent is built around the windows with a catch
bag at the lower portion. Tile protective covers are
installed over window perimeter tiles on the forward and mid
windows on each side. The windows are then brushed and
vacuumed to remove dust and lint particles. A polishing pad
is fabricated by assembling alphalap felt polishing material
over a rubber pad. The windows are then polished with a
ceramic oxide/deionized water mixture. The polishing compound
is cleaned off the windows with deionized water/Joy soap. The
window< surface Js inspected with a fiberoptic light source to
see if the process needs repeating. After all windows have
been cleaned a resolution chart is placed on the outside of
the windo_ and a photograph is taken from the nearest seat in
the orbiter- cockpit. The photographs are inspected to verify
that the _indows are now cleaned satisfactorily.
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1.4.8.5 New Technology Requirements
Develop a new material for the windshield with surface that
contamination will not adhere to. (Present outer window pane is
low expansion fused silica glass chosen for its high optical
qualities, 5/8 inch thick.)
1.4.8.6 Technology Application Requirements
I) Provide an overlay that could either be jettisoned after
ascent or be removed after flight.
2) Apply a treatment to the windshield that the contamination
will not adhere to.
3) Redesign the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) separation motor
exhaust to prevent it from impinging on the windows.
1.4.8.7 Technical Evaluation
Polishing the windows does not solve the real problem here, it
merely keeps from compounding it. The windows are contaminated
at the time of separation and the real need for clear windows is
at landing, so the polishing comes after the need. Therefore the
best solution would be a material that the contaminants could not
adhere to.
Technical databases were researched for new materials that might
be hard enough to resist the contaminants. Two candidates were
found. First, polycrystalline magnesium aluminate spinel
(MgAl204) possesses an unusual combination of optical,
dielectric, physical and mechanical properties that make it an
attractive candidate for windows. It is exceptionally strong and
hard for an optical material, has good thermal shock resistance
_nd moderate thermal expansion coefficient.. (Refer to paper
"POLYCRYSTALLINE MgAlzO4 SPINEL FOR HIGH PERFORMANCE WINDOWS" by
D. _. Roy and J. L. Hastert.)
The second and most promising material is the diamond film. The
following are excerpt taken from High Technology Magazine/April
1987:
"Initially U. S. scientists were skeptical about
reports from Russia in the 1970s that investigators at
Mosco:_'s Institute of Physical Chemistry had made true
diamond films via chemical vapor deposition - a process
by which a carbon vapor is deposited on a substrate.
The claims "seemed almost like alchemy," says Russell
Messier, associate professor of engineering science and
mechanics art Penn State. The scoffing waned during the
ear]t" ]980s, however, when Japan's Nations] Research in
Inorganic _laterials (Ibaraki) repeated the Russian
work."
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"The coatings are now made either by CVD techniques
or by bombarding a substrate with high-velocity carbon
ions, which then form a film. In the latter method,
carbon ions may be generated from a hot carbon cathode
or produced by "sputtering"-that is, knocked off a solid
carbon block by a high-energy beam. Various ion-beam
and sputtering methods are under study at the NASA Lewis
Research Center in Cleveland.
Both types of techniques have generally yielded
diamond-like rather than true diamond films. The
diamond-like films are perfectly adequate for many
applications, according to Bruce Banks, chief of the
Electrophysics Office at NASA/Lewis. For example, this
could be used to make abrasion- and corrosion-resistant
computer disks, and infrared-transparent windows in
aircraft that would stand up against pitting and
scarring from raindrops at high speeds.
Among the most important developments in the CVD are
methods (based largely on the addition of hydrogen to
the methane) that allow diamond to be deposited on a
wide range of surfaces, including metals, silicon, and
glass; earl_" methods allowed deposition only on other
diamonds. Crystallume president says his company plans
to use the Penn State technology to make a variety of
novel products, including cutting tools, knives,
surgical scalpels, computer disks, and _indo_s for
planes and spacecraft; also in the docket are heat
sinks and heat-resistant enclosures for high-temperature
electronic equipment."
-QS-
1.4.8 WINDOW POLISHING (Tentpole C)
_Cont_nued)
1.4.8.8 Shuttle Cost Trades
IMPLEMENTATION DESCRIPTION: Design outer pane with CVD diamond
on outer surface.
IMPLEMENTATION COST ESTIMATE:
Item M_nbours M_terial[ Comment
Design | Quai, Test_
M_nufacturing cost for 3 vehfcies
N
TOTALS
GROUND OPS COST SAVINGS PER FLIGHT AFTER IMPLEMENTATION:
[tea
V7253 Windo_
PollK Polishzn_
for Conta_fnatio_
Removal
OLH 5M_ MAT OTHE LM_ MAT OTHR DMH MAT OTh_
!_O 300 l!E 0 O 0 30G
GROUND OPERATIONS SAVINGS FOR FUTURE VEHICLES:
The cost savings for future vehicles is approximately equal to
cost avoidance of the current STS costs.
$$ COST ANALYSTS: This data is presented in Section 1.5.3, COST
TRADE SU_I_IARY.
_Or%_
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1.4.8.7 Conclusions & Recommendations
STS
A jettisonable overlay is a possible solution for this problem.
Using shape-memory (Nitinol or similar material) for retainers
and springs, a system could be designed to be energized by the
temperature extremes of outer space. This would be automatic,
with no crew involvement, and would not require penetrations
through the vehicle surface for wires or linkages. Once back on
the ground the shape-memory could be reset and new overlays
easily installed. Jettisoning, without damaging the Orbiter is,
in itself, a problem.
The best solution, however, would be the one where no flight
maintenance is required. The diamond hard surface currently
being developed appears to be the better solution. This study
therefore recommends that the diamond surface be further
investigated.
FUTURE VEHICLES
The "lesson learned" from this problem should be to analyze
designs that have retro rocket plumes pointed toward surfaces
that might be contaminated. Advances in Computer Aided Design
and data collected by STS should allow for more accurate
prediction of flow patterns on future programs.
Diamond-type coatings on windows of manned vehicles should be
considered as a low cost standard procedure.
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1.4.9 THERMALPROTECTION SYSTEM (TPS) INSPECTION (Tentpole D)
INTRODUCTION
The development of a reusable thermal protection system was a
major technical accomplishment of the early Shuttle development.
Although the current TPS is far from optimal, it has proved to be
durable as well as forgiving. However, future vehicles will
require or benefit from more advanced and capable TPS. This
requirement is fully recognized by NASA and Industry and
extensive effort is already being expended in this direction (see
TPS Reference 8). Consequently, this study has concentrated on
the maintenance and non-destructive testing (NDT) and flight
readiness verification of TPS tiles used on the Orbiter. In the
case of the current Orbiter, the NDT of over 30,000 tiles during
each turnaround is not even possible. This study examines R & D
effort in the area of NDT of the tiles and reduced life cycle
costs.
1.4.9.1 Related Issues
From the AFOTEC Launch Rate Capability Study:
"Repairs to the TPS, especially tile, have caused launch delays.
Data collected during Orbiter processing shows that time to
repair or remove and replace damaged tile, and the time needed to
rewaterproof after flight, are major constraints to reducing
turnaround time.
The characteristics of the TPS (low-density, porous silica glass)
make it susceptible to absorbing water when exposed to certain
environmental conditions. Thunderstorms can cause significant
amounts of water to be absorbed by the tile while the Orbiter is
at the Pad. The absorbed water is added weight that is carried
into orbit. This reduces the performance margin and requires
Orbiter positioning to evaporate the absorbed water. Water still
trapped in the tile starts to evaporate and boil off during
descent as the temperature rises. With the rise in temperature
and if sufficient amounts of water are present, pressure will
increase in the tile and cause damage.
Problems caused by water absorption were identified early in the
program and the need to rewaterproof the TPS after each flight
was known and planned for. Scotchgard was applied by spraying in
order to waterproof the tiles. This method proved ineffective as
heavy precipitation washes off the Scotchgard. The
rewaterproofing ' method was changed on STS-7/OV-099. The
application ' _e@hod used involved injecting a small quantity of
silane and acetic acid solution, known as DC6079, into the tile.
There were no known problems associated with technique until
after the STS-17 mission.
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Post-flight inspections of OV-99 after the STS-17 mission (sixth
flight of OV-099) revealed that a thermal protection tile was
missing from the lower surface of the fuselage. Inspection of
the tile cavity revealed that RTV577, used as screed material and
RTV560, used as an adhesion material, had softened. A decision
was made to remove other tile bonded over screed in the area of
the missing tile and inspect for the same condition. The RTV was
found not to meet the required hardness specification, leading to
the removal of approximately 4100 tiles bonded over screed.
Extensive investigation and laboratory testing has concluded that
the waterproofing material, DC-6079, combined with water and
thermal cycles causes softening of the screed. The
rewaterproofing procedure was again changed to require Scotchgard
spraying over areas that has screed and to use injections with
DC-6079 in other areas for near-term solution.----"
"Flight experience has demonstrated that inadequate TPS
waterproofing can have mission impacts, as well as impact to
ground processing flows. Until a more effective agent than
Scotchgard can be certified for use on the Orbiter, the potential
for launch delays due to water-soaked tiles as well as changes to
planned on-orbit attitudes to facilitate TPS drying will exist."
From the National Space Transportation and Support Study
I1995-2010), May 1986. " The TPS maintenance is a Logistic
S_-stem Cost Driver. Future Operational Concepts should minimizp
TPS inspections & closeouts and minimize repair. System
Requirements should be -- no between flight servicing and
weatherproofing.
From our Operational Analysis in this study -- The turnaround
time on-line required for TPS inspection, repair, and validation
ha_ deerea_pd drastical]y since the first s_veral flights;
nevertheless, the on-line time and the manhours involved are
still very significant.
ORiGiNAL PAGE IS
(:_. pOOR QUALITY
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1.4.9.2 Schedule History
The initial design criteria (160-hr turnaround) allowed 40-hours
flow time for TPS refurbishment. After the first 20 flights, the
TPS tile replacements are shown in Figure I. The OPF-XX schedule
show on-line TPS refurbishment time as 336 hours. Typically,
total manhours would be in the range of 2000 to 3000. A
significant portion of this time is associated with test and
verification of tile flight readiness.
T
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Figure 1
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1.4.9.3 Todays Methods
For inspection and flight readiness verification there are two
remaining major inspection problems associated with the TPS
tiles, moisture intrusion and bonding. Flight damage is readily
detected by macro and micro visual inspection.
Evolution into a macro-micro visual inspection was brought about
by insufficient time available to perform both the original
overall inspection and the needed repairs. With the macro-micro
inspection, the overall vehicle TPS is given a gross inspection
while selected areas receives detailed inspection. If a number
of discrepancies show up in the detailed inspection, the option
exists to expand into other areas. Also, the macro may lead
directly to micro Jf the conditions warrant it.
Moisture intrusion on the Orbiter's lower surface is grossly
detected with the use of infrared scanners but it is not a
qualitative inspection.
A major problem with the tile system is verification of the bond
strength in a non-destructive manner. Currently there are no NDT
methods available; this has dictated the use of proof or pull
testing as a means of bond verification.
The objective of OMI V6028, "Post Flight Orbiter Reusable Surface
Insulation Inspection", is to perform post-landing and pre-ferry
survey/inspection of the TPS and determine if components exhibit
obvious latent mission-induced damage that would require
reservicing, repair, redesign, or replacement. The tasks
involved are:
(1) Post landing Orbiter debris inspection and mapping
verification.
(2) Engineering macro inspection of RSI (pre-ferry
flight)
(3) RSI inspection (macro and micro)
(4) Engineering inspection / additional micro
inspections
(5) Micro inspection of leading edge subsystem and
nose cap (internal)
(6) Micro inspection of RCC panels no. I0 and ]7
(internal)
(7) Micro inspection of RCC panel no. 9 (internal
OV-lO2)
(8) Micro inspection of RCC panel no. 16 (internal
OV-099) The procedures and authorization for
infrared tests for moisture and pull tests for
bonding are not OMI's.
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1.4.9.4 Technology Application Requirements
The requirement for improved thermal protection systems is well
understood and in work; consequently, this requirement is not
addressed by this report.
This study does address the requirement which exists for
developing fast, dependable, qualitative, repeatable,
non-destructive tests for moisture and bonding. This is critical
for reducing turnaround time for the existing STS tile and
blanket thermal protection systems. Depending on the future type
TPS used, these new techniques will be useful in whole or part
for future vehicles.
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(Continued)
1.4.9.5 Technical Evaluation
After determining the technology requirement for TPS tile
non-destructive testing, a technology search was made using the
XTKB (Expanded Technology Knowledge Base) developed for this
Study and the NASA RECON database. Technical papers and document
abstracts were screened from various "anding" of available
secondary keys in RECON including:
THERMAL PROTECTION, ABSORPTIVITY, ACOUSTIC FATIGUE,
ACCEPTABILITY, ADHESION TESTS, ANOMALIES, ASSEMBLING, BONDING,
CONTAMINATION, CREEP TESTS, DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, MOISTURE, MOISTURE
RESISTANCE, NONDESTRUCTIVE TESTS, PERFORMANCE TESTS, PREDICTIONS,
PREFLIGHT OPERATIONS, PRELAUNCH PROBLEMS, QUALITY CONTROL, RADAR
EQUIPMENT, SPECTROSCOPIC ANALYSIS, TENSILE TESTS, TEST EQUIPMENT,
CHALLENGER, DYNAMIC TESTS, FAILURE MODES FATIGUE TESTS, GROUND
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT, GROUND SUPPORT SYSTEMS, GROUND TESTS,
ILLUMINATING, INSPECTION, LOAD TESTS, MATERIALS TESTS,
MAINTENANCE, LASER APPLICATIONS, TENSILE TESTS, VIBRATION TESTS,
WAVELENGTHS, WINDOWS, X R, X RAY DIFFRACTION, X RAY SPECTROSCOPY.
Where the abstracts appeared promising, actual documents or
papers were obtained and analyzed from an application standpoint.
The result of this effort was papers with direct application to
this technology requirement. These are listed in the
bibliography at the end of this topic.
PROBI,EM DESCRIPTION: The tile material is made of microscopic
silica fibers that are slurried with a binder, pressed and
sintered into rigid, lightweight (9#/ft 3 ) ceramic blocks.
Individual tiles are machined from the blocks. The tile
dimensions ave typically 6"x6" and varies in thickness from 1/2"
to 4". After machining, the top and sides of the tiles are
coated with a thick borosilicate glass coating impregnated with
pigments to provide the coating with its high temperature
emittance properties. The coating also affords limited
protection against moisture pick-up and handling damage.
The attachment of the tile to the aluminum skin of the vehicle is
accomplished by adhesive bonding the components of the bonded
system are shown in Figure 2.
OF POOR QUAL Y
TILE ATTACHMENT SYSTEM
Figure 2
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Because of the low strength of the tile material and the thermal
expansion mismatch between the tile and the aluminum, they could
not be bonded directly to each other. A nomex felt pad called a
strain isolation pad (SIP) was bonded between the tile and the
aluminum to minimize lateral strain transfer.
Needling of the nomex pad to control its thickness and stiffness
resulted in fibers oriented straight through the thickness of the
pad. On loading of a tile, the straight fibers created hard
points or stress concentrations in the bottom of the tile. This
condition is shown in Figure 3. The net result was a lower bond
strength than the design had taken into account.
TILl
t /
I _IJ_F.NTRAlr |i_11 |
_ti[tMAW*OUmT I.F[LTCO
A
\\_'%\\ \\ \ \ \ \ \ % %% %%%%
ALUMINUM SUBSTRATE
STRESS CONCENTRATIONS IN TILE
Figure 3
The tiles are extremely critical to reentry survival of th_
vehicle. The loss of a single tile could have serious
consequences. Because of the extreme criticality of the tiles,
successful completion of a proof test, although very important
and confidence building, was not considered sufficient to ensure
the adequacy of the tile bond strength. An NDT technique is
required to ensure no significant damage occurs to to the tiles
during testing.
ACOUSTIC TESTING (ref 86A34627): Early in the STS program, a
crash test program was implemented by JSC and Rockwell/Downey, to
develop and implement an acoustic emission monitored proof test
system. This was implemented at KSC on a 24-hr, 7-day/week
schedule. Eighteen systems (Figures 4 & 5) were used to certify
approximately 30,000 tiles for the first Orbiter flight. Each
test required about one hour to complete and a total of about
20,000 tests were performed overall. Although many problems were
encountered in this application of acoustic emission,
particularly extraneous noise sources causing high reject rates,
the problems were generally solved or worked around. Application
of acoustic emission in this instance was extremely beneficial in
that. it added confidence to an unusually critical system that was
yet to be proven. Acoustic emission helped screen out tiles that
had inadequate strength. Acoustic emission monitoring is no
longer used in tile testing; however, to obtain a confidence
level prior to the first flight, it was the only method
avai]ab]e.
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ACOUSTIC EMISSION SYSTEM
Figure 4
PROOF TEST DEVICE
Figure 5
The objective of the tests was to establish a pass/fail criteria
based on acoustic activity or signatures prior to failure. Full
size tiles with the intermediate SIP layer were bonded to
aluminum substrates. Loading conditions evaluated for acoustic
emission signatures included high and low strain rates, sustained
loading, and fatigue cycling. Acoustic activity could be
detected long before actual failures occurred. The progressive
nature or time dependency of the bondline failures were ideally
suited for acoustic emission monitoring. The difficulty was
establishing gain settings that were not overly sensiti_e and yet
still provided enough conservatism to ensure that early damage
signatures could be identified. A fatigue test sequence was
utilized that enabled the difficu]ty to be overcome. The
sequence consisted of the following: (I) incremental proof load
with 6_-sec_nd holds at each level, (2) terminate hold when
significant acoustic activity occurred, (3) decrease load to 80%
of maximLJm proof load attained and (4) fatigue cycle from zero to
80% until failure occurred or 400 cycles were reached. A typical
fatigue teal profile is shown in Figure 6.
PR_ LOA0
_-,_ cvcl.-4
TYPICAL FATIGUE TEST SEQUENCE
Figure 6
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The acoustic emission acceptance criteria were based on the
fatigue test results. Tiles which passed the 400 cycles without
failure were considered successes or good tiles and those that
failed were considered failures or bad tiles. The acoustic
counts that occurred during the proof test prior to the start of
each fatigue were evaluated for criteria that would screen all of
the bad tiles and maximize the acceptance of good tiles. The
logic is illustrated in Figure 7. Criteria were established such
that each failure was rejected by two or more of the acceptance
criteria. The criteria that were established are shown in Figure
8.
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Figure 7
ACOUSTIC EMISSION REJECT CRITERIA
Figure 8
In addition to passing the proof test, each tile had to pass the
four acoustic emission criteria. Failure to meet any one of the
criteria was cause for rejection.
ACOUSTIC EXCITATION-/-LASER SENSING: The search for a
cost-effective NDT for bond integrity led NASA/KSC, in 1984, to
begin discussions with the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
(INEL) and its contractor, EG&G. The outgrowth of these
discussions led to a contract to develop an experimental
technique using acoustic excitation and laser measurement of the
tile response.
In early tests, the tiles were excited using a variety of methods
including white noise and impulses from an acoustic speaker, as
well as mechanical methods. In all cases, the tiles showed
characteristic spectra with several distinct vibration modes
present. The two strongest modes of vibration were be]ieved to
be fundamental frequencies of two plate modes in the anisotropic
composite material from which the tile is formed. The relative
amplitudes of these oscillations have been shown to be directly
dependent on the bond between the SIP and the tile and the SIP
-ll_-
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and the aluminum plate used in these tests. When bond
deterioration was induced, a large drop in amplitude of the
second spectral peak was consistently observed as wel! as several
less dramatic but possibly significant spectral shifts. It was a
consistent observation that the spectra generated by the tile
were very sensitive to variations in the bond condition.
A second phenomenon was investigated in which the tile-SIP
oscillation was examined at lower frequencies where the system
would behave as a simple mass-spring with the tile being the mass
and the SIP as the spring. The spring constant would then depend
on the total area of good bond. Tests were limited in this area,
however, by the difficulty in obtaining a simple excitation
method with sufficient low frequency content to give an
acceptable signal/noise ratio. This approach has promise as an
independent or complementary measurement.
PHASE I RESULTS from the EG&G STUDY (summarized)
I , Non-contacting acousto-optic sensing is feasible. Good
agreement between laser-acoustic sensor system and
standard accelerometer between 200 and 5000 Hertz. No
apparent problems in sensing directly off a tile surface
even after normal mission degradation.
.
Resonanne vibrations of the tiles studied are affected by
disbonds. Both the point and image data showed the
effects of bond slicing in the single tile tests.
3 ° Similar tiles have significantly different spectra, but
all of the tiles studied show common spectral features.
4. Phase I _tudy results provide beginning point for complete
understanding of the phenomena.
EG&G STI[DY PHASE II PI,ANNING
I. Refine and qualify the sensor design.
2. Model and analyze the dynamic tile behavior.
3. Prototype system design.
4. Fabrication, checkout, integration into Orbiter
processing. (See Figure 9).
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Figure 9
BACKSCATTER X-RAY TECHNOLOGY
During PHASE 2 of this STS Ground Operations Efficiencies /
Technologies Study, it is planned to further investigate the
potential of backscatter x-ray techniques using actual Orbiter
tiles and I[!S engine inspection facilities.
1.4.9.6 Conclusions and Recommendations
Extensive effort is going on the development of improved thermal
protection systems. This Study was limited to investigating the
problems and potential solutions for ground operations
efficiencies in non-destructive testing of Orbiter tiles.
An automated non-contact NDE is required to reduce
time and provide the degree of reliability necessary.
turnaround
Based on the Phase ] reported progress of the EG&G, KSC
sponsored, investigation into an Acoustic Excitation/Laser
Sensing System, it is recommended that this effort be accelerated
to provide an on-line system to support Shutt]e processing as
soon as possible.
It is also recommended that bonded samples of Orbiter tiles be
provided to Boeing for a preliminary check into the feasibility
of using backscatter X-ray techniques currently being used on the
I[:S solid rocket motors.
-112-
1.4.9 THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM (TPS) (Tentpole D)
(Continued)
1.4.9.7 Bibliography - TPS
(Each of the references listed below has its own bibliography)
(1) EGG-SD-7571
Barna, B.A.; Allemeier, R.T.; Rodriguez, J.G.;
26 pages, Informal Report, February 1987
NDE OF THE ORBITER THERMAL TILE PROTECTION SYSTEM
(2)
EG&G, Idaho (DOE Idaho National Engineering Laboratory)
Prepared for NASA KSC, Contract No. DE-AC07-76IDOI570
RECON 86A18037
Shideler, J.I.,et al; 7 pages; May 1985
NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, Va.
VERIFICATION TEST OF DURABLE THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM
(3)
14)
CONCEPTS
RECON 85N]6979
Doris, R.I .; Curry, D.M.; Tillian, D.J.
19 page paper, June 1983
NASA Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas
ORBTTER THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM
RECON 84A49504
Cooper, P.A., et a];
NASA Langley Research Center
7 page paper, October 1984
EFFECT OF SIMULATED MISSION LOADS ON ORBITER THERMAL
(5)
PROTECTION SYSTEM UNDENSIFIED TILES
RECON 84A36557
Sawyer, J.W.
NASA l.ang]ey Research Center
8 page paper, June 1984
MECHANICAL PROPERTIES OF THE SHUTTLE ORBITER THERMAL
(6)
PROTECTION SYSTEM STRAIN ISOLATION PAD
RECON 84A17175
Mack, F.E. and Hogenson, P.A.
Rockwell International Corporation
15 page paper, April 1983
ULTRASONIC INSPECTION TECHNIQUES APPLIED TO STRENGTH
EVALUATION OF SHUTTLE ORBITER THERMAL PROTECTION TILES
(7)
(8)
RECON 83N30702
Cooper, P.A.
NASA Langley Research Center
9 page paper, undated
SPACE SHUTTLE THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS
RECON 84X]0356
KELLEY, H.N. eta]
NASA Langley Research Center
5]6 page Symposium Document, December 1983
ADVANCES IN TPS AND STRUCTURES FOR SPACE TRANSPORTATION
SYSTEMS
-113-
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF.. POOR QUALITY
1.4.;I0 POWER REACTANT STORAGE & DISTRIBUTION (PRSD) (Tentpole E)
1.4.10.1 Summary
With the existing mission requirements for STS, the fuel cell
still appears the best option for the Orbiter energT storage
system. If the mission duration should change drastically in
either dimection, ho_ever, batteries or solar systems could
become viable options subject to detailed trade studies.
While the Orbiter fuel cells are several times more efficient
than those for Apollo, they are not state-of-the-art. The
requirement exists for development of reliable, easily
maintainable, high density fuel cells to be incorporated in a
Shuttle Block Modification.
For future vehicles, there are a number of promising energy
storage devices in various stages of development in the areas of:
regenerative fuel cell systems, Ni/H2 batteries, Na/S batteries,
and Li/SOCL2 batteries. Any specific recommendations would, of
course, involve detailed trade studies of performance, energy
density, maintainability, life cycle costs, development risk,
etc. The NaS batteries appear to be the best known bet for
further development in the area of materials research.
1.4.10.2 Related Issues
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1.4.10.3 Schedule History
The ground operations turnaround time for the PRSD is not
consistent with the requirements for an operational capability.
Figure I shows the shifts of work for processing the PRSD system
for 5]-L at the OPF. The total time for 51-L includes the PAD
time shown below:
Tank Set 4 R & R
OPF Ops & T/S
Pad Ops (Purge/Load)
120 hours
139 hours
36 hours (7 hrs were Pad
clear and 17 hrs local
clear for this operation)
EFFICIENCIES/TECHNOLOGIES
TECHNOtOGY
| FUEl.CELLSOI_RATtON
NOVEMBER1985 " DECEMBER 1985 "
i[- . . . . (
All timebars indicate 3 shift/day operations
51-L OPF PROCESSING
Figure 1
1.4.10.4 Current STS Methods
The descriptions below of the current STS OMI's for the Power
Reactant and Storage System (PRSD) provide a graphic view of the
complications, time on-line, and manhours expended because of the
current design. These descriptions represent 3794 pages of OMI's
and exclude a ver_" significant page count for non-OMI procedures.
DESCRIPTIONS:
V1091 -- ORBITER PRSD CRYO DRAIN (LPS) (407 pages}
OBJECTIVE: O_II is to provide instructions to detank and
inert Orbiter PRSD LO2 and LH2 tanks at the OPF using the
Launch Processing System (LPS). This is a hazardous OMI due
%o LO2 from Orbiter through GSE to vents.
PREPARATION: Includes Pneumatic Systems Setup;
Systems Setup; and Engineering Walkdown.
Cryogenic
GSF/VERIFY POWER UP: LPS activated; OPF GH2 and LH2
Systems Power Up; HWS Power Up by instrumentation; OPF GO2
amd LO2 Systems Power Up; Verify Orbiter Power and Cooling
per Standard Power Up.
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OPERATIONS: GH2/LH2 and GO2/LO2 Systems Purges/
Pressurization; Moisture Sample using $72-1106-1; Sample
Pressure for Purity; Pressurize and Leak Check Orbiter/GSE
Interface; Power Down Fuel Cell Power Plants and Start Cool
Down; Drain Orbiter PRSD LH2 System until Tanks/GSE Drain
Warmup is Accomplished; Purge Orbiter T-0 Line and Lockup
Static Purge in Orbiter PRSD LH2 System; Drain Orbiter PRSD
1,O2 System until Tanks/GSE Drain Warmup is Accomplished;
Purge Orbiter T-0 line and Fuel Cells Lockup Static Purge in
Orbiter PRSD LO2 System.
VI022 -- FUEI, CELL AND PRSD SYSTEM TEST - ORBITER
VEHICLE - LPS (810 pages)
OBJECTIVE: Provide procedures for verification of fuel
cell/PRSD instrumentation and controls, including functional
operation of system relief valves and control circuits on
the Orbiter.
PREPARATION: Perform -- Pre-Power Switch List and Pre-Power
GSE Placards and Setups.
POWER-UP: Perform -- Power Up LPS;
Systems (O2H2).
Power Up PRSD Gas
PERFORM: H20 RV Checks - ISOL VLVS to ECLSS Water Tanks
Closed. Display VDR 02 STS GSE and VDR29 H2 Sys GSE.;
Perform Purity and Moisture Samples as follows: Purge and
Sample 02 Sys GSE, Gas and Liquid Systems with GHe; Purge
and Sample Hz System GSE, Gas and Liquid Systems with GHe;
Depress GSE to Pad Pressure. Mate Umbilical Lines at
Mid-Body, T-0, Horizontal Drains, and Overboard Relief
Ports. Display VDRSI - Orbiter Mechanical System. (Cont'd)
Verify Orbiter Power and Cooling per Standard Power Up;
Vehicle Valve Cycle (EM) and Flow Checks Utilizing Pad
Pressure from GSE; FC/Cool and Loop Instrumentation
Verification; FC Heater Operational Checks: FC Heater
Operational Checks; H20 Line Strip Heaters, H20 Valve
Heaters; H20 Relief Port Heaters; Oz/H2 Vent. Port Heaters.
DISPLAY: VDR29, H2 System GSE and VDR51, FC Operations.
PERFORM: Modify Cryo Tank Control Logic PGMS VCR05 and 06
to Allow Checkout; Pressurize Vehicle Manifolds via
Horizontal Drain Line and Perform Manifold Decay Test;
Instrumentation Checks and Pod External Leak Checks; Tank
CV Reverse Leakage Checks; Manifold RV Crack/Reseat Checks;
Horizontal Drain Pod I/F Leak Checks at Flight Pressures;
T-0 Valve Leak Check and T-O Pod Poppet Leak Check;
Pressurize T-0 Line Run and Leak Check Pod I/F at Flight
Pressure; Open Gas Supply Valve and Vent Vehicle to Pad
Pressure.
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DISPLAY: VDR50 ORBITER H2 Electrical Control and Monitor
and VDR51, FC Operations.
PERFORM: On Cryo tanks -- Vat-ion Pump Checks and Monitor
vacuum Levels; Tank Wuantity Checks; Modify Limits of
Tank Heater Monitor Control Logic; Tank Heater Checks via
Cockpit Control; Tank LO/Hi Pressure Checks Using GSE Ramp
Rate with Tank Heaters Off; Tank Heater Auto On/Off Checks
using GSE Ramp Rate with Tank Heaters in Auto.
DISPLAY: VDR29, Hz System GSE and VDR50, Orbiter Electrical
Control and Monitor H2.
PERFORM: Modify Tank Heater Control Logic Limits and Tank
Temperature Monitor Limits; Slowly Pressurize Cryo Tanks
and Perform Instrumentation Checks. Lo Pressure CW Checks,
Heater Turn On Check (Lo Pressure-Auto Mode) Cutoff Checks,
and Heater Manual On/Off Checks above Auto Cutoff Pressure:
Leak Check Mid-Body Pos I/F and FC Interface; FC
Instrumentation Checks at Flight Pressuresl Cry_ Tank RV
Crack/Reseat Checks and Post Reseat Internal Leak Check;
Vent Cryo Tank to Soak Pressure.
DTSP[.AY: VDR22, 02 SYSTEM GSE and VDRSI, FC Operations.
PERFORM: Modify VCR03 and 04 to Allow Checkout; Include
leak checks for uninsulated connections on 02 System.
DISPLAY: VDR49 Orbiter Electrical Control and Monitor --
02, FC Operations.
PERFORM: Vac-lon Pump Checks and Monitor Vacuum Levels;
Tank Quantity- Checks; Modify Limits of Tank Heater Monitor
Contrnl l,ogic; Tank Heater Checks via Cockpit Control;
Tank LO/HI Pressure Checks Using GSE Ramp Rate with Tank
Heaters Off; Tank Heater Auto ON/OFF Checks using GSE Ramp
Rate ,<_th Tank Heaters in Auto; Tank Current Sensor
Trip/Reset Test, Tank Heaters Off; Tank Heater Current
Sensor Tests - Tank Heaters On (In Auto-Mode, Tank Pressure
LO.
DISPLAY: VDR22, 02 System GSE and VDR49, Orbiter Electrical
Control and Monitor - 02.
PERFORM: Modify Tank Heater Control Logic Limits and Tank
Temperature Monitor Limits; Slowly Pressurize Cryo Tanks
and Perform Instrumentation Checks. Lo Pressure CW Checks,
Heater Turn On Check (Lo Pressure-Auto Mode) Cutoff Checks,
and Heater Manual ON/OFF Checks Above Auto Cutoff Pressure;
I_eak Check Mid-Body Pod I/F and FC Interface; FC
Instrumentation Checks at Flight Pressures; Cryo Tank RV
Crack/Reseat Checks and Post Reseat Internal Leak Check;
V_nt Cryo Tank to Soak Pressure; Leak Check Uninsulated LO2
Connections.
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DISPLAY: VDR29, Hz GSE, FC Operations
PERFORM: Moisture and Purity Checks from H2 Tanks;
System to Pad Pressure.
Vent H2
VI077 -- ORBITER FUEL CELL COOLANT SERVICING AND SAMPLING (LPS)
(120 pages)
OBJECTIVE: Provide procedures to measure compressibility
and sample the fuel cell coolant loops.
DESCRIPTION: The supporting equipment will be set up at the
Orbiter servicing Access Panel (Door 44); A Compressibility
Test will be conducted, Accumulator ullage established, and
the quantity of dissolved gas in the coolant measured; to
meet periodic OMRS requirements to sample on board F/C 40
per SE-S-0073. Sample will be taken, dissolved gas
measured, ullage established and compressibility test
performed; Compressibility GSE will be disconnected from
the orbiter and servicing disconnects visually leak checked
prior to flight caps installation.
VI093 -- FUEL CELL SINGLE CELL VOLTAGE TEST (LPS)(575 pages)
OBJECTIVE: Provide procedure to conduct a single cell
voltage test (both the TAFEL test and GN2 Diagnostic Test)
of the Orbiter fuel cells. The TAFEL Test will only be
performed if a fuel cell is suspect and not as part of the
normal Diagnostic Test.
TEST PREPARATION: Placard reactant GSE; placard Single
Cell
GSE; configure FC for Single Cell Test; prepower Switch
List. POWER UP: LPS powered up; Power up Reactant GSE;
Verify Orbiter Power and Cooling per Standard Power Up.
OPERATIONS: Reactant Gas Purge Orbiter; Connect Single
Cell Cables; Load Test and Voltage Scan (VAH0]) -- Under
LPS control, 4 calibrated loads are applied for a maximum
of 15 seconds each. While each load is applied, and LPS
scan of the 96 individual cells is made. A minimum of 2
minutes rest is allowed between load tests. Then with
reactants in the fuel cells, the baseline GN2 Diagnostic
Test is run. The 02 side of the fuel cells are next purged
with GN2 and the Diagnostic Test is run again; disconnect
load cables; inert fuel cell. When VI091 follows the
performance of v]0g3, the inerting will be done in V]091;
inert GSE. POWER DOWN: Power down Orbiter (if required);
Po_er down reactant GSE unless V]091 is to be run
immediately after completion of V1093. In this case the GSE
PNLS may be left powered up; secure Single Cell GSE;
secure LPS.
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V5R0__._____! -- FUEL CELL POWER PLANT INSTALLATION/REMOVAL (620 pages)
OBJECTIVE: Pro\'ide the sequence of operations for Fuel Cell
] , 2, and 3 transfer from shipping container to vehicle and
reverse procedure from vehicle to shipping container.
DESCRIPTION: This procedure contains hazardous steps since
a critical flight item, fuel cell, will be lifted into and
out of vehicle.
OPERATIONS: Connect vacuum pump, FC-40 canister, reg pn]
and entrained gas detection unit on Ivl 4E; connect test
setups for fuel cell bench servicing; transfer fuel cell
from shipping container to bench; remove cover from
shipping container. Using overhead crane lift fuel cell
from container to work bench; pressurize fuel cell 02 and
H2 ports with 100psi (min) GHe supply; connect FC-40
coolant fluid canister and a vacuum pump in parallel to fuel
cell coolant disconnects. ; disconnect fuel
ce]I vehicle electrical and fluid interfaces,
remove fuel cell from vehicle and transfer to bench
; transfer replacement fuel cell from bench to
vehicle ; connec't fuel cell vehicle electrical
and fl_Jd interfaces; transfer fuel eel] from bench to
shipping container; GSE teardown.
VSR02 -- PRSD BASELINE TANK INSTALLATION/REMOVAL(462 pages)
OBJECTIVE: Task ] - To configure and validate OPF Oz/H2 GSE
panels for tank removal/installation. Task 2 - To remove or
instal] PRSD H2 tank I as required. Task 3 - To remove or
install PRSD O2 tank I as required. Task 4 - To remove or
install PRED }l_ tank 2 as required. Task 5 - To remove or
_nsta]_ PRSD O2 tank 3 as required.. The above brief
descriptions of the related PRSD procedures are indicative
of the complications induced in turnaround operations by the
current design.
VSRO3 -- PRSD MISSION EIT TANK SET REMOVAL/INSTALLATION (LPS)
(_00 pages)
OBJECTIVE: To remove or install PRSD H2/O2 Tank Sets 3,4, &
5 as required to meet mission objectives.
_]0 ^
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1.4.10.5 Technology Application Requirements
The requirement exists to drastically improve the Energy Storage
System (ESS) for the current Orbiter and future vehicles
Improvement is required in energy density, reliability, and
maintainability.
1.4.10.6 Technology Evaluation
The breadth and size of this Study necessarily limits depth of
the technology evaluation. The goal here is to utilize previous
in-depth surveys in related areas. In the case of energy storage
systems, work being done for Space Station and led by the NASA
Lewis Research Center (LeRC) is most appropriate. LeRC is
supported by contractor teams of Rocketdyne (Ford Aerospace,
Harris, Garret*, and Sunstrand) and TRW (Genera] Dynamics and
General Electric). The following information is extracted in
large part from the Bibliography, Section 1.4.10.8.
In the case of the current Orbiter, we are interested in
technology _hich would ]end itself to block modifications in the
time frame of the early ]990's. In the case of future vehicles
we are interested in the technology extending to 20]0.
In addition to the obvious requirement of meeting performance
requirements, life cycle costs (LCC) must be considered with
equal importance. The major LCC factors that will provide low
I.CC are:
* Minimal Launch Cost
* Low mass
* Lo_ volume
* Minimal Operations Cost
* Automation
* Minimal impact on other systems
+ Power generation subsystem drag
+ Thermal control subsystem drag
* Minimal maintenance/replacement cost
* High reliability and long wear-out life
* Low replacement cost
+ Low mean-time-to-repair
+ Modularity
+ Low mass and volume (launch cost)
+ Lo_ production cost
.-]_,._
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ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEMS FOR SPACE STATION
The energy storage options initially considered for Space Station
included battery systems, regenerative fuel cell systems, and
flywheels:
Battery Systems
+ Nickel-cadmium
+ Nickel-hydrogen (CPV)
+ Nickel-hydrogen (IPV)
+ Nickel-hydrogen (Bipolar)
+ Sodium-Sulfur
* Regenerative Fuel Cell Systems
+ Alkaline/alkaline hydrogen-oxygen
+ Alkaline-FC/SPE-EM hydrogen-oxygen
+ SPE/SPE Hydrogen-oxygen
+ Hydrogen-halogen
When the characteristics necessary to meet Space Station IOC were
considered (maturity, development cost, production cost, solar
array cost, thermal control cost, launch cost), the initial
Sl/rx'ive['s were:
* Alkaline/alkaline regenerative fuel cell (RFCS)
* Nickle-cadium battery
* N_ck]e-hydrogen IPV battery
Of these options, Ni-Cad is relatively heavy and costly; Ni-H2
appears lower in overall IOC and operational cost, and is favored
for maintainability and safety. The RFCS has a mass advantage,
but an overall small disadvantage in Space Station IOC cost and
development risk. Bottom line is that the RFCS and the Ni-H2
battery are apparently the finalists based on an IOC date.
Short descriptions of energy storage systems considered for Space
Station follows.
-l.'.J-
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OVERVIEW OF ESS DESIGNS CONSIDERED FOR SPACE STATIONS
Regenerative Fuel Cell. The aklaline regenerative fuel cell
system (RFCS) consists of four identical assemblies. Each
includes a fuel cell module (FCM), a water electrolysis module
(WEM), a FCM accessory section, and a WEM accessory section. The
accessory sections contain the valves, pumps, regulators, heat
exchangers, etc., required for RFCS operation. A set of hydrogen
and oxygen tanks serves two of the assemblies. The electrode
areas of the FCM and WEM are sized to provide a relatively high
efficiency of 62%, which includes losses associated with
accessory section operation. Typical operating voltages of the
FCM and WEM stacks are 155 V.
IPV Ni-Hz battery. The individual pressure vessel (IPV) Ni-H2
battery option consists of four batteries of 275 Ah capacity in
series, distributed over five identical assemblies. These
assemblies hold their 21 cells supported on structural beams that
carry heat pipes for efficient heat removal. Twenty assemblies
are he]_ in two "oven-rack" type arrangements, one per utility
center. Typical discharge voltage is 133 V averaged over the
35-minute, 40% DoD discharge.
Bipolar Ni-H2 battery. The bipolar Ni-Hz battery uses the design
concept developed by Ford Aerospace and Yardney under NASA-LeRc
sponsorship. It consists of four batteries, each w_th three
assemblies in parallel. The assemblies each consist of a
pressure vessel containing two cell stacks of 52 cells in series,
with a capacity of 90 Ah. The cells have the long, rectangular
configuration: about 12 cm wide by 160 cm long. The 16 panels
are mounted in "oven-rack" type arrangements in the Station
utility center.
ESS OPTIONS COMPARISON FOR SPACE STATION
Ni-Cd Battery. The Ni-Cd System consists of 16 batteries of 125
Ah capacity and with 104 series cells. Each battery is divided
into four 26-cell battery packs, mounted on a honeycomb panel
with embedded heat pipes. The 16 panels are mounted in
"oven-rack" type arrangements in the Station utility centers.
Na-S Battery. The sodium-sulfur (Na-S) battery, operating at 300
to 400°C, uses cell sizes close to those being produced
currently. The 75-kW system would consist of four batteries each
with four 87-kg modules of 70 cells of 65 Ah capacity, delivering
about 126 V on discharge. Each module has a variable conductance
radiator system on its external surface. The modules are placed
on the outside of the utility module.
Energy Wheels. The energy wheel data shown represents a blend of
various approaches. This was necessary because of the extremely
wide range of characteristics reported for point designs for
Space Station flywheels.
-TZj-
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A comparison of ESS alternatives are presented in Figure 2. The
alkaline Hz-Oz RFCS is used as the baseline in this comparison.
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Figure 2
PERFORMANCE
The RFCS has a much lower mass than the other feasible systems,
the Ni-Cd, IPV Ni-H2, and bipolar Ni-Hz batteries. However, its
thermal control equipment is considerably heavier than that of
the others, because of the RFCS's relatively low roundtrip
efficiency and its resulting high heat rejection rate, a]beit at
a higher temperature. In the case of the room temperature
systems, it is also feasible to use a common thermal control loop
for the ESS and P_|AD, which is difficult to do _ith the RFCS.
The roundtrip efficiency difference also results in solar array
mass "credit" for the non-RFCS systems. When all the impacts
have been included, the RFCS has still the lowest mass, but the
othe_r systems become more competitive.
By far, the most attractive is the Na-S battery system; however,
this technology has not reached the maturity required for serious
consideration for the IOC Space Station. It provides low mass,
high efficiency, and minimal thermal support requirements due to
the high rejection temperature. With sufficient dex:elopment, its
benefits may be applicable to the growth Station.
-I 27-
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MATURITY
The development maturity for the a]kaline/alkaline RFCS is sp]it.
The fuel cell part has been used on the current Orbiter with
success; the electrolyzer has so far been demonstrated only as a
laboratory breadboard.
In the case of the IPV Ni-Hz battery a 220-AH cell has been
demonstrated by Ford Aerospace and Yardney. Production costs are
lowest for the Ni-H2 system due to low complexity, moderate
modularity, and replication. The RFCS is intermediate due to
greater complexity and lower modularity. Solar array costs and
thermal control system costs are somewhat higher for the RFCS
because of the greater heat. rejection requirement. The RFCS is
about 20% lower than the Ni-H2 in total mass. Overall, for the
early 1990's time frame, costs appear lowest for the Ni-H2
batteries with the RFCS not far behind. NiCad batteries are not
_n the running because of cost and weight.
COSTS
Operations costs appear lowest for the Ni-H2 batteries because of
lower complexity while the RFCS has higher drag related fuel
costs because of the larger solar arrays and more extravehicular
repair activity.
ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEMS FOR CURRENT ORBITER
The development time scale involved for Orbiter block
modification consideration roughly coincides with Space Shuttle
IOC. Consequently, any major improvement in the fuel cells for
the Orbiter could be related to Space Station development.
A significant change in Orbiter mission length could alter the
ESS requirements to reconsider the trades for fuel cells, Ni-H2
batteries, and solar" cells.
The state-of-the-art for fuel cells is, even today, well advanced
over the design used for the Orbiter. Further advancement could
be enhanced with more competition, however. Detailed trade
studies are recommended which would consider implementation of an
improved system with 80% (80 flights) of an Orbiter's life
expectancy left.
ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEMS FOR FUTURE VEHICLES
Looking ahead to future vehicles past the mid 1990's allows much
more latitude in our consideration of alternate energy storage
systems.
Specific mission requirements will undoubtedly require up-to-date
trade studies with the latest projected state-of-the-art. Today
it looks like a run-off between RFCS and Ni-H2 batteries.
Looking far ahead, however, there is the developing lithium cell
(Li/SO2, Li/Thionyl, Li/Sulfuryl Chloride) technology and the
very promising NaS battery.
-] %'_
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SODIUM-SULFUR (NaS) BATTERIES
Future space missions will require much higher power levels than
the 5kw needed today. Directed energy weapons, ultrahigh
resolution radar, and direct broadcast will boost the maximum
requirements se_'eral orders of magnitude. Scale-up of present
energy storage systems to these high power levels is not
practical because of tremendous weight penalties.
The NaS battery is different in that both the anode and cathode
are liquids instead of solids (Figure 3). As such, they do not
experience the fatigue and degradation problems associated with
the continuous cycling of solid electrodes. Conceivably, the
sodium and sulph_2r could continue to cycle forever in an ideal
cell. The life limiting factor in this case is not the
electrode, but the solid ceramic electrolyte and the cathode
container. Shaped in the form of a tube, the electrolyte serves
as both an ion conductor and a separator in the cell.
SODIUM- SULFUR
BAKERYCELL
IR[IbLrllK T[ I¢_.Jr_ll
r _'='
ORIGINA PAr E IS
OF POOR QUALrl ,
SODIUM-SULFUR BATTERY CELL
(Operating temperature range - 350 ° to 400 ° g)
Figure 3
Commercialization goals for terrestrial sodium-sulfur technolog3-
set energy storage costs of the battery at between $50 and $I00
per kilowatt-hour. Compare this with the current average of $50K
per kw-hr for a spacecraft battery. Goals of 30,000 cycles and
ten years life should be achievable through advancements in
research by the year 2000.
Efficiency is the amount of energy withdrawn from the battery
during discharge divided by the amount of charging energy put
into the battery during one typical electrical c_'cle. NaS
batteries are 85-90% efficient while Ni-Cad and Ni-H2 have
eff_ciencies of 75%. This is an additional savings (up to 10%)
in weight for NaS because of reduced solar array requirements.
-] -_gr
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This also results in reduced drag, smaller radar signature, and
reduced altitude maintenance propellant requirements -- while
each is small, their total is significant.
NaS TECHNOLOGY DEFICIENCIES
The cells commonly fail by breakage of the tube resulting from
flaws in the ceramic. Corrosion of the cathode container is the
other factor presently limiting cell lifetime.
Sufficient lifetime and reliability of the NaS cell for GEO and
MAO are questionable. The life goal of ten years is yet to be
attained and will not be known for several years. Cell
reliability is also unacceptable due to something less than 10%
of cell failures still occur within the first 200 cycles.
The NaS battery, at this time, appears to be the best possibility
for meeting future requirements. Its current shortcomings are
well known and only require further development.
In short, there is immediate need of accelerated materials
research for the solid ceramic electrolyte and cathode container.
1.4.10.7 Conclusions and Recommendations
The launch processing time required for the PRSD system is not
consistent with the requirements for an operational system.
A new technology requirement exists for fuel cells with minimal
maintenance -- or replacement of fuel cells with new technology
batteries. The latter alternative, batteries, does not appear to
be a reachable goal with known technology. However, any R & D
goals for fuel cells should place maintainability on equal status
with the performance specifications. Even a cursory look at the
3794 pages of OMI's for the current Orbiter PRSD makes it
readi]y apparent that this is not an operational type system.
It is understood that there is an RFP being released b_ SDIO for
deve]opment of a fuel cell with 30 times the power density of the
current Orbiter cells. Details of this RFP were not available at
the release date of this report.
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1.4.11 ORDNANCE OPERATIONS (Tentpole F)
1.4.11.1 Summary
Ordnance devices must be handled with care and have rigid safety
restrictions to prevent accidental detonation. All ordnance
operations are performed slowly and carefully. "Slowly" often
means a task time that is not ideal for an operational type
transportation system. In addition to being slow the hazardous
nature of ordnance causes other work to be rescheduled or
stopped. Forty-four hours of ordnance operations performed in
the OPF and at the VAB are serial hours where time is at a
premium. Personnel must have special training and equipment and
this limits who may perform the work.
The shuttle uses ordnance to perform several different types of
operations:
I. Ignition devices
2. Release devices
3. Separation devices
4. Range Safety devices
The release and separation devices appear to be candidates for
timeline improvement by substituting non-hazardous and reusable
devices. The use of the shape memory metal Nitinol
(Nickel-Titanium-Naval Ordnance Laboratory) for release or
separation devices is a definite possibility. One of the early
uses of Nitinol was a torsion tube use to trigger the rapid and
reliab]_ r'el_a_e of satel]ite instrument booms, replacing an
explosive bolt. Contact with the originators of Nitinol about
using shape memory devices to replace ordnance was very
encouraging.
The ignition devices and the Range Safety devices were excluded
from detailed examination because of study time l_mitations and
no readily apparent technology,
It is recommended, for both Shuttle and Future Programs, that
concentrated effort be made to eliminate ordnance devices to make
ground operations more efficient. Specifically, it is
recommended that Nitinol technology be explored as a starting
point in replacing ordnance type release and separation devices.
Further technology such as lasers should be investigated for
ignition devices and a complete assessment be made of Range
Safety requirements and ordnance devices.
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ORIGINAL PA,_E iS
OF POOR QUALITY
1.4.11.2 Related Issues
]. Ordnance devices do not lend themselves to quick turnaround
operations.
2. Working with ordnance requires clearing the adjacent or pad
area thus precluding other work being performed.
3. Personnel who handle ordnance must have special training
certification.
4. Ordnance devices require special logistic handling.
and
The following are examples from the Preliminary Issues Database:
_III_I;_llltIltlIl;IIl;l;IIl_l_l_ttl_llIllllll_llllililZlllll¢l_Itl1111¢121;I;
[D: < 70_,G_i Is_ueI_!:TIMEION-LINE :SAFETY
Issueslsicont.: PLAN_IN_ : :
Description:
"HAZARDOUS¢FERATIONSAN_ CON_iT[ON_INTHE VEHICLEPRE?AEATIONAREAGREATLY
AFFECTOPEEATiCN_T_ME_ANP INCREASECOS:5,DURINGSUC}!TIMES,TECHNICIANSARE
PREVENTDFROM_OINGUSEF_ILWOREON THEVEHICLES,AND ONLYONE TASKCAN PROCEEP
AT ANYONE Tl_. TO M!NIMI_ETHRS_DELAYS,ORDNANCEOPERATIONSMUST_
ABSOLUTELYw[_!MTZE[AN['PREFERA_L_ELIMTNATHDFROMTHE PROCRSHiNGFL£_W.
SiM:LARL_,TH_ USE OF TOUC MATER:ALSSHOULDBE ELIMINATEDOR STRICTL_
(:_NT_CLLE[.NRCESSAR_TO_[_MATeRiALSSYSTEMHSHOULDBE MODULARIZEDOR
CONTA[NRRSZE[SC THATE_!IPMENTCAN HE CHANGEDOUT WITHOUTREQUIRINGEVACUATIO_
OFTHE HURR_IPRPINGAREA."
Is_u=S'ur:÷: <!i_T_ , DRAFTDATE__/8_.TABLE_-I
_e....rt_U:,
f":_TPR:VR_ : REQUIREMENTS
PYRCD_VICES
-HAZARDO:I_OPERATION:
-REFURBISHMENT_
INSTALLATIONOFF-LINE
: USE NONELECTRICAL
P_ROTECHNICINITIATORS
: CONDUCTORDNANCE
USHMECHANICAL/
ELECTRO/PNEUMATIC
DHVICES
: MIN!RI_HP_RODEVICE_
: USE LASERINITIATED
PYRODEVICES
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1.4.11.3 Related KSC Schedule History
, The 160-hour schedule had 8 hours for ordnance installation
at the Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF).
. Currently I]2 hours of processing time is spent in ordnance
operations in the following areas:
OPF .................................................. 8 hours
External Tank (E/T) CHECKOUT CELL ................... 24 hours
Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) ..................... 44 hours
PAD ................................................. 36 hours
(20 hours requires complete pad clear)
Total 112 hours
(Total on-line serial time 44 hours)
Th_s schedule is primarily taken from the as-run of 5]-I,, then
modified to simulate a typical STS flow.
The eight hours of scheduled ordnance work
considered serial time since clearing is
restrictions are placed on other activities.
in the OPF is
required and
The 68
paralle].
the OPF.
ho_Jrs in the VAB (including the E/T checkout cell is
work since it is primarily done while the orbiter is in
It does restrict some other work in the VAB.
The 36 hours at the pad is the most detrimental to the schedule.
At least 20 hourm requires clearing the whole pad and _t would be
hard to calculate how many man-hours of other work are lost.
-135-
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1.4.11.4 Current STS Methods
The descriptions below of the current STS OMI's for the
installation of ordnance provide a graphic view of the
complications, time on-line, and manhours expended because of the
current design:
OMI V5012, Ordnance Installation and Checkout (LPS), is worked in
the OPF. The following ordnance items are installed requiring a
lO-foot radius to be cleared during hazardous operations. The
nose landing gear strut thruster cartridge, the forward
separation bo]t pressure cartridge, the Remote Manipulator System
(RMS) Manipulator Positioning Mechanism (MPM) pyro, the KU-BAND
pyro, the fir_ extinglJisher pyro and the fire suppression pyro.
Power-off stray voltage checks, shield-to-ground resistance
checks and electrical connection of ordnance are performed
requiring a 10-foot clear around the affected areas.
OMI B5304, SRB Systems Mate and Closeout, is performed at the
VAB. The Linear Shaped Charge (LSC) is installed in the boosters
requiring clearing of levels D, B, & E and roped area on ground
floor. Installation of the Confined Detonating Fuse (CDF)
assemblies requires clearing of platform E-main. Installation of
Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) Ignitor Safe and Arm (S&A) device
requires clearing extensible platform E-main. A 10-foot radius
around the SRB must be cleared for installation of NASA Standard
Initiators (NSI's). The E-main, E-roof and AP-100 platforms are
cleared for cable installation. The SRB holddown post-ordnance
installation requires a 10-foot clear from the SRB aft skirt
ares. C]ogeout firing-line continuity checks require the above
mentioned areas to be cleared.
ONI T5142, SRSE Ordnance Installation, is also performed in the
VAB. The external tank Shuttle Range Safety System (SRSS) LSC is
installed in the LOz and LH2 cable trays. The appropriate levels
of the E/T checkout cell are cleared during LSC installation.
OMI $5009_ Final Ordnance Installation/Connection, and Aft
Closeout (LPS), is final ordnance installation, connection and
aft c]oseout at the pad. This procedure is performed in two
parts. The first part requires clearing to pad perimeter for SRB
ordnance operations, Cargo ordnance operations, Tail Service Mast
(TSM) ordnance operations, Orbiter forward Launch Control
Amplifier (LCA) and aft Left Hand/Right Hand (LH/RH) separation
ordnance operations. The blast danger area is cleared for Pyro
Initiator Controller (PIC) resistance testing on the Orbiter,
external tank and solid rocket boosters. Part 2 requires
clearing to the pad perimeter for stray voltage testing and
ordnance electrical connection.
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1.4.11.5 New Technology Requirements
Replacement for current Shuttle :
devices with non-explosive devices. Candidates for
are:
- Orbiter main & nose gear strut release
- Orbiter/ET separation bolts
- SRB holddown bolts
- SRB/ET aft separation system
- SRB/ET fwd separation system
- SRB frustum separation
- SRB parachute cutter
- SRB main parachute release
- TSH drop weight release bolts
- E/T H2 vent arm release
ordnance release or separation
replacement
Shape-memory metal (Nitinol) has been used to trigger release of
satellite instrument booms replacing an explosive bolt. The
shape-memory can he returned to the original configuration so
those applications on recoverable portions of the vehicle would
not require replacement.
For Future Vehicles:
Eliminate all ordnance devices which require special handling and
restrictive safety measures. This will require innovative
technology for ignition and Range Safety devices. It also means
early coordination with and qualification of devices by the
Range Safety Organizations.
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1.4.11.6 Technology Evaluation
The initial 160-hour schedule reflects 8 hours in the OPF to
install ordnance. The safety considerations required for
handling ordnance preclude ever approaching this amount of time.
To reduce the time involved we must consider performing the same
functions by other means. First the required operating time must
be evaluated for each application to determine actual need.
Present Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications
Document (OMRSD) requirements have I0 or 20 millisecond
requirements on many applications. Each application can then be
evaluated to see if a non-explosive device can be substituted.
Candidate Devices:
The Orbiter main & nose gear strut release pyros are a back-up
system and are initiated if the main hydraulic unlocking
mechanism failm to operate. These devices are initiated by
pressure cartridges. They are installed at the OPF and the OPF
is the last point they can be accessed. See Figure 1 for
location of main landing gear pyrotechnic release thruster. Nose
gear is similar.
Emergency Uplock
Pyrolechnic ReleaseThrusler
/'
Up
ORBITER MAIN AND NOSE RELEASE PYRO
Figure 1
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The SRB holddown bolts have a load limit of 1,135,000 pounds and
a minimum ultimate load of 1,512,000 pounds. They are preloaded
to 725,000 to 834,000 pounds. They must operate bpt_een 200F and
]500F. These devices are initiated by detonators. They are
installed at the VAB and the PAD is the last point they can be
accessed. The frangible nut is shown in Figure 2 and the
insta]]ation in Figure 3.
,,-  CCCCCC   II_2 /IUPlIIHIIGAL
II
3.f_-4-_lN IUTT - !
I. 27¢,. /
f /I-z
| -- //"_////"'_¢" |_ 14 •
--..Iem i_
3
L IU[PARA|_ PLA#_
FRANGIBLE NUT
Figure 2
IIIF. DwG. NO. ,O.A.WgI_'
, iml 61m'&_ill_.
$1CTIQN A.A
SRB/MLP HOLDDOWN RELEASE PYROTECHNICS
Figure 3
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The Orbiter/ET forward separation bolts operate similar to the
SRB holddown bolts described above. These devices are initiated
by pressure cartridges. They are installed at the OPF and the
OPF Js the last point they can be accessed. See Figure 4.
ORIGINAl. PAGE IS
OIF. POOR QUALITY
,
ORBITER/ET SEPARATION BOLTS
Figure 4
-'140-
1.4.11 ORDNANCE OPERATIONS (Tentpole F)
(Continued)
ORIGINAL P,' GE
OF POOR QUALITY
The SRB/ET aft separation bolts have a flight load limit of
393,000 pounds axial tension and must operate within I0
milliseconds of initiation signal. They must operate between
20°F and 1200F. These bolts have an installation torque of 1000
foot-pounds. These devices are initiated by NSI pressure
cartridges. They are installed at the VAB and the PAD is the
last point they can be accessed. See Figure 5.
Th_ SRB/ET for_ard separation system bolts have a flight load
limit of 189,000 pounds axial tension limit load with a 55,344
inch-pound end moment. They must separate within 10 milliseconds
of initiation signal and operate within -100F to ]20OF. These
devices are initiated by NSI pressure cartridges. They are
installed at the VAB and the PAD is the last point they can be
accessed. See Figure: 5,.
DIAGONAL _ /II$I .
STllOT :__
AFT SEPARATION BOLTS
SRB SEPARATION SYSTEM ELEMENTS
Figure 5
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The SRB frustum separation currently uses a linear shaped charge
that runs around the periphery of the frustrum. It must operate
between 250F and I050F. The ring thickness at the separation
line is 0.25 inches thick. This device is initiated by a
detonator. It is installed at the VAB and the PAD is the last
point it can be accessed. See Figure 6.
The SRB parachute line cutter must be capable of cutting 3 plies
of 1 */s inch MIL-W-4088, type XX III 12,000 lb. webbing. The
operating temperature range must be 20OF to 200OF. This would
appear to be the easiest device to replace with a Nitinol device.
See Figure 7.
SRB FRUSTUM SEPARATION/CHARGE
Figure 6
PARACHUTE LINE CUTTER
Figure 7
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The SRB main parachute release bolt is a 1.25-]2 UNJ-3A bolt
under a tension load of ]35,000 pounds. The bolt is torqued to
775 +/-25 foot-pounds and must operate at 200F to 2000F. The
current release spec is for 20 milliseconds after initiation
signal. This device is initiated by a detonator. They are
installed at the VAB and the PAD is the last point they can be
accessed. See Figure 8.
MAIN PARACHUTE RELEASE SYSTEM
Figure 8
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TSM drop weight release bolts and the E/T H2 vent arm release are
of a design similar to the SRB/ET and Orbiter/ET forward
separation bolts. All are initiated by NSI pressure cartridges
that make the bolt fracture at a predetermined location. They
are installed at the PAD; and the PAD is the last point they can
be accessed.
Two prime candidates for Nitinol application would seem to be the
SRB parachute cutter and main release. The timing is not as
sensitive and the type of application lends itself to an
electro-mechanical device (solenoid type) or perhaps
shape-memory. Either of these cases could be reusable and not
sensitive to low level stray voltage actuation.
Candidate Techno]o_}- - Nitinol
A number of articles and papers indicate potential uses of shape
memory are still emerging. The following excerpt from June 1984
Materials Engineering is a sample:
When shape-memory alloys are deformed at one temperature,
they remember the previous shape and completely recover it
when heated to a higher temperature. The shape recovery
produces a displacement or a force, or a combination of the
two, as a function of temperature. Shape-memory alloys
(SMA_) are used in applications such as pipe and tube
couplings and electronic tight seals and connectors.
In additions, improved alloy processing and a better
understanding of the shape-memory effect (SME) mechanism has
provided alloys that have a precise mechanical response to
small and repetitive temperature changes. This
characteristic is put to use in mechanical and
electromechanically controlled systems.
Although the shape-memory phenomenon occurs in many alloy
systems, including austenitic stainless steels, most of
these alloys cannot, be used because of some inherent
limitation, such as low ductility, which causes fracture
during shape recovery.
Two alloy systems well suited for commercial application due
to the combination of SME and favorable mechanical
properties are NiTi alloys and CuZnAl alloys.
Alloys having the shape-memory characteristic need to
satisfy certain conditions to obtain shape memory and a
number of variables must be controlled to fabricate a useful
engineering device.
-]44-
1.4.11 ORDNANCE OPERATIONS (Tentpole F)
(Continued)
Foremost,
transformation. Such
graphically reversible
alloys. The crystal
configuration known as
certain temperature or
Those alloys having
an alloy must undergo an austenite to martensite
transformations are crystallo-
and typically occur in ordered
structure can shift into the
martensite when subjected to a
stress and then shift out of it.
a thermoelastic martensite
transformation also have the shape-memory effect.
For example, a wire of shape-memory alloy can be bent into
some configuration at room temperature and then heated until
the austenite crystal structure is attained. When the wire
is quenched, the atoms rearrange themselves into the crystal
form of martensite. If the wire is bent into another
configuration and then heated to a temperature above that at
which martensite reverts to the austenite or parent phase,
an orderly shift of atoms restores the wire to the original
configuration. The memory is accomplished at the martensite
formation temperature or at a higher temperature - where the
alloy reverts to austenite. Transformation temperature is
de%ermined by composition for each memory alloy but can also
be shifted by applied stress. For many alloys, composition
must be controlled within very close tolerances to obtain
the required sensitive temperature.
If a shape-memory metal is mechanically deformed at a
specific temperature, it will return to its original form
when the temperature is raised. The process is known as
one-way shape-memory effect - "one-way" because the shape
change occurs only in heating. Cooling the material
subsequently will not reverse the shape change.
Further
provided
remember
t._o-_cay
heating
stress
research of the shape-memory effect mechanism has
shape-memory alloys that can be "trained" to
t_ configurations. This phenomenon is know as
memory effect because the shape changes both on
and cooling. The metal is trained by appropriate
and/or thermal cycling below the critical
temperature, which limits the number of variants of
martensite formed. Stressing the alloy while cooling from
the elevated temperature to the critical temperature favors
the initial formation of particular variants of martensite.
Repeating the sequence of austenitizing, quenching,
deforming, and reaustenitizing eventually trains the
structure. When this condition is achieved, a specimen will
bend spontaneously during the austenite/martensite
transformation and unbend to the original shape during the
reverse transformation. In both cases, the shape changes
with the absence of an external stress.
By restricting the shape-memory transformation, a usable
force associated with the shape change is available for
doing work or gripping another object. The mechanical
stresses produced are limited only by the material. The
deformation of a part is limited to an internal strain of
between 2 and 9% to achieve 100% shape recovery.
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Shape memory alloys also have excellent fatigue properties.
For example, the cyclic strain required to cause fracture
after a number of cycles is higher by a factor of ten than
that required for' conventional alloys. Generally, after the
first, three to five reversals of temperature, the material
stabilixes to repeated values. However, if a part, such as
an actuator, is overstressed or exposed to temperatures out
of the working range of the alloy for long periods, the
metal carl fail by thermal or mechanical fatigue or the
memory can fade.
Although the nickel-titanium (NiTi) intermetallic compound
was not the first system that demonstrated the shape-memory
effect, as a result of the austenite/martensite
transformati_n, it was the first used for commercial
shape-memory applications. Called Nitinol, for
Nickel-Titanium Naval Ordnance Laboratory, the alloy
provides high yield strength and ductility, high
strength-to-weight ratio, and good corrosion resistance.
With alterations in the nickel-titanium ratio and additions
of small amount, s of other elements of small amounts of other
element_, the martensit_ transformation temperatures range
of -459 to 2120F.
Onf_ of th= first applications was the use of a Nitinol
torsien tube to trigger the rapid and reliable release of
satellite instrument booms, replacing an explosive bolt.
_]nce the phase change from martensite to austenite Js
diffusionless, the shape-memory effect occurs very rapidly
over a narrow temperature range.
Other typical satellite u_es include sun seeker/tracker, torsion
drives and trigger mechanisms.
Acti_it.:. in the application of Nitinol Devices is accelerating
from 19G7 to ]gs0 there _ere 90 patents. By 1987 there were 160
patents.
The followin_ chart of physical and mechanical properties of
55-Xitinol was taken from the October 1969 issue of Materials
Engineering:
Density, Ib/in. 3 0.234
Melting Point,0F 2390
Magnetic Permeability <1.002
Ult Tensile Strength,100 psi 125
Elongation, % 60
Modulus of elasticity, 106 psi 10.2
Shear Modulus, I06 psi 3.6
Poisson's Ratio 0.33
Fat. Strength (I0 _ cyc),1000 psi 70
nk_
......_..... ;\L _' _'"-'-
01= QuAt.rrY
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Although the shape-memory effect was discovered in 1962 most of
the effort to develop practical applications has been fairly
recent. Design News, 12-i-86, names several active participants
and their products:
Beta Phase
frames.
Inc.,Menlo Park,CA, is making shape-memory eyeglass
Innovation Technology International Inc.,Beltsville,HD, headed by
Fredriek Wang (one of the original researchers) is developing an
engine to run on low cost heat sources.
Raychem Corp.,Menlo Park, CA.,has developed several items
including the "Cryotact" ZIF socket and a flexure arm in a hard
disc drive that prevents head crashes.
Memory Metals, Inc.,Stamford ,CT.,is working on electrical and
optical connectors and a line of safety related devices including
an anti-scald sho_er valve.
Nitinol Investigation:
During the Seattle technical survey trip, robotir? applications
were demonstrated which further indicated further development of
Nitinc_l c,r similar alloys have potential for this technology
applicat ion.
._, sp_c'ial technic:el sur'x'e,_ trip was made to the Naval St, rface
Weapons C_nter (ex Naval Ordnance Lab) to provide a cursory look
at. the potential application of Nitinol to substitute ordnance
type de\'ices. Discussion of the ten selected devices with David
Goldstein of NSWC, a Nitinol Specialist, revealed that the
technology should support innovative design of substitute
devices. Nitinol is capable of providing 300K PSI as a one-shot
r_peration or 20OK+ PSI on a repetitive basis. Reaction time is
n_,t a parameter that has been thoroughly researched. Although
Kit ino] has the approximate resistivity of niehrome _,'Jre, there
i s a need for basic energy versus mass curves. Also, a
requirement for inn_vative design to minimize triggering mass and
the required power/energy for triggering.
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1.4.11.7 Cost Trades
SHUTTLE COST TRADES
Implementation Description: Eliminate ordnance devices by making
substitute devices using Nitinol.
implementztie_Cc.=tEsr,im_te:
..... g_r! ur_ Materials C0_ment
Designi Quai.Test_
Man_facturin_ cost for3
M_difioati:n_ venic!es
[n_t_llaticn
TOT_I,_
VS_I[OH 44 21:
_._55( ,.: .'7 Lt
TZigL ST ::/: eel _4 L'A
$50_ PA! I_[ _'A
Safety _ Logi_uic_ L'A
NAT _THR DMH MAT OTHR
Z34
_/A
_/A
Delta
DMH MAT 'QTH_,
KA
_/A
N/A
N/A
Ground Operations Savings for Future Vehicles:
The cost savings for future vehicles is approximately equal to cost
avoidance of the current STS costs.
$$ COST ANALYSTS: This data is presented in Section 1.6.3, COST
TRADE SUMMARY.
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1.4.11.8 Conclusions & Recommendations
Due to the criticality of the operations that ordnance devices
perform, a high confidence level will be required for any
replacement device. Careful analysis should be performed on the
OMRSD requirements for each application. A careful study should
be performed for nther possible substitute devices. Nitinol
appears to be a very likely candidate for these devices. Since a
number of companies are trying to enter the shape-memory market
the timing for research or study contracts should be ideal. This
study therefore recommends that further research into the use of
shape-memory devices(for ordnance substitutes) be done as soon as
possible.
The ignition devices and the Range Safety devices were excluded
from detailed examination because of study time limitations and
no readi ]y apparent technology.
It is recommended, for both Shutt]e and Future programs, that
concentrated effort be made to eliminate ordnance devices to make
ground operations more efficient. Specifically, it is
recommended that Nitinc)l technology be explored as a starting
point _n replacing ordnance type release and separation devices.
Further, that _ther technology, such as lasers, be investigated
for ignition devices and a complete assessment be made of range
safety req[_irements and ordnance devices.
Tn the ease nf Nitinol technology, it is specifically recommended
that NASA KSC fund a small investigation by the Naval Surface
Weap(_n Center to provide the missing basic data on reaction time
and energy/power/mass relationships as a basis for' a later RFP
for substitute ordnance devices.
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1.4.12.1 Introduction
Design for performance has been the priority goal for new systems
for decades. Consequently, many analytical procedures and data
bases have been developed to accomplish these design activities.
In contrast, design for support has had much lower priority;
consequently, few analytical procedures and databases have been
developed which allow the support factors to be included in the
design process.
Hnwever, thP opportunity exists today to significantly, and
dramatically, improve the capability to design for
supportability. The opportunity exists now because of the
convergence of four historical trends.
The first trend is the steadily increasing demand by the
Department of Defense to drastically improve the maintenance and
support of systems while reducing manpower and costs.
The second trend is the accumulation of evidence from recent
research performed by the Human Resources Laboratory at
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base which indicates that maintenance
and iogistic_ supporf characteristics must begin with early
concept studies. This research indicates, also, that one of best
ways to improve design for support is to put the maintenance and
logistics data and factors directly into the daily working
procedures used by the design engineering personnel. (Reference
l)
The third trend is the "explosive" emergence of computer aided
design (CAD) as the daily working procedure within American
industry for design of products. One of the main reasons for
this rapid gro_th is that CAD greatly reduces the time and
engineering labor hours required to produce a new design. The
opportunity, therefore, is to link these trends and develop the
technical capability to put maintenance factors, logistics
factors and operational requirements directly into the CAD
proces_ being used by the aerospace industry. This technical
capability does not exist today except in limited scope and then
only in isolated cases. The current status of design for support
is primarily that of analyses being performed "off-line" from the
main performance engineering design activities, and then being
performed "after the fact" without input to major design
decisions. Development of the technical capability to put
maintenance and logistics factors directly into the main CAD
process can change this picture. Design for supportability can
become an on-line design activity.
The fourth trend is one that will tie together the first three
and maximize their combined effect on development of the next
generation systems. As costs have risen, the competitive
posit_on of aerospace industry in the world market has been
further weakened by the inequity of foreign governments
subs_diz}ng man1_facturing and operating costs. To meet this
challenge the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company has developed
the Design/Build Te_m (DBT) concept as a dramatic approach to
cost reduc'tion and product improvement.
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1.4.12.2 Issues
This Study used the STS 51-L(the last Challenger flight) launch
operations data and the post 51-L reports as a point of
departure. This data was then used to analyze the launch
operations characteristics and place documented problems into one
or more of several categories called "ISSUES".
A total of 40 different categories were identified, 18 of which
will be discussed here. The following list contains those Issues
that have a potential for avoidance in the future by
incorporation of techniques within ULCE.
ACCESSIBILITY
CHANGECONTROL
CONSTRAINTS
DESIGN
DESIGN CRITERIA
DISCIPLINE
DRAWING SYSTEM
INTEGRATION
LOGISTICS/SPARES
MAINTAINABILITY
MANAGEMENT
PAPERWORK
PROCEDURE
QA
RELIABILITY
REQUIREMENTS
STANDARDS
TRAINING/CERTIFICATION
1.4.12.3 ULCE Related Issues
Each of the issues described above is listed in the following
section with a brief description of the general nature of the
problem. Source of these quotes is the Issues Database from this
Shuttle Ground Operations EfficiencieslTechnologies Study. The
number of occurrences of the issue in the database will give the
reader a relative feeling of its severity as evidenced by the
degree of documentation by numerous committees and organizations.
Accessibility:
(104
occurrences)
"...Contract specifications need to stress LRU
maintainability/accessibility...Fund maintainability and
accessibility up front to significantly reduce unnecessary
support costs in the operational area...include a
logistics representative on the design team to continually
address the problems of standardization, ease of
maintenance, and accessibility..."
Change Control:
(30)
"...The qualification of the test article was not in all
cases representative of the flight configuration...Work
accomplished on Flight 10 was formally approved for Flight
ll...This OMI was deviated to change the configuration of
the holddown post-blast shields for launch, formal
engineering was not available for the operations, verbal
agreements were reached and four of the blast shields were
modified, post launch inspection revealed that the items
incorporated for the mod were blown away at launch..."
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Constraints:
(18)
"...Events associated with the STS 51-L mishap identified
SRM flight, safety issues not addressed in the FRR
process...Manpower limitations due to high workload
created scheduling difficulties and contri but_d to
operational problems...MSFC is not part of the formal
IIZA (Tnflight Anomaly) tracking system...Team members
identified sex:era[ problems with the constraint system
_¢h ich hampered effective traceabi 1 ity of open work
items...I, imited visibility of the constraints status make
it difficult to identify and schedule work to support the
test flow..."
Design:
(750)
"...Designers of black boxes should position PCBS so they
_il] be vertical when the black box is installed in the
system. Locate electrical feed through connectors on the
side or back, not on the bottom...Design specs would
require simplicity of design/accessibility to facilitate
maintenance, maintainability verification should be
conducted to identify & correct maintenance deficiencies
before design is "'frozen"..."
Design Criteria:
(298)
...Perform fit checks of mission equipment hardware on a
high fidelity mock-up at the design agency to preclude
field problems...Provide a defined maintainability design
criteria at the inception of the program and a design
review board to monitor adherence to these criteria..."
Discipline
(125)
"...Five weeks after the 51-L accident, the criticality of
the solid rocket motor field joint _as still not properly
documented in the problem reporting system at
_|arshal i . . .Work authorization doe1_mentation audit, the
review has found that the ability of the work control
d,_(_nmentat ion system to guarantee proper real time
exe('ution _f tasks and their subsequent traceability is
inhibited by fact_rs that must be identified and corrected
b)" I{SC management..."
Drawing System:
(20)
"...incremental delivery of Orbiter/payioad mod kits is a
problem. A system m_Jst be devised to I .D.
problems/delays before becomin_ constraints to the
field...Reference designators _hould he of a constant
fr_rmat across :_ll pr'ogr_m elements: Orbiter, External Tank
(ET) , Solid Rocket Rooster (SRB._) , develop a uniform
system...V_ni'ni'(,e ;_ ._tandarc{ized drawing _nd part number
system <_n al I contractor and government furnished
e,lllipment... "
Integration:
(ll)
"... Provi,|o :_ full fi,ielity model for s,lh-sy_ t,÷m
m_intaiL_ability t._._t, ing, t.o be used early in the desiqn
phase to verify ,lesiOn requirement <:ompliance..."
Logistics: "'...Use stan,iar'd industry hr_r'dl.are rather than ,ini(lUe
(81) h:irdware, unique l Emits the ava/lability of _pares anti
dt'lv_s up the ,:ost..."
Maintainability: "...>!aint.enance requirements should be: [d,-,nt it'l_-d prior
_i ) t _('>" " ,lesi!In; Imposed at. the sub ,-cot r:_ot(_r l_,v,,] , (le._i_n
_.,,,ltlil',_m_n ts |fillS t :t,_d I't'q. _- fn:ti n ti,rl:Iri¢2#_ . . . "
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Management:
(82)
"....Methods should be developed which assure more direct
design contractor involvement in the processing and
testing effort at the launch sites...Signature
requirements on 'Real Time' work paper (deviations,TPS'
[PR'S etc.) are lengthy and required personnel are
geographically scattered ..."
Paperwork:
(I04)
"...The OHRSD system is very difficult to paper track with
respect to auditing requirements. The OMP and PSP which
are often incorrect in the deviations and revisions are
incorporated between the publication of one document and
another. The OMP is not a closed loop system and is
sufficiently complex such that cognizant systems engineer
is the only person who knows the full status of OHRSD
requirements..."(ref, to,'Paperwork Problems' for details)
Procedure:
(94)
"...Of the 51 work documents generated by the MCR's, 96%
were found to have errors of an administrative or format
type as defined by the SPI (Standard Practice
Tnstructions)...Task deviation log does not indicate
effectivity of temporary deviations. Therefore, there is
no foolproof way to determine if a temporary deviation is
effective on a given run..."
QA:
(107)
"...OMRSD V41BG0.010 which checks the redundancy of
individual regulators was not verified under flow
conditions...The leak check steps for test port _4 were
inadvertently omitted from OMl V[009.04. This is a
violation of OHRSD V41AZ0.070..."
Reliability:
(51)
...Design is a compromise between performance,
reliability, maintainability, weight, space restrictions,
safety, etc. Management must re-prioritize these factors
so maintainability receives it's deserved attention..."
Requirements:
(167)
"'...The processing support plan is a KSC document that
1 ist.s all work that may he performed on a specific STS
flow and li_ts OMRSD requirements and OHl's that will be
released. The PSP is published about 50 days prior to OPF
roll-in and is continually updated by system engineers.
There is NO feedback into the OMP..."
Standards:
(33)
"...Probl_,m reporting requirements are not concise and fail
to _et or'} t.ic_[ information to the [)roper levels of
m;_.rl:i_elll_nt . . . "
Training/Certif: "...Trainin_ must he adequate to en_ure that ;ill w,_rkers
(3l) :_,',+ :_hl_ r.,) _omply with t.h_ regul:_t, ions l<hi(:h govern the
paperw_rk _Sst_m .... The OHR._D requirement, of 1 paid in
the mani{',}ld was violate,| in that 6 psid were present
(';kUSirl_ t.h+_ \':_IVt_ tO sl:Im..."
'rhi,_ n,ultii) li(:ity t_l" i)rohl_ms is ast.oni_hin_! It is
| }|:tt ;t _,_ _ t t:IIL _+++ ,{eve [ <)pe(i t¢) ('ont ro [ |.best++
L,r'L+L,I+,,n_. l!l,('l +'. (';in pr,>vi,i++ t.h_ (+'ore _<)l,{tion ? +
i ml>, +rat. ive
i n t ++'r r(" ] :_ t.,+',i
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1.4.12.4 Today;s Methods
The problems identified in the previous Issues section all have a
common denominator, lack of SUPPORTABILITY. Each of the issues
discussed in the previous section are the result of vehicle
supportability being de-emphasized early in the design phase.
This problem can be seen in almost all vehicle sub-systems as
well as ground support systems.
The emphasis on performance has resulted in many tools being
developed to support the evaluation of a given design for
performance. The evaluation of supportability is primarily
performed off-line, after-the-fact and if it is performed at all,
too late for initial design influence.
It is clearly defined that the life cycle cost (LCC) of a system
can be divided int.o four primary phases.
]. The Mission Definition phase involves conceptualizing the
system; defining the problem to be resolved and
considering initia] architectures.
° The Design phase in which the system is designed and the
prototype J_ constructed and tested.
3. The Production phase entails manufacturing the product.
° The Operations phase involves repair, operations, spares,
training, product improvements, maintenance testing etc.
The distribution of the LCC for a DOD or commercial
given in Figure 1 ;
system is
LCC Phase LCC %
I. Definition <I %
2. Design <I0 %
3. Production 30 %
4. Operations 60 %
DOD LCC Distribution (reference 3)
Figure 1
The current STS LCC has a distribution as shown in Figure 2;
LCC Phase LCC %
1. Definition <I %
2. Design 6 %
3. Production 8 %
4. Operations 86 %
SHUTTLE LCC DISTRIBUTION (reference 4)
Figure 2
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In the past, up front costs and performance have been given
priority at the expense of reliability and maintainability. The
design of future systems will have to consider Operational
requirements including reliability and maintainability; at the
same level as performance, if our designs are to provide life
cycle costs competitive in the market place.
The prime reason for this trend has been political economics. If
inadequate funds are allocated for the initial design and
manufacturing, then proof of concept (initial flight) take a] ]
the allocated funds leaving none for maintainability, and
reasonable life cycle costs factors.
1.4.12.5 New Technical Requirements
The previous sections have identified the urgent need for a
radical shift in design techniques. The methods used to design
systems Jn the past, although adequate in their time, are no
longer suitable 'for systems of the future where low cost
operations are paramount..
There are several CAD (Computer Aided Design) technologies
currently available or in development that can alleviate many of
the operational problems associated with today's Shuttle.
To define the nature of the work required to
capabi] ity, it is necessary first to understand
characteristics of such a system: (Reference I)
provide CAD
the relevant
I. Quickness of reaction time is probably the characteristic of
CAD that _Jll most affect the future design for supportability.
Entire vehicle system design must be established within days or
weeks. Support analyses for proposed designs cannot exist
off-lin_. Support analyses will need to respond rapidly or they
_cil] be disregarded.
2. Computer-bamed automated analysis models are an essential
part of the CAD process. Presently these models are used to
assess performance characteristics or weight and balance. These
automated analysis models are one of the reasons for quick
reaction time of the CAD process. Automated maintenance and
logistics analyses models will also be required.
3. The ability to view objects in three dimensions is now
resident within many CAD systems. Color representation of
objects is now possible. These characteristics will afford
opportunities to use CAD to perform mockup maintainabilty
evaluations of equipment during early design.
4. The design and drawing data generated by CAD are being
bridged to the databases that operate numerically controlled
machines _,'ithin the manufacturing facility. The data flows from
CAD tr_ CAXl and eveniuslly to field and service engineering.
Unfortunately, the databases that are used in maintenance and
log:i_t ic._. analy._.i._ models are not linked wi th the CAD/CAN
engineering databases. Design tasks for future systems will have
to prnvide for supportabi]it,v analysis data interchange with
C:\D/CA_!.
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5. Design systems of the future will be required to provide an
integrated data path, providing a birth-to-death documentation
trackin 8 capability. Data generated during the design and
manufacturing phase will have to be compatible _¢Jth the data
structures and processing systems used in the field and vice
versa.
6. To achieve the maximum benefit from new computer aided design
techniques will require new management techniques that can
instill within the project four basic steps (William E. Conway,
Conway Quality Inc.):
A. Desire to change
B. Belief that change can be accomplished
C. Wherewithal to change
D. Doing
1.4.12.6 Technology Evaluation
The Air" Force Human Resources Laboratory, Wright-Patterson AFB
(AFHRI.) is jnvo]\ed in the development of future aerospace
systems design techniques to reduce LCC (Life Cycle Costs) and
increase supportability, this project is known as ULCE (Unified
I.ife CFe]e Engineering).
There are three primary components in ULCE;
1. IDSS (Integrated Design Support System)
2. RAMCAD (Reliability and Maintainability through
Computer Aided Design)
CREW CHIEF and TARS (Turnaround and Reconfiguration
Simulation).
3. IMIS (Integrated Maintenance Information System)
IDSS
The integration of dissimilar CAE/CAD/CAM and operational data
sources on local and geographically distributed networks is the
major problem faced in the development of ULCE. The development
of the IDSS by the Air Force will provide a means to accomplish
this integration. The goal of IDSS is to develop a computer
soft,care methodology for the acquisition, storage, retrieval and
coordination of technical information between design engineering
effort_ and operational activities to support such developments
as Operations and _laintenance Instructions (ONI) , training
proKrams, and operations problems analyses. The IDSS will
provide for the reduction and duplication of data while also
providin_ f'_r r_pid distribution and increase in qua]ity of the
data. (Figure 3. )
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IDSS
Figure 3
The architecture of the IDSS is comprised of two main areas the
E_:eoi_tive Cc_rltro] Sb'_tem (EC_) and the Data Acquisition System.
(see Figure 4.)
ECS _,_ DAS
EXECUTIVE DATA
CONTROL AOUISITION
SYSTEM SYSTEM
I •
ECS
Figure 4
The F.CS _,ill provide for:
]. User interface
2. Application software (e.g Data query,Data Edit, etc}
3. Data coordination and distribution
4. Configuration control
5. Project management
6. Data security (i.e Data access control)
The DAS portion will provide for;
1. Heterogeneous H/W and S/W systems
2. Distributed database management
3. Netlvork communications protocol
4 . Data integrJ ty
-158-
1.4.12 PAPERWORK & REQUIREMENTS (ULCE) (Tentpole G)
(Continued)
IMIS
The modern operational environment is being increasingly
inundated with additional information systems. Each new
"operational aid" is an operations hindrance because it forces
technicians to learn yet another "system" To utilize the
valuable information these new systems offer, while eliminatinK
the specialization required for each, AFHRL is developing IMIS.
IMIS ,_il] utilize a very small portable computer/display to
interface with on-board systems and ground computer systems to
provide a single, integrated source of information needed to
perform req_ired task_ on-line and in the shop. IMIS will
consist of a world,ration for use in-shop, a portable computer for
flight line use, and a vehicle interface panel. (Figure 5. )
ORIG!N_L PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
)
IMIS SYSTEM IMIS
Figure 5 Figure 6
The system will provide the technician with direct access to
several information systems and databases compatible with IDSS.
IM!S will process, integrate, and display maintenance information
to the technician. The system will display graphic and/or
technical instructions, provide intelligent diagnostic advice,
analyze in-flight performance and failure data, and access and
interrogate on-board built-in-test capabilities. It will assure
that all of the Operational and Maintenance requirements are
satisfied by directly interrogating the requirements database.
(see Figure 6.)
It will also provide the technician with easy, efficient, methods
to receive work orders, report maintenance actions, order parts
from supply, and computer-aided training lessons complete with a
_imulat_on capability.
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RAMCAD
RAMCAD is a joint Air Force in-house and contractor study to
develop an analysis model and database structure for assessing
the lotation of line replaceable units (LRUs) within a vehicle
_ith regard to failure rate of the components and accessibility
for maintenance actions. The goal is to develop an automated
assessment mode] which will yield a quantitative index of the
"goodness" of a given arrangement of LRUs within a housing.
CREW CHIEF and TARS
Crew Chief is a computer-based model of the technician which can
be used to assist in the evaluation of equipment designs. The
early design was based on the COMBINATION model which was an earlier
product of Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory,
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. The Crew Chief model can be
used to provide mockup-type evaluations of equipment on 3-D
in_pr_otiv_ graphic displays.
Crew. Chief can be utilized to evaluate such maintenance
ol)eraticn_ a_ component testing, component removal and
replacement, vehicle servicing and turnaround activities, engine
removals, fuel and ordnance loading. The operations may be
performed with the model wearing various types of clothing, such
as warm weather, cold weather, and chemical defense gear(SCAPE).
Exploded vle_< enlargements of hand and arm activities to include
manipulation of t_o]s are included. It is also possible to
_valuato human strength capabilities for various lifting and
pulling task_. (see Figure 7. }
OR!GI_IAL PAG_ :S
OF POOR QuALrI"Y
CREWCHIEF
Figure 7
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TARS is a tool similar to Crew Chief except the emphasis is on
the interaction of the entire operations £eam with the vehicle.
Provisions are also made for placing the vehicle within a
processina facility. This system will provide for the same level
of detail as Crew Chief including 3-D interactive graphics while
also a]]owin_ the designer to evaluate the operations team
accessibility to the vehicle, such as the process of engine
removal, placement of work stands , positioning and access for
robotics, payload bay reconfiguration, and assorted OMI
development.
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1.4.12.7 Management Technology
Without management acceptance,implementation and followup, no
successful system can be installed. The discussion of new
management technology is a topic deserving of a paper of its own.
The topic is so important, to the success of any project, that it
must be mentioned here in an attempt to convey its meaning.
The first two management steps Desire and Belief, of the four
basic requirements to instill a change, represent about 80% of
the effort required to accomplish a change. The aforementioned
computer aided techniques are the Wherewithal to accomplish the
change and will only be of use if the first two steps are
completed. For example the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company is
placing new management, techniques "on-line" that will provide the
m_ans to accomplish the first two steps. Boeing believes this is
necessary to survive in tomorrow's marketplace.
Productivity improx'ement planning requires the same kind . of
systematic approach as financial planning. Every manager from
t},_ hi_he_t level (i.e. Presidential and Congressiona_ ) do_n
must establish a plan to instill the Desire and Belief that
change is required and possible. This must be a continuous
process requiring frequent follow-up reinforcement.
The manager's greatest responsibility is to work on the system
i tse] f; this re(luire._, making changes in the ways in which _.'ork
is performed at all levels of the project. These types of
changes are usually highly effective at producing both increased
quality And reduced costs. Experts in productivity improvement
estimate that 80% or more of" the opportunities for change are the
resu] I of managen,_n! 's improvement of the system to a] Io_" change.
The workers accomplish the remaining 20%.
TF a [,r'o}_lem is shared among several groups, it is important for
these gr'oups _f_ share the accountability for it. and to ,_ork
together' t(_ solve it. Design Build Teams (DBT) are an effective
way _ do this. The DBT has members from all of the affected
funct innal area_; dpsign engineering, manufacturing, materials,
operations, etc. All team members participate directly in the
design pr(,ee_, each assuring that the initial design meets all
of the operational and performance requirements.
A quote from W. Edwards Demming (of Japanese industry fame) may
be best, to close this brief discussion of new management
techniques;
"Eliminate targets, slogans, pictures, posters for the
work force, urging them to increase productivity,
...ghat is needed is not exhortations but a road map
to improvement, management's obligation.
Pressure t(_ work harder or better does not achieve productivity
improveme.nt . >h_._.I _,(:rkers already believe they are doing the
b_.-:t they can in the current environment. Evaluatin_ them by the
quality of their work places the entire responsibility for
impr'ovement on them alone.
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1.4.12.8 COST TRADE
Improvements in lh_ paperwork processing systems using the IMTS
concepts described shove can produce a r_duotion in [,Jfe Cyo1_
Cost for the present configuration of the Shuttle of about 5%.
The fol]owin_ figures £ & 9 present Net. Present. Value curve&
showing 5%, 7.5%, & ]0% discounts assuming a realistic flight
rate of 10 per year. Figure 8 Js based on $246_I per flight, which
is actual 1985 expenditures during which 8 STS's were launched.
Figure 9 shows the same information based on a per-flight cost of
$]00M, which is an estimate based on achieving a flight rate of
24 per year or a 300% increase in the flight rate over the rate
of 1985.
The best that can be hoped for without major Shuttle block
modifications is to improve the launch processing sytems to
minimiz_ the paper_cork and establish this system for future
vehin]ns. If the Shutt]_ £]]e_ an additional 45-55 flizhts then
a payback may be achieved for the current Shuttle configuration.
If th_ r_:Tr(_nf _hutt_e dne_ not mana_n annther 55 £1Jghts then
the system wi] ] be on-) Jne and available for the next generation
STS conf'Jgur.atic_n_.
NETPRESENT
VALUE
(MILLIONS)
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
-200
-400
O&M IMPROVEMENT DISCOUNT 5°/,_ /
IRR • -24% 7.5 ,_,
=o
j<_ 395
,, .... i_ _ ! ', ', ' 1 ', ', 1 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
YEARS
IMIS IMPLEMENTATION
(10 FLIGHTS PER YEAR - $246 MILLION PER FLIGHT)
Figure 8
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NETPRESENT
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Figure 9
1.4.12.9 Conclusion
Design for Performance has been the priorit,v goal for new systems
for decade._.. The :'esu]t when supportability takes a back _,eat to,
p_rformar',o,_ [._. exemp] _ lied _n the overwhe]m_n_ [.ife Cycle Co_t
and schedule delay_ evident in the operation of the current
S},ut,t I _.
The Shutt le Ground Operations Efficiencies/Technologie._ Studs-,
usin_z data made. available primarily as a result of the, 51-L
incident }_a_ been able to document a host of problems that are
r_latn.h!_ to.. th_ la.qk of supportability eonsiderat ion._, in design
of the- Shl_lt ]e.
The c;urrenl CAD design tools utilized are all related to
per forman_-e with little or no consideration being given to
reliabi 1 ity and maintainability requirements. The USAF has a
major effort underway to improve supportability for new systems,
b;, de\eloping des i._n tools to provide on-line analysis of
sul)portahi]it5 for a proposed design. These tools will include
maix!tenanc'e arid reliability factors within CAD.
it i_, re._lized that improved design for support is. not the only
m_anF. I o an end. Improved training of maintenance personnel ,
t,ot ter jo}_ perf',arman,-_'e t, hruu_h new management t.echniquos, and
bet ter automat _d ma.: nt enan_e aids and c:on_ept._. _-:i I ] also
oontri!_t_. However, improved design for suppor't _-.il I make a
_i_l_i l i,,a,._, _'c_,,_t r'ihut i on, and inc]udinK r_l iabil it5 and
maintai_:a'._i i i t.y fa_t.ors in C_D will make a significant
_ontrl.bt_t i_,:i 1_.. impr'ovin_ the design.
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1.4.12.10 Paperwork Problem References
PAPERWORK PROBLEMS -- SUMMARY
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The Presidential Commission Report. on the Space Shuttle
Cha]lenKer Accident noted that of the approximately 5000
documents evaluated, a large percent were found to be incorrectly
executed. The discrepancies were generally minor in nature, such
as incorrect signatures, missing signatures, lack of Quality
Control, jneomplet.e rationale for closure, etc. An in-depth
review of all KSC Shuttle Processing paperwork was also conducted
by several paperwork review teams. These teams were co-chaired
hy both XASA and SPC, and team members included representatives
from the organizations responsible for Space Shuttle Processing.
The information below is taken from these reports.
PAPERWORK PROBLEMS -- CURRENT KSC METHODS
Operation Maintenance Instruction (OMI)
I.SOC/NASA quality reviewed 121 OMI's, 47% (57 OMI's) had paper
errors, of a relatively minor nature. 13% of the OMl's had some
data recording points missing or incorrectly documented (such as
ca]ibrat }oI, date_, \c_]tag_, temperature, and pressure reading_
not. recorded).
Work %uthorizat ion Documents (WAD)
A total of 479 Orbiter WAD's in the IPR, PR, or TPS category were
revie_.:ed, of the 479 70_. had the following anomalies:
36% - Inadequate/inaccurate level of detail
2.19X - k-.\D n_t properly stamped by Shop/QC/QK
29% - Correct signatures not. obtained
20_, - Inadequate summary for closure/deferral
9% - Task not performed correctly the first time
°Z". - R_,te._.t not adequate/satisfactory
2_. - Inadequate rational to defer WAD
Modification Change Requests {MCR)
A total of 22 MCR's were applicable to the 51-L processing flow.
An independent safety review of all MCR's discovered the
fol lowin, a error_ :
20% - Critical skills or wrong numbers for skills
20% - No certification annotated
80% - Procedure/format problems
20% - Mi_sin_ Safety stamp
40% - Qua] ity disposition on a Safety area
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These MCR's generated 5] Work Authorization Documents which were
reviewed, 96% were found to have the following errors of an
administrative or format, error as defined by the SPI (Standard
Practice Instructions).
85% - WAD format incorrect
69% - Improperly stamped by Shop/QC
35% - Incorrect Signatures
35% - Required data not recorded
31% - Inaccurate ]eve] of detail
22% - Proper Engineering not identified
]0% - Engineering from Design Center not timely
]0% - Work accomplished did not match Engineering
6% - Retest required not identified
4% - Inaccurate summary for closure deferral
Operation Maintenance Plan (OMP)
IfSC maintains an OMP database to track the OMRSD requirements and
the OMT's and Task Numbers where the requirements will be met.
3Z70NI's listed for 51-L the following observations were made:
]0% - Of the OMl's not applicable to STS-33
]3% - Of the OMl's were contingency procedures
Also, nol.ed that the O_IP is not a closed-loop, therefore as
revision._ t o O_IT '._. are pub] ished, page and task numbers are
frequently incorrect. The O._|P does not reflect the current O_IRS
implementation. And, the OMP does not contain a "clock" such
that when LRU changeouts occur the interval requirement can be
updated to indicate the true effective date.
Proeessin_ Support Plan (PSP)
The Processing Support Plan is a ICSC document that lists all work
that may be performed on a specific STS flow and lists the OMRSD
requi rements and ONI's that will be released. The PSP is
published about 50 days prior to OPF roll-in and is continually
updaled by system er,._ineers. There is no feedback into the O_IP.
General Findings
An unacceptable error rate in the work paper was approximately
50% and had these contributing factors:
- Signature requirements on "real time" work paper (deviations,
TPS's IPR/PR's, etc.) are lengthy and required personnel are
geographically scattered (usually miles, not feet). Rapid
response to problems or changing work schedules is precluded;
encouraging "short cuts".
- The signature
"processors" as
el l_ineeFs.
"loop" is manpower intensive, requiring many
we]] am full time availability of system
- The amount of time required to complete any category of
documentation from open to close is unacceptably high when
compared to the actual time to do the work.
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- Many tasks cannot be "bought off" at the location due to Safety
or physical restrictions: later transferring stamps provides
another failure point.
- Due to its complexity, writers, performers, and "buyers" of
tasks have difficulty in understanding the paper system.
- There are many different levels and categories of paper and
many inconsistencies in the preparation and disposition of this
paper.
- The "tiering" from integrated OH], to standalone OMI, to RTOMI,
to job card (plus all deviations) creates a very complicated
contr'(_] and status trail for Quality Assurance personnel, as _el]
as Operations Nanagement.
- Nany tasks, due to the system or poor discipline in the
origination process, end up with multiple items of work paper,
compounding the buy-off process.
- No singl_ organization ham th_ responsibility for final review
for closure.
ConcI_ision_: During the document review, many areas of unclear
or ineoncise documentation were noted. Instructions in WAD's are
frequently not clear or precise. The OMRSD system is very
difficult to paper track t,'ith respect, to auditing requirements.
The ONP and PSP, which are the KSC supporting documents to the
O_iR.ql) s.vst._m, are usually incorrect in that the deviations and
rexision._: are invariably incorporated between the publication of
one document and the other. Finally, the OMP is not. a closed
leap sy._t em and is. sufficiently eomplex that the cognizant
s v._tem._, engineer is the only person who knows the full status of
O.NI_SD requirements.
Basically, the system is not simplified for the originator,
performer, or verifier; and therefore, is not a tool, but an
impediment to good work and good records - the only reasons for
it's existence.
-187-
1.4.12 PAPERWORK & REQUIREMENTS (ULCE) (Tentpole G)
(Continued)
Recommendations: The solution to this or any problem with a
system as complex as the Space Shuttle Processing paperwork
system requires a team effort. Most importantly, in this
instance, a commitment to compliance with processing procedures
and requirements by high level management and the proper training
and discipline of personnel responsible for using the paperwork
system is required.
To assist management , engineering, and the technicians, in the
Space Shuttle processing operation, maximum emphasis on current.
efforts to develop automated systems to facilitate the planning,
tracking and management, of processing operations. Many changes
being contemplated during this review period will increase the
time required to manually process the paperwork. The
incorporation of integrated automated systems is imperative in
order to ensure proper completion of orbiter turnaround
requirements as the launch rate increases.
Paperwork Problem Improvements In-work: All the work performed
on Shuttle flight, hardware, Shuttle facilities, and Shuttle
gr'ound support equipment must be documented for traceability.
This results in a large amount of documentation which must be
processed each flol_. The time spent preparing documentation for
each flight ea_ be _r=at]y reduced by the use of computer_.
In additit, n to planned work and scheduled maintenance, the
prf)_s_ _eam mu_t be prepared to react efficiently to real time
I,roh_em_ _hich _'esu]t in unscheduled maintenance. Pr'oblems are
documented into three categories. An Interim Problem Report.
(IPR) is used to describe a problem when troubleshootinK is
required to determine the cause ef the problem. A Problem Report
(PR) is used to describe a problem and remedial instructions when
the _au_e of the problem has been determined. A Discrepancy
Repor_ (DR) is used to solve minor problems which can easily be
returned to normal configuration. In a nominal flow, there are
approximately 4000 IPS's, PR's, and DR's written for STS vehicle
processing.
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
POOR Qua,,.,+v
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,
March 1986.
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SPACE SHUTTLE
o
CHALLENGER ACCIDENT
Volumes I and II, May 1986.
HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND
SPACE OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND
TRANSPORTATION - 99th CONGRESS - FIRST SESSION ON NASA
AUTHORIZATION FOR FY-1986. February, March, April 1985.
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1.5 SPACE STATION TECHNOLOGY APPLICATIONS
Significant technology developments are being funded by the Space
Station Program which will be directly applicable to Ground
Operations for both Shuttle block changes and future programs.
The same j._ true for SDIO activities.
A minima] look at Space Station development activity was
accomplished in the study. This resulted in Figure 1, which
illustrates typical Space Station technoiogits under"
_nvestJ_ati_n and their eventual application to space vehicle
ground operations.
SPACE STATION VEHICLE & _ CPI_ATICNS (SHUTrLE/STAS)
DEV£_ $$$
Elect Pwr (_&C Data l_jmt Assenbly & (2K_ckout
EXPI_T SYSTEM
Fault Diagnosis X X X
Trend Analysis X X X
Power Manag_nent X X
Fault Toleranoe X X
Attitude Control X
I_]BOTICS
Teleoperat ion
Proximity Touch &
Force Sensing
Range & Image Under-
standing
F.nd Ef fectors
B_&ER
Batteries
Fuel Cells
OIHER
Video Probe
Electron Beam Welding
X
X
X
X
SPACE STATION TECHNOLOGIES
APPLICABLE TO SHUTTLE AND STAS
Figure I
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1.6 GROUND OPERATIONS EVALUATION SUMMARY
The background and rationale for the future program and Shuttle
recommendations presented in this section were described in
detail in Section ].4, "Tentpole and Related Issues Analyses"
1.6.1 Future Program Applications
FUTURE VEHICLES
The significant conclusions and recommendations related to the
trade studies for future vehicles follows:
] •
_]ajor changes in design and management methodolog7 are
required.
2. New technology
too]m.
involves management and computer-aided
ULCE/CAL:_ (Unified Life Cycle Engineering/Computer Aided
[.oKis#ic._. System). This will provide the means to avoid
maintenance problems such as accessibility, commonality,
change control, interfaces, isolation, procedures,
._andard_, training, Q:\, integration, spares, etc.
•:. DBT/DTC (Desi_n-B_Ji]d Team/Design to Cost)
WJthout consistent long-term management commitment,
through 4 _i]l not work.
Future vehicles, beginning with the Design Concept Phase,
must put life cycle costs ahead of performance. We are
hauling cargo via freighter -- not participating in a
yacht race.
, All engine maintenance should be accomplished off-line
_.ith adequate facilities and spares.
. Car_o should be self-sufficient with minimal power /
contro_ / data interfaces. It should be containerized
and processed entirely off-line. Weight penalties to
provide containerization should be absorbed by system
robustness.
, Design for testability, fault tolerance, transparency to
changes, self-improving diagnostics, false alarm
discrimination, data compression, optimum man/machine
interfaces must all be firm design requirements.
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1.6 GROUND OPERATIONS EVALUATION SUMMARY
(Con t i nued )
1 () .
11.
12.
Large, complex, launch control centers must be eliminated
by incorporation of BIT, BYTE, and concepts such as
sel f-check "automatic test equipment on a chip
technolo_.v" in the vehicle itself. For manned vehicles,
the crew/math ine interface should be capable of
p_,rformin_ the countdown.
Art. ificia] Tnt.elligence and Expert Systems are now in an
infantile stage and are not a panacea for the next round
nf now v_hie]es. It will be the second round and into
the late 1990's before there will be reasonable risk
designs available.
Ordnance devices must be eliminated to accomplish
efficient, processing. It appears practical t.o eliminate
ordnance type release devices at an earl?" date through
the use of technology such as Nitinol. SRB ignition and
range safety devices are a tougher proposition. Some
innovati_ concepts will be required in t.hes_ areas.
Perhap_ sr, met.hing as far out as laser_ for ignition and
weapon s?'_t.em_ linfrared seeker missiles) for range
_afety.
Thore are a large number of desirable (required) features for
fut.ur_ vehicl_ which _er'e not investigated because of Study
limitations. These include:
E! i mi nat_ veh i c.l e hydraul ic _5s t _m._ v:i th
electromechanieal de,.'ice._ to simplify ffround operation._.
2. Kliminale hydraz i r:._ sys! em._ t.o simplify ground
operat icarus.
q. Nini,_iz_ fa_ il ity/GSE/vehicle interfaces, to simplify
groun.i oper:a_ i on._:. El iminate hardwi re electrical
interfac:es, atLd swing arms
4 .
7.
g.
9.
10.
E]iminat_ requirement for ECS GSE to simp]ify ground
op_l'a t i oIk. _, ,
Maximiz_ automation of structural inspection_ to
eliminate requirement, for off-line periodic inspections.
Provide easily maintainable Thermal Protection System.
Standardize propellants, fluids, and grades.
Incorporate automated servicing in vehicle design.
Vehiete/GSE design such that
in1 rasil_ transportation, and
cor:._trained bs" weather.
assembly and checkout,
landing/recovery are not,
El(:. , etc. (See Volume 4, Preliminary Issues Database
for addit ional operational needs under t.opir._ _uch as
ar,c.e._._ i bi 1 i t y, commonality, integration, interface,
i._.o!ation, logistics/spares, maintainability, redundancy,
s.af'_15" , _er'uri!5 , and surface transportatinn).
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1.6 GROUND OPERATIONS EVALUATION SUMMARY
(Continued)
• , iS
I:_RIGINI_L pAGE
i,ooRQU ,LTTY
1.6.2 SHUTTLE RECOMMENDATIONS
1.6.2.1 IMIS (Integrated Maintenance Information System)
Shuttle derived ground operationa] efficiencJes require major
block level modifications, and as shown in the cost trade section
are not recommended. The single item with the largest payback is
a redesign of the SPDMS to conform to IMIS specifications.
The oporstions] env_rnnment is being increasingly _nundsted with
additional information systems. Each new "operational aid" is an
operations hindrance because it forces technicians to learn yet
another "symtem". To utilize the valuable information that these
new systems offer, _zhile eliminating the specialization required
for' each, the Air Force Human Resources Laboratory (AFHRL) is
deve]opin_ IMTS. IMIS will utilize a very smal] portable
computer/display to interface with on-board systems and ground
computer systems to provide a single, integrated source of the
informati(_rL needed to perform required tasks on-the-line and
in-shop.
Th_ _y:_en, wi]! provide the technician with direct access to
several information systems and databases. IMIS wi]] process,
integrale, and display maintenance information to the technician.
Tho ._,y._.tem _<i] ] display graphic and/or technical instructions,
provide into]] igent diagnostic advice, analyze in-flight
performance and failure data, and access and interrogate on-board
built-in-t._st capabilities. It wi]] assure that all of the
operationa] and maintenance requirements are satisfied by
directly interrogating the requirements database.
It ui]] also provide the technician with easy, efficient methods
t,o ree.eive _.'ork orders, report maintenance actions., order parts.
from supply, and computer-aided training lessons complete with a
simu]atir)n capabi] it>'.
1.6.2.2 Orbiter Block Change Candidates
DE, t.he NAS4 Engineering Development organization at KSC, and
XF-PZO, the NASA Shuttlp Engineering Project Offic_ at KSC ha\'_
over 500 specific candidates for vehic]e and GSE modifications.
These return-to-flight-status mod candidates have been developed
at the system engineer ]evel. These candidates are recorded in
the Preliminary I_sues Database, Volume 4 of this report, with
ID's of 1800 to 2900.
Time limitations of the study prohibited an in-depth look at
these DE/KE-PEO candidates. However, based on our Operations
Analysis and approached from the standpoint of OMI processing, we
identified 32 operations which appear to have likely system
candidates for design changes that could significantly reduce
both proces.¢ing time and manhours. There is some overla I) where
thes_ op_r'ation_ o,.,er]Jl_ the DE/NE-PEO candidates. (Figure 1
]isis th,= OMT'x, related systems, the technician manhours, the
TIS r'af'_r'_,_<_ number (from Vo].3 of this Repot-l>, and an
indication if there are related DE/NE-PEO candidates).
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1.6 GROUNDOPERATIONSEVALUATIONSUMMARY(Cont i nL_ed)
TIS
3
5
I0
15
17
19
21
22
23
24
34
35
38
39
41
47
48
54
56
57
68
69
74
79
81
82
83
85
86
87
88
204
TECH
OMI HOURS _H
VI158 56 336
VI091 48 192
V900 IVLI-VI4 ? ?
V5043VLI-VL3 96 1632
VI01 I.01-. 07 252 2064
V5006.01-. 03 12 96
VI009.01-. 05 264 2112
V6018 92 368
V5E02 36 360
V5E06 36 324
V9002 .01-. i0 68 212
VII31 24 120
VI134 8 48
VI078 48 288
VI153 8 56
VI018.02-. 04 8 48
VI055 24 168
VI196 24 168
VI165 72 288
VI003 12 72
VI041 12 72
V5050 24 96
VI037 24 240
VI007 24 96
VI034 ? ?
V5101 12 192
N52XX 48 240
N/A 168 336
N/A 192 1344
N/A 120 840
N/A 72 288
S0024 i00 ?
DE/NE-PEO
SYSTEM MODIFICATON S
FRCS and C_ pod Y
PRSD IO2 and LH2 Y
power up and power down N
heat shield remmral/inst. N
eng leak and functional Y
PLB doors N
_S leak and functional N
cabin air debris screens N
ss_ hpt_ N
hp turbopunlD N
ground power N
hydraulic system _2 N
water drain N
APU lube oil Y
APU water servicing Y
APU/water spray boiler Y
potable water Y
APU fuel tank servicing Y
nose landing gear Y
electrical power N
ECLSS N
crew equipment N
ammonia boiler N
PVD structural leakage test N
flight control N
weight and balance (GSE only) N
cargo/equipment remmval N
cargo/equipment reoonfiguration N
payload bay reconfiguration N
PLB radiator N
Orbiter/PLB interface N
hydrazine N
VEHICLE BLOCK CHANGE CANDIDATES
(TECHNOLOGY IMPROVEMENTS)
Figure 1
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1.6.3 COST TRADE SUMMARY
ORIGINAL PAGE P3
OF POOR QUALITY
Generally, cost trade information is to be found in the
appropriate Tentpo]e and Related Issues Analysis section. This
summary section provides an overview and examples. It should be
noted that. the data required for a rigorous cost trade (manhour
data by OHI} was either not available or only partially available
since cost data has not been accumulated at this level by the
Shuttle Processing Contractor,
Figure ]
discussed
Analysis.
provides a brief qualitative summary of each tentpole
in detail in Section 1.4, Tentpole and Related Issues
The t_co major cost trades provided in the study are for ANOM%LY
RESOLUTION and ULCE (Unified Life Cycle Engineering). The prime
source of data for these cost trades comes from the Air Force,
DoD, and the NASA Congressional Budget Hearings. Improvement
factors come from the Air Force and DoD while actual costs and
projected costs _omo from the Nasa Congressional Hearings and the
Congressional Budget Office.
It should be noted, in examining cost data in this study, that
there is a signific'ant difference in cost data from this Study
and those in STAS or the NASA budget hearings:
STAS and NASA use a projected figure of 24 total flights per year
and an overall life of I00 flights per vehicle. Based on FY-85
actuals for all operations, this gives an approximate operations
cost figure of $I00 million per flight.
In this study, we have used a more conservative projected figure
of I0 total flights per year based on our operations analysis and
as an extrapolation of the fact that the best accomplished to
date, FY-85, was 8 flights. I00 flights per vehicle was used as
an overall life. Based on FY-85 actuals for all operations this
gives an approximate operations full cost figure of $246 million
per flight.
The f_llowing im a quote from Eric Hanushek, Deputy Director,
Congressienal Budget Office, in hearings before the Senate
Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space for FY-86:
"The estimated full costs are particularly sensitive to
the number of flights, because fixed costs, either
operational or capital, must be spread over a smaller
base if flights are less than 24 per year estimated by
A:,4S4. In table 3 of my full testimony, there is an
indication of the sensitivity of the estimates. For
examf,le, if there are onlj- 12 flights instead of 24 .in
I98 g, the average full cost increases to 8258 million. '"
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1.6.3 COST TRADE SUMMARY
(Continued)
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
l{l|illll;ll;l|lt{, I{ll:Ifl){)ilill|lixl;{{|lilllJIZIl{:Ill;;l{l;{{{{lIlil;IZl{{{lil;*{{
TEXTPOLE TEADEDESCRIPTION POTEWTIALMAGNITUDE
SSRE PRiCESS[NC SHnP DEH'SNICONSTRU_TIONC057
VE,::SLISLONG RUN VARiAELE LA_O_
A!I[T'.ME_,.rL:_
TIME AN_ MAN?CWE_ SAViNgS
* rPLE;.J'. DE_!GN { FABRICATIONCF STRCNG-
HACK TRAP[F AGA[g_" PER FLIGHT
SIGNIF._AN_ uN-L.N_
PROCES.OTN'IT ME RED'v'?TC?:
CAEIN Ai_ py ;,:r,,_ :,rC_EIN AlE ,_w".")_",_
PRECLUDE FUTURE DIRECT LAHOR ON-INE SAV[NOS ANF PROJECTEL!
OFEEASiC!_5
_!JTALI,AT!ONCC:STOF LOA_ _EI/._
VE_S_ SiGNIPi_N7 ..... E,_,N_
SiGnIFiCANTOFF EE[L:'TIOF
OF C'N-LINE"'_:
,"i£,_::?!l_i
5I_I!i!FI_AYCUFFRON_ C£:5T_OF
V' _?_;'_w _L,N_R:,NLABORREP',!CT!ONS
WELL DOZUMENT[_. _JC_ L_U
¢YCLE CO_T SA::I'll5TL TH_ {F
FOE FUTU_F VBHI_LE. LIH!TE_
PCHSIBL!TIES F!;ESH_TCL_
W,J'"£ F!I! C'::'" /
,' L':..
MODERATE SAVINGS, MAINI_
EFFECTIVE FOE SHUTTLE.
........uA,,_; NO ON-LIN_ _AV!N:ZS,51'ZNIFI"_T
DIRLCT LABOR SAVIN_5
Tf_ INfiPEJT5!I 515.11FIFA_I[M_%EHEN?_IICgCOFT
FC_ RK + OF AUTOMATEDHYSTE_
MAm_ _mn,!omT,_IN ON-LINE
TIME AND OFF-LINE MAgH_UES
I_'T o "OFREnt!IRE9 D. .,O. MEN: NFW
,," v_M,':N,,!;r_FUEL CELL5
O _ r_
_IGNIF[CANT IM.R VEMEN,
OFF-LINE MANHOUBE
ORDNANCE MODERATE RE:ESIGN { MATERIAL
COST5 ZOMFAEEL WITH SIGNIFICANT
LA_O_ SAVINGS AND REZUCEL
TURNARC_NL TiM_
VERY SIGNIFICANTON-LINE
REDUCTION;WC_LP SFEEL P?
ENTIRE SHUTTLE PROCESSINGFLCW;
SIGNIFICANT SAVINg5,
PA_,EF.W'R: :NCC':FC::,.tSE'JL:"E" '";;': LIFF.CI'CLECO_T REi;UMI:,IiF"_
:.E_I:::.E_:'::: SE F'LEFL.TL_F.:VE:::"L£5.
LIM:TEL FOE fiHU?TLEEICE_:
)){ ))x;e,Ic {II*_ l,*_** ))I))I ! { ){ l{ {)_ { _ )**l)l):}){*l**l! :_11*1_)II lll*)_l$ ll)llll{*ilxlc* l:_*x-'{ _|11{ *_:a*_
Figure I , Trade Studies
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1.6.3 COST TRADE SUMMARY
(Continued)
Full Operations Cost Derivation: (From Congressional Budget
Office data)
$2189.4M for 8 flights, FY-85 or $273M/flight (total ops co_t.)
Example: Launch Operations = S347.5M for 8 flight_
= $347.5/$2189.4 = 15.9% of Total Op_
= $347.5M/8 = $43.4M/flight
Note: The $273M/flight was used to verify validity of the $246_!
derived from other sources and the $246M was used as a more
conservative figure determining cost benefits in the cost
analysis below.
Life Cycle Cost Derivation:
Operations = $246>I/flt x I00 flts/vehicle : 24.6B/vehicle = 86%
R & D : 1.65B/vehic]e : 6%
Manufa,'_ . = 2.4B/vehicle = 8%
Total LCC $ 28.6B/vehicle 100%
1.6.3.1 Anomaly Resolution and ULCE Cost Trades
Th_ following series of figures, based on AF and DoD
quoted earlier in Section 1.4.6, provide the rationale and
Cycle Cost. savings for the following:
Figure 2, Anomaly Rese]ution (Future Vehicles)
Figure 3, IMIS (Shuttle}
Figur_ 4, THIS Implementation Curves (Shuttle)
(10 fli_hts/yr, S1OOM/flt. )
Figure 5, IMIS Implementation Curves (Shuttle)
(24 flights/yr, SlOOH/flt.)
Figure 6, ULCE (Shuttle)
Figure 7, ULCF (Future Vehicles)
refel-ence.£
Life
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1.6.3 COST TRADE SUMMARY
(Continued)
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
LIFE CYCLEPHASE
• RID Deslqn
• Production
• Ooerotion & flolntenonce
Reooir Lobor Costs
S_ores I Reoolr _oterloi
OI;erot !on
•lnltiOl LOGIStiCS Sul_ort
g OF SYSTFJI
LI FE-CYCLE
COST
lOX
30:
(601)
32t
141
IOZ
_Z
LOOZ
ROUGH I
ESTIHATE _"
BIB
OF ITR
COST IRPACT
UO 102
Doom 13. L11
Down 1511
Down 15|
IIqPACTOF
ITM ON
LIFE-CYCLE
COST
|
Uo 1.0%
Uo 1.511
Down q.2z
Down 2. IZ
Down !.5X
i Don 5,3X I
(FOR I00 FLIGHT SHUTTLE THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN (.053 X 28.6B) = $1.5B)
ANOMALY RESOLUTION (FUTURE VEHICLES)
(POTENTIAL COST IMPACT)
Figure 2
CYCLE PHASE
R & D DESIGN
PBCDUCTION
O&M
6%
8%
86%
O%
O%
DO_ 3.4%
_rT OF U_X
ONLOC
N/A
N/A
D_N 3%
NET: DOWN 3%
SHUTTLE LIFE CYCLE COST SAVINGS
UTILIZING ONLY IMIS CONCEPTS
IMIS (SHUTTLE)
Figure 3
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1.6.3 COST TRADE SUMMARY
(Continued)
,_E'T/_E.SF.N7
V_.UE
1200
1000
$00
600
400
200
0
-200
-4GO
llqR . -24_ 7 S%
i_ 5":_'_ _9 ,0%
0 1 2 3 4 S 6 ? $ Sl 0
IMIS IMPLEMENTATION CURVES (SHUTTLE)
(10 flts/yr, $246M/flt)
Figure 4
NET PRE,_N"
VALL_
[MW./._SJ
1200 _
O_M NI_OV_J_ T
1000 S%
_. -24%
aO0
600
400 _rf"_
200
0 : , .
-400
IMIS IMPLEMENTATION CURVES (SHUTTLE)
(24 flts/yr, $100M/flt)
Figure 5
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1.6.3 COST TRADE SUMMARY
(Continued)
CYCLE P_
R & D DESIGN
PtqXXETICN
O&M
% OF SYST£M
IEC
icurrent goal
6% 10%
8% 30%
86% 60%
ULCE COST
IMPACT
up
up
down
66%
375%
30.2%
IMPACT OF Ul/_
GNIEC
up 6.6%
up 112.5%
down 18.1%
net: up 101%
ULCE (SHUTTLE)
FiEure 6
LIFE CYCLE PHASE
R & D DESIGN
_GN
O&M
% OF SYST£M
LCC
10%
30%
60%
ULCE O0ST
IMPBCT
UP 20%
UP 10%
DC_N 19%
IMPACT OF UI/_
ONLCC
UP 2%
UP 3%
11.4%
NET: _ 6.4%
ULCE (FUTURE VEHICLES)
FiEure 7
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1.6.3 COST TRADE SUMMARY
(Continued)
1.6.3.2 Trade Studies Conclusions and Recommendations
SHUTTLE
The significant conclusions and recommendations for the
Shuttle vehicle are listed below:
current
The current Shuttle will always be an R&D vehicle because
was not designed for efficient operations.
it
Major block modifications of the Orbiter to make it an
operationally efficient vehicle are not cost. effective.
Besides, the out-of-service time would lose 3 to 6 flights.
Cost effectiveness will also be a function of remaining
Orbiter life. The launch processing manhour data necessary
for credible detailed cost trades is not readily available.
There are two additional considerations, however, for block
modifications. (I) If Orbiters are taken out-of-service for
mandatory safety mode, then there are efficiency and
technology candidates which may be cost effective if packaged
with the safety mods, and (2) Shuttle vehicle modifications
may be best used as proof-of-concept for future vehicle_ even
though, in themselves, they may not be cost effective.
Wit. houi major bl c_ck modi fJ cat. ions to the Shuttle or the
Shuttle Pro(_essing Data Management System (SPDMS) only minima]
ground operations efficiencies can be achieved. The potential
f_r i ncr_a,_ i ng ] aunch operations efficiency without major
block mods or major overhaul of the SPDMS is minimal (in the
order of ]0%) -- and this potential will be overwhelmed by
additional safety requirements for some time to come.
The Study analysis indicates that very significant improvement
in current operations can be gained via redesign of SPDMS to
conform to IMIS specifications. Potential sa\ing_ -- S2.6B
plus increase of up to 30% in launch rate based on FY-85 rate
of R/year).
FUTURE VEHICLES
The significant conclusions and recommendat
trade studies for future vehicles follows:
ons related to the
* Major changes in design and management methodology are
required.
* New technology involves management and computer-aided tools.
ULCE/CALS (UnJ fled L_fe
Logistics System)
Cycle Engineering/Computer Aided
* DBT/DTC (Design-Build Team/Design to Cost)
Without consi._t_nt ]on.._-t.erm management commitment., this. will
nnt work .
Future vehicles, beginning with the Design Concept Phase, must
put life cycle costs ahead of performance. We are hauling
cargo via freighter -- not participating in a yacht race.
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1.7 FOLLOW-ON STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS
The following follow-on study recommendations are provided with
the objective of establishing launch operations requirements for
probable future vehicle configurations:
Based on Phase 1 Study results, and using STAS
architectures as an input, specific configurations will
be recommended to the NASA KSC Study Manager for his
approval prior to their analysis.
Prepare a be conceptual ground operations plan for the
vehic]e_ to identified from two selected architectures:
e.g., (1) an expendable unmanned cargo vehicle and (2) a
manned cargo vehicle.
Design concepts/requirements for ULCE/CALS will be
expanded; coordination between DoD and NASA/KSC will be
established, with participation on associated technical
advisory _roups encouraged and developed.
Dp\'alop operational support requirements and design
concepts including a checklist handbook for designers and
program managers.
Launch site facility concepts for the vehicles under
study _¢il I be developed. These concepts wilt describe
the me_t effieient processing with respect to time and
manhours and will be optimized in conjunction with the
operations concepts.
Highlight ne_.' and developing technologies that apply
subject._, of the Study.
to
Plac_ _ the Expanded Technology Knowledge Base on line for
use by NASA and Air Force personnel.
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1.8 APPENDIX -- BIBLIOGRAPHY ABSTRACTS FROM NASA RECON
References which were obtained through NASA RECON have abstracts
which make up this appendix. They are listed in numerical order.
Some RECON numbers listed are top numbers for Conference
documents and contain numerous papers.
72N30468.# ISSUE 21 PAGE 2836 CATEGORY 17 RPT#: NASA-SP-5110
LC-74-177266 72/00/00 91 PAGES UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
UTTL: The Alloy With a Memory, 55-Nitinol: Its Physical
Metallurgy, Properties and Applications
UNOC: Metallurgy, characteristic properties, and industrial
applications of nickel titanium alloy with shape memory
TLSP: Technology Utilization
AUTH: A/JACKSON, C.M. ; B/WAGNER, H.J. ; C/WASILEWSKI, R.J.
CORP: Battelle Memorial Inst., Columbus, Ohio. AVAIL.NTIS
SAP: ; SOD Sl.00
CIO: UNITED STATESWashington NASA Sponsored by NASA
MAJS: /*CHEMICAL PROPERTIES /*MECHANICAL PROPERTIES /*METALLURGY
/*NITINOL /*PHYSICAL PROPERTIES
MINS: / INDUSTRIES/ METAL WORKING/ NASA PROGRAMS/ STRUCTURAL
STABILITY/ TECHNOLOGY UTILIZATION/ THERMAL STABILITY
ABA: Author
ABS: A series of nickel titanium alloys (S5-Nitinol), which are
unique in that they possess a shape memory, are described.
Components made of these materials that are altered in
their shapes by deformation under proper conditions return
to predetermined shapes when they are heated to the proper
temperature range. The shape memory, together with the
force exerted and the ability of the material to do
mechanical work as it returns to its predetermined shape,
suggest a wide variety of industrial applications for the
alloy. Also included are discussions of the physical
metallurgy and the mechanical, physical, and chemical
properties of 55-Nitinol; procedures for melting and
processing the material into useful shapes; and a summary
of applications.
-]$3-
1.8 APPENDIX -- BIBLIOGRAPHY ABSTRACTS FROM NASA RECON
(Continued)
82A14841# ISSUE 4 PAGE 531
UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
CATEGORY 33 81/00/00 10 PAGES
UTTL: Progress in Designing for Testability --- of Avionics and
Test Equipment
AUTH: A/ALLEN, D. R.; B/FERCH, B. C. PAA:
Wright-Patterson AFB,OH)
B/(USAF,
CIO: UNITED STATES
In: NAECON 1981; Proceedings of the National Aerospace and
Electronics Conference, Dayton, OH, May 19-21, 1981.
Volume 3. (A82-14676 04-01) New York, Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc., 1981, p.
1362-1371.
MAJS:/*AVIONICS/*DESIGN ANALYSIS/*ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
TESTS/*FAILURE ANALYSIS /*RELIABILITY ENGINEERING/*TEST
EQUIPMENT/*USER REQUIREMENTS
MINS: / AIRBORNE/SPACEBORNE COMPUTERS/ AUTOMATIC TEST EQUIPMENT/
CIRCUIT RELIABILITY/ NONDESTRUCTIVE TESTS/ ONBOARD DATA
PROCESSING/ TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT ABA: (Author)
ABS: This paper presents an overview of recent developments in
testability concepts, testability measures, and
testability enforcement in the design of avionics and test
equipment. Each of the joint services has efforts
recently concluded or underway to better define
requirements for testability in the areas of built-in
test, the inherent testability of units under test, and
the interfaces with test equipment. This paper brings out
the significant contributions from the various activities,
and provides a critique of proposed solutions.
******************************************************************************
1.8 APPENDIX -- BIBLIOGRAPHY ABSTRACTS FROM NASA RECON
(Continued)
82N19033# ISSUE 9 PAGE 1297 CATEGORY
NSWC/TR-81-129 NAVSEA-S562-78
UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
74 RPT#:
81/07/01
AD-AI08278
71 PAGES
UTTL: Nitinol interconnect device for optical fiber
waveguides TLSP: Final Report
AUTH: A/GOLDSTEIN, D.; B/TYDINGS, J.
CORP: Naval Surface Weapons Center, Silver Spring, Md.
AVAIL.NTIS
SAP: HC A04/MF AOI
CIO: UNITED STATES
MAJS: /*CONNECTORS/*FIBER
WAVEGUIDES
OPTICS/*NITINOL ALLOYS/*OPTICAL
MINS: / BUNDLES/ FABRICATION/ OPTICAL COMMUNICATION/ PIPES
(TUBES)/ POWDER METALLURGY
ABA: Author (GRA)
ABS: Two different interconnect devices for optical fibers have
been developed. Each uses the shape memory effect alloy
'NITINOL' The simpler of the two is of tubular design
and accommodates fibers as small as 200 micron diameter.
The more complex multi-component design accommodates 125
micron diameter fibers. The complex design is simpler to
use, easier to manufacture and lower in cost. It permits
less than I db loss and is re-matable. A description of
NITINOL manufacture is given.
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83N30702.# ISSUE 19 PAGE 3100 CATEGORY 27 82/05/00
UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
I0 PAGES
UTTL: Structural Characteristics of the Shuttle Orbiter Ceramic
AUTH:
CORP:
SAP:
CIO:
MAJS:
MINS:
ABA:
ABS:
Thermal Protection System
A/COOPER, P. A.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Research Center, Hampton, Va. AVAIL.NTIS
Langley
HC A09/MF A01 In Shock and Vibration Inform. Center The
Shock and Vibration Bull., No. 52. Part 2 p 101-110 (SEE
N83-30692 19-31)
UNITED STATES
/*REENTRY SHIELDING/*REUSABLE HEAT
SHUTTLE ORBITERS/* SPACE
PROTECTION/*TILES
SHIELDING/*SPACE
SHUTTLES/*THERMAL
/ CERAMICS/ CERTIFICATION/ FLIGHT TESTS/ TENSILE STRENGTH
R.J.F.
The thermal protection system (TPS) of the Space Shuttle
Orbiter is described as well as the results of dynamic
reponse studies conducted in support of the efforts to
certify the TPS for flight. The ceramic Thermal
Protection System consists of ceramic tiles bonded to felt
pads which are in turn bonded to the Orbiter substructure
to protect the aluminum substructure from the heat of
reentry.
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83N34652# ISSUE 22 PAGE 3696 CATEGORY 63 RPT#:
DM55/JPS/JP/317-83-VOL-2 ESA-CR(P)-I759-VOL-2 CNT#:
ESTEC-4869/81/NL-PP 83/00/00 2 VOLS 276 PAGES UNCLASSIFIED
DOCUMENT DCAF E003091
UTTL: Standard Generic Approach for Spacecraft Intelligence and
Automation. Phase 1, volume 2: Technical report TLSP:
Final Report
AUTH: A/BERGER, G.; B/CORNET, J.;
E/SOTTA, J.; F/THIBAUT, M.
C/CELLIER, M.; D/RIOU, L.;
CORP: MATRA Espace, Paris-Velizy (France). AVAIL.NTIS
SAP: HC AI2/MF A01
CIO: FRANCE Paris ESA
MAJS: /*ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE/*AUTONOMY/*ONBOARD
PROCESSING/*SATELLITE CONTROL/*SPACECRAFT DESIGN
DATA
MINS: / DATA MANAGEMENT/ DECISION MAKING/ GROUND SUPPORT
EQUIPMENT/ HIGH LEVEL LANGUAGES/ MICROPROCESSORS/ PATTERN
RECOGNITION/ STRESS ANALYSIS
ABA: Author (ESA)
ABS: Applications of onboard autonomy and data processing, and
the corresponding spacecraft and ground control
organization were identified by analyzing the Viking 75
deep space mission and the ERS-I (ESA satellite) Earth
observation mission. Telecommunication satellites, STS,
data relay satellites and large space stations were also
studied. An approach to spacecraft intelligence and
autonomy based on a hierarchical decentralized system
structure, in order to limit failure propagation, simplify
interfaces, and improve performance predictability, is
proposed. Onboard management is subdivided into routine,
crisis, and end product management. Orbit determination
and control is autonomous.
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84A16548# ISSUE 5 PAGE 643
UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
CATEGORY 60 83/00/00 5 PAGES
AUTH: A/ASKREN, W. B. PAA: A/(USAF, Human
Laboratory, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH)
Resources
CIO: UNITED STATES
IN:
MAJS:
NAECON 1983; Proceedings of the National Aerospace and
Electronics Conference, Dayton, OH, May 17-19, 1983.
Volume I (A84-16526 05-01). New York, Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 1983, p. 221-225.
/*COMPUTER AIDED DESIGN /*DESIGN ANALYSIS /*LOGISTICS
/*MAINTENANCE /*PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT/*SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
MINS: / AEROSPACE
MANUFACTURING/
AND DEVELOPMENT
INDUSTRY/ BIODYNAMICS/ COMPUTER AIDED
DATA BASES/ MATHEMATICAL MODELS/ RESEARCH
ABA: Author
ABS: The concept of including maintenance and logistics factors
in computer aided design (CAD) of new systems and
equipment is presented. Air Force Human Resources
Laboratory's plans for research and development in this
area are described. The concept includes the role that
CAD could play in improving design for supportability, the
characteristics of CAD that are relevant to including
maintenance and logistics factors, and the products that
are needed to integrate maintenance and logistics factors
into CAD. The research and development includes four
efforts: the development of a maintenance analysis model
for CAD; a biomechanical model of the maintenance
technician; demonstrations of maintenance and logistics
factors in CAD in the aerospace industry; and integrating
a logistics data base with CAD/CAM engineering data bases.
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84A17175 ISSUE 5 PAGE 605 CATEGORY 38 83/00/00 16 PAGES
UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
UTTL: Ultrasonic Inspection Techniques Applied to Strength
Evaluation of Shuttle Orbiter Thermal Protection Tiles
AUTH: A/MACK, F. E.; B/HOGENSON, P. A. PAA: B/(Rockwell
International Corp. Space Transportation and Systems
Group, Downey, CA)
CIO: UNITED STATES
IN: Materials and processes - Continuing innovations;
Proceedings of the Twenty-eighth National SAMPE Symposium
and Exhibition, Anaheim, CA, April 12-14, 1983 (A84-17101
05-23). Azusa, CA, Society for the Advancement of
Material and Process Engineering, 1983, p. 1069-1084.
MAJS: /*ACOUSTIC VELOCITY/*CERAMICS/*SPACE SHUTTLE
ORBITERS/*TENSILE STRENGTH/ THERMAL PROTECTION/*ULTRASONIC
TESTS
MINS: / CERAMIC COATINGS/
SHIELDING/ TILES
FIBER ORIENTATION/ NONDESTRUCTIVE
ABA: Author
ABS: The development of an ultrasonic technique for determining
the strength of the thermal protection tiles used on the
Space Shuttle Orbiter is described. The basic test
approach was to experimentally relate through transmission
pulse velocity readings for l-inch by l-inch coupons to
ultimate strengths of the same coupons and in turn
extrapolate this information to the full size tiles.
Factors affecting the pulse velocity such as material
thickness variability, sonic coupling, and influences of
the higher velocity components of the coating and
densified layer were studied. These effects on pulse
velocity were integrated in a software correction factor
which was applied to the tile data so the strength
properties of the basic tile material could be compared
with the coupon reference system and the appropriate
accept/reject criteria used. Use of the ultrasonic
technique to evaluate strength variability within the
large blocks of material from which the tiles are machined
is also described ........
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84A26768 ISSUE II PAGE 1506 CATEGORY 6 83/00/00 7 PAGES
UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
UTTL: Testing BITE on Boeing 757/767 In a Simulated Operational
Environment
AUTH: A/LEE, H. F.; B/CARSON, D. P. PAA: B/(Boeing Co.,
Seattle, WA)
CIO: UNITED STATES
IN: Digital Avionics Systems Conference, 5th, Seattle, WA,
October 31-November 3, 1983, Proceedings (A84-26701
11-06). New York, Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers, 1983, p. 15.4.1-15.4.7 ........
MAJS: /*AIRCRAFT CONTROL/*AUTOMATIC TEST
SIMULATION/*FLIGHT CONTROL/*GROUND
MANAGEMENT
EQUIPMENT/*DATA
TESTS/*SYSTEMS
MINS: / BOEING 757 AIRCRAFT/ BOEING 767 A RCRAFT/ DATA
ACQUISITION/ DESIGN ANALYSIS/ ELECTRONIC AIRCRAFT/ FAULT
TOLERANCE/ FLIGHT SIMULATION/ FLIGHT TESTS
ABA: Author
ABS: To provide 'on-airplane' data that supports validation of
the system-level equipment (BITE), a series of ground
tests were conducted with simulated airplane flight and
fault conditions. These tests provided qualitative
support for establishing BITE credibility, and usage
experience prior to airplane service introduction. BITE
indications were correlated with the cockpit effects,
simulated fault conditions, and simulation limitations to
determine proper correlation and utility of indications.
Results either indicated proper operation or improvements
needed.
*********************$**************$***************$****$***$****************
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84A26771 ISSUE II PAGE 1506
UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
CATEGORY 6 83/00/00 8 PAGES
UTTL: Fault, Detection, Isolation, and Recovery Techniques for
Fault Tolerant Digital Avionics
AUTH: A/HITT, E. F.; B/ELDREDGE, D. PAA:
Columbus Laboratories, Columbus, OH); B/(FAA,
Center, Atlantic City, NJ)
A/(Battelle
Technical
CIO: UNITED STATES
IN: Digital Avionics Systems Conference, 5th, Seattle, WA,
October 31-November 3, 1983, Proceedings (A84-26701
I]-06). New York, Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers, ]983, p.]6.I.1-16.I.8 .........
HAJS: /*AIRBORNE/SPACEBORNE COMPUTERS/*AVIONICS/_COHPUTER
SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE/ DIGITAL SYSTEMS/*ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
TESTS/*FAULT TOLERANCE
MINS: / CIRCUIT RELIABILITY/ FAILURE ANALYSIS/ IN-FLIGHT
MONITORING/ SYSTEM FAILURES/ RELIABILITY ENGINEERING
ABA: Author
ABS: Fault tolerant design technologies for digital avionics
system are described in this paper. The techniques
include both hardware and software methods used for
detecting faults at three levels. These levels should be
implemented to assure (I) the correct operation of each
processing unit, (2) valid communication of data between
digital subsystems, and (3) data validity, prior to use in
subsequent computation and after conversion of digital
data. Once a fault is detected, system recovery must take
place to assure the continued performance of the
function(s) affected by the fault. The methods used to
control the system recovery techniques are dependent upon
the systems ability to isolate the detected fault to the
lowest the lowest possible level. The system recovery
techniques are also dependent upon system architecture.
Fault isolation and system recovery techniques require
knowledge of the system status vector and its history in
sophisticated systems.
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84A26795 ISSUE 11 PAGE 1615 CATEGORY 60 83/00/00 7 PAGES
UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
UTTL: Processor Monitoring and Self-test In the Boeing 767/757
Flight Control Computer
AUTH: A/KOVALAN, M. PAA: A/(Rockwell International Corp.,
Collins Air Transport Div., Cedar Rapids, IA}
CIO: UNITED STATES
IN: Digital Avionics Systems Conference, 5th, Seattle, WA,
October 31-November 3, 1983, Proceedings (A84-26701
11-06}. New York, Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers, 1983, p 21.1.1-21.1.7 ..........
MAJS: /*AIRBORNE/SPACEBORNE COMPUTERS/*CENTRAL PROCESSING
UNITS/*COMPUTER SYSTEMS PROGRAMS/*FAILURE ANALYSIS/*FLIGHT
CONTROL/*RELIABILITY ENGINEERING/*SELF TESTS
MINS: / BOEING 757 AIRCRAFT/ BOEING 767 AIRCRAFT/ ERROR
DETECTION CODES/ MICROPROGRAMMING/ PROGRAM VERIFICATION
(COMPUTERS)/ SELF TESTS/ SYSTEM FAILURES
ABA: Based primarily through frequent execution of a
comprehensive self-test design is basef on functional
verification of the processor's ability to properly
execute all steps associated with integrated interrupt
response. An analysis of the processor alogrithms and
interrupt response. An analysis of the processor
self-test and monitor was performed to assess the coverage
of processor functions obtained through the chosen
monitoring arrangement. The undetected failure rate for
CAPS-6B was predicted to be about 10 to the -7th per hour,
corresponding to less than 1 percent of the total
processor failure rate.
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84A36557'# ISSUE 17 PAGE 2438 CATEGORY 18 84/06/00 8 PAGES
UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
UTTL:
AUTH:
Mechanical Properties of the Shuttle Orbiter Thermal
Protection System Strain Isolator Pad
A/SAWYER, J. W. PAA: A/(NASA, Langley Research Center,
Structures and Dynamics Div., Hampton, VA)
CORP: National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Langley
Research Center, Hampton, Va.
CIO: UNITED STATES
(Structures, Structural Dynamics and Materials
Conference, 23rd, New Orleans, LA, May 10-12, 1982,
Collection of Technical Papers. Part I, p. 23-31)
Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets (ISSN 0022-4650), vol.
21, May-June 1984, p. 253-260.
MAJS: /*FATIGUE TESTS/*ISOLATORS/*MECHANICAL PROPERTIES/*SPACE
SHUTTLE ORBITER /*SPACECRAFT SHIELDING/*THERMAL PROTECTION
MINS: / COMPRESSION LOADS/ CYCLIC LOADS/ HYSTERESIS/ LOAD TESTS/
SHEAR PROPERTIES/ STATIC LOADS/ STRESS CYCLES/
STRESS-STRAIN DIAGRAMS/ TENSILE STRENGTH/ TILES
ABS: Previously cited in issue 19, p. 2029, Accession no.
A82-30079
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84A49504*# ISSUE 24 PAGE
UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
3499 CATEGORY 18 84/10/00
UTTL: Effect of Simulated Mission Loads On Orbiter
7 PAGES
Thermal
Protection System Undensified Tiles
AUTH: A/COOPER, P. A.; B/MISERENTINO, R.; C/SAWYER,
D/LEATHERWOOD, J D. PAA: D/(NASA, Langley
Center, Hampton, VA)
J. W.;
Research
CORP: National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Langley
Research Center, Hampton, Va.
ClO: UNITED STATES
(Structures, Structural Dynamics and Materials
Conference, 23rd, New Orleans, LA, May I0-12, 1982,
Collection of Technical Papers. Part I, p. 32-40)
Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets (ISSN 0022-4650), vol.
21, Sept.-Oct. 1984, p. 441-447. Previously cited in
issue 13, p. 2029, Accession no. A82-30080.
MAJS: /*DYNAMIC LOADS/*DYNAMIC STRUCTURAL
SHUTTLE ORBITERS/* SPACECRAFT
PROTECTION/ZTILES
ANALYSIS/*SPACE
DESIGN/*THERMAL
MINS: / CERAMICS/ CLIMBING FLIGHT/ DYNAMIC RESPONSE/ LOAD TESTS/
RANDOM LOADS/ STATIC LOADS/ TENSILE TESTS/ THERMAL
SIMULATION
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84N22528# ISSUE 13 PAGE 1925 CATEGORY 1 RPT#: AD-A138587
AFWAL-TR-83-1183 CNT#: F33615-81-C-1517 AF PROJ. 2003
83/12/00 323 PAGES UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
UTTL: Integrated Testing and Maintenance TechnoloEies TLSP:
Final Technical Report, 25 Sep. 1981 - 15 Sep. 1983
AUTH: A/DENNEY, R. O.; B/PARTRIDGE, M. J.; C/WILLIAMS, R.
B.
CORP:
SAP:
Boeing Aerospace Co., Seattle, Wash.
HC AI4/MF A01
AVAIL.NTIS
CIO: UNITED STATESWright-Patterson AFB, Ohio AFWAL
MAJS: /*AVIONICS/*EXPERT
AIRCRAFT/*MAINTENANCE/*ONBOARD
INTEGRATION
SYSTEMS/*FIGHTER
EQUIPMENT/*SYSTEMS
MINS: / ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE/ COST ANALYSIS/ DATA
AC@UISITION/ LIFE CYCLE COSTS/ MILITARY AIRCRAFT/ SYSTEMS
ANALYSIS/ SYSTEMS INTEGRATION/ WEAPON SYSTEMS
ABA: Author (GRA)
ABS: Maintenance of weapon systems is becoming an increasingly
important consideration in weapon system development,
because the cost of maintenance is a significant portion
of the life cycle cost of the system. The objective of
the Integrated Testing and Maintenance Technology effort
is to define requirements for an onboard test system for
the avionic suite planned for tactical fighters in the
]990's. Problems with current onboard test systems were
analyzed to determine where improvements could be made.
In addition, the anticipated avionic architecture and
mission of the 1990's were evaluated to determine the
impact on maintenance capability. Requirements for the
Integrated Testing and Maintenance System were developed
and documented in a system specification. Identified
improvements over current systems include better
filtering of intermittent failure reports, better
isolation of intermittent failures through the use of
recorded data, more extensive use of system-level tests
of mission operational data and a man-machine interface
providing more information to the maintenance technician.
In addition, artifically where the intelligence
applications were evaluated to determine might be
effectively applied to ITM. A design concept for fault
classification expert system was developed.
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84N25089'# ISSUE 15 PAGE 2348 CATEGORY 39 84/05/00
UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
15 PAGES
UTTL: Passive Sun Seeker/tracker and a Thermally Activated Power
Module
AUTH: A/SIEBERT, C. J.; B/MORRIS, F. A.
CORP: Martin Marietta Corp., Denver, Colo. AVAIL.NTIS
SAP: HC AI4/MF A01 In NASA.
18th Aerospace Mech.
15-39)
Goddard Space Flight Center The
Symp. p 171-185 (SEE N84-25078
CIO: UNITED STATES
MAJS: /*HOMING DEVICES/*NITINOL
(STS)/*SOLAR RADIATION
ALLOYS/*POWER MODULES
MINS: / ALGORITHMS/ KINEMATICS/ PARABOLIC REFLECTORS/ PHASE
TRANSFORMATIONS/ PLASTIC MEMORY/ THERMAL ENERGY
ABA: Author
ABS: Development and testing of two mechanisms using a shape
memory alloy metal (NITINOL) as the power source
described. The two mech developed are a passive Sun
Seeker/Tracker and a generic type power module. These
mechanisms use NITINOL wire initially strained in pure
torsion which provides the greatest mechanical work
capacity upon recovery, as compared to other deformation
modes (i.e., tension, helical springs, and bending).
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84XI0356.# ISSUE
1.55:2315
DOMESTIC
8 CATEGORY 16 RPT#: NASA-CP-2315 L-15790 NAS
84/07/00 516 PAGES UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
UTTL: Advances in TPS and Structures for Space Transportation
Systems
AUTH: A/KELLY, H. N.; B/GARDNER, J. E. PAT: A/comp.;
B/comp.
CORP: National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Langley
Research Center, Hampton, Va.
SAP: Limited by ITAR
CIO: UNITED STATES Symp.
1983
held in Hampton, Va., 13-15 Dec.
MAJS: /*CONFERENCES/*SPACE SHUTTLE
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM/* SPACECRAFT
PROTECTION
ORBITERS/*SPACE
STRUCTURES/*THERMAL
MINS: / AEROTHERMODYNAMICS/ CARBON-CARBON COMPOSITES/ CERAMICS/
COMPOSITE STRUCTURES/ METALS/ STRUCTURAL ENGINEERING
ANN: Flight experiences with the Space Shuttle orbiter thermal
protection system are described and evaluated, and
research on new concepts in metallic, ceramic, and
advanced carbon-carbon TPS and structures is presented.
Advanced and alternate configurations and missions for
next-generation space transportation systems and issues
and technology needs are discussed.
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85N11592# ISSUE 2 PAGE 244 CATEGORY 63 RPT#: AD-AI45349
AFHRL-TR-84-25 CNT#: F33615-82-C-0013 84/06/00 525 PAGES
UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
UTTL: Artificial Intelligence in Maintenance: Proceedings of
the Joint Services Workshop TLSP: Interim Report, Sap.
-1982 Sap. 1983
CORP: Denver Research Inst., Colo. AVAIL.NTIS
SAP: HC A22/HF A01
CIO: UNITED STATES Workshop held in Boulder, Colo., 4-6 Oct.
1983
MAJS: /*ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE/*AUTOMATIC TEST
E@UIPMENT/*INFORMATION
DISSEHINATION/*MAINTENANCE/*MANAGEMENT METHODS/*TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER
MINS: / CONFERENCES/ DEFENSE PROGRAM/ EDUCATION/ MILITARY
TECHNOLOGY/ PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT/ RESEARCH/ RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT
ANN: This report presents the proceedings of a workshop on
artificial intelligence (AI) in maintenance that was
sponsored by 7 Department of Defense agencies. The
workshop, entitled Joint Services Workshop on Artificial
Intelligence in Maintenance, was held October 4-6, 1983 in
Boulder, Colorado. The primary objective of the workshop
was to provide an exchange of technical information among
personnel invo]ved in on-going research and development in
artificial intelligence applicable to automatic testing,
maintenance aiding, and maintenance training. A second
objective was to identify both theoretical and practical
app]ications issues in the use of AI in maintenance. This
report is organized into four sections: Overview; The
Science; Department of Defense Programs and Projects;
and Commercial and Industrial Development Projects. The
material in the report includes contributed and,
significant papers previously published, and edited
transcripts of presentations made at the workshop. For
individual titles see N85-I1593 through N85-I1627.
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85N16731# ISSUE 8 PAGE 1063 CATEGORY ] RPT#:
ISBN-92-835-0366-I0 AD-AI49199 84/10/00
ENGLISH and FRENCH UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
AGARD-CP-361
281 PAGES In
UTTL: Design for Tactical Avionics Maintainability
CORP: Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development,
Neuilly-Sur-Seine (France). AVAIL.NTIS
SAP: HC AI3/MF A01
CIO: FRANCELoughton, England Conf. held in Brussels, 7-I0 May
1984
MAJS: /*AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT/*AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE/*AUTOMATIC TEST
EQUIPMENT/* AVIONICS/*MAINTAINABILITY
MINS: / AIRBORNE/SPACEBORNE COMPUTERS/ ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE/
CHECKOUT/ COST REDUCTION/ ELECTRONIC MODULES/ PROGRAM
VERIFICATION (COMPUTERS)/ RELIABILITY ENGINEERING/ SERVICE
LIFE
ANN: Advanced methods and tools to support design for avionic
maintainability and testability are discussed. Both
hardware and software design for maintainability issues
and approaches are addressed. For individual titles see
N85-16732 through N85-16756.
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85N16752# ISSUE 8 PAGE 1066
UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
CATEGORY 1 84/10/00 6 PAGES
UTTL:
AUTH:
A Weapon System Design Approach to Diagnostics
A/NEUMANN, G. W.; B/BATTAGLIA, M. PAA:
Associates, Inc., Arlington, Va.)
A/(Giordano
CORP: Naval Electronic Systems Command, Washington,
AVAIL.NTIS
n. Co
SAP: HC AI3/MF A01 In AGARD Design for Tactical Avionics
Maintainability 6 p (see N85-16731 08-01)
CIO: UNITED STATES
MAJS: /*AVIONICS/*GOVERNMENT/INDUSTRY
RELATIONS/*MAINTENANCE/*WEAPON SYSTEMS
MINS: / ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE/ COMPUTER AIDED DESIGN/ COMPUTER
AIDED MANUFACTURING/ COSTS/ EDUCATION/ FAULT TOLERANCE/
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
ABA: R.S.F.
ABS: Providing a diagnostics capability for today's weapon
systems requires a multifaceted combination of hardware,
software, and personnel. The approach to providing this
capability is fractionated among a number of different
communities (e.g., testing, training, human engineering,
publication writers). The result is reflected in the
field, where the technician has been furnished a myriad of
too]s and documentation, which is confusing, complex and
often contradictory. The result is lengthy repair times
and a waste of manpower and dollars. The basic reason for
this diagnostic deficiency is the lack of an integrated
design approach providing this capability and the
inability to transition technological advancements to
weapon systems acquisitions. Recent Department of Defense
and U.S. industry efforts to solve this problem are
discussed.
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85N16947'# ISSUE 8 PAGE 1099 CATEGORY 16 85/01/00 18 PAGES
UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
UTTL: Space Shuttle Electrical Power Generation and Reactant
Suvvly System
AUTH: A/SIMON, W. E.
CORP: National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Lyndon B.
Johnson Space Center, Houston, Tex. AVAIL.NTIS
SAP: HC A01/MF A01 In its Space Shuttle Tech. Conf., Pt. 2 p
702-719 (SEE N85-16937 08-12)
CIO: UNITED STATES
MAJS: /*CRYOGENIC FLUID STORAGE/*FUEL CELLS/*SPACE SHUTTLE
ORBITERS/*SPACECRAF POWER SUPPLIES/*SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
MINS: / APOLLO PROJECT/ CIRCUIT PROTECTION/ LIFE SUPPORT
SYSTEMS/ OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS/ POTABLE WATER/ STRUCTURAL
WEIGHT/ SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS
ABA: A.R.H.
ABS: The design philosophy and development experience of fuel
cell power generation and cryogenic reactant supply
systems are reviewed, beginning with the state of
technology at the conclusion of the Apollo Program.
Technology advancements span a period of 10 years from
initial definition phase to the most recent space
transportation system (STS) flights. The development
program encompassed prototype verification, and
qualification hardware, as well as post-STS-] design
improvements. Focus is on the problems encountered, the
scientific and engineering approaches employed to meet the
technological challenges, and the results obtained. Major
technology barriers are discussed, and the evolving
technology devolopment paths are traced to their
conceptual beginnings to the fully man-rated systems which
are now an integral part of the shuttle vehicle.
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85N16979.# ISSUE 8 PAGE 1104 CATEGORY 16 85/01/00 20 PAGES
UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
UTTL: Orbiter Thermal Protection System
AUTH: A/DOTTS, R. L.; B/CURRY, D. M.; C/TILLIAN, D. J.
CORP: National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Lyndon B.
Johnson Space Center, Houston, Tex. AVAIL.NTIS
SAP: HC A23/MF A01 In its Space Shuttle Tech. Conf., Pt. 2 p
1062-1081 (SEE N85-16937 08-12)
CIO: UNITED STATES
MAJS: /*AEROTHERMODYNAMICS/*SPACE SHUTTLE
PROTECTION
ORBITERS/*THERMAL
MINS:
ABA:
/ ABLATIVE MATERIALS/ PERFORMANCE TESTS/ REUSABLE HEAT
SHIELDING/ SPACECRAFT DESIGN/ TEMPERATURE CONTROL/ THERMAL
INSULATION
E .A.K.
ABS: The major material and design challenges associated with
the orbiter thermal protection system (TPS), the various
TPS materials that are used, the different design
approaches associated with each of the materials, and the
performance during the flight test program are described.
The first five flights of the Orbiter Columbia and the
initial flight of the Orbiter Challenger provided the data
necessary to verify the TPS thermal performance,
structural integrity, and reusability. The flight
performance characteristics of each TPS material are
discussed, based on postflight inspections and postflight
interpretation of the flight instrumentation data.
Flights to date indicate that the thermal and structural
design requirements for the orbiter TPS are met and that
the overall performance is outstanding.
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85N24839# ISSUE 14 PAGE 2407 CATEGORY 63
RADC-TR-84-203 CNT#: F30602-83-C-0048
UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
RPT#: AD-AIS0694
84/10/00 187 PAGES
UTTL: Artificial Intelligence Applications to Testability TLSP:
Final Report, Apr. 1983 - May 1984
AUTH: A/LAHORE, H.
CORP: Boeing Aerospace Co., Seattle, Wash. CSS: (Engineering
Technology Organization.) AVAIL.NTIS
SAP: HC A09/MF A01
CIO: UNITED STATESGriffiss AFB, N.Y. RADC
MAJS: /*ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE/*COST
TECHNOLOGY
EFFECTIVENESS/*MILITARY
MINS: / COMPUTER AIDED DESIGN/ ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT/ EXPERT
SYSTEMS/ MAINTENANCE/ RELIABILITY/ WORKSTATIONS
ABA: GRA
ABS: This study provides the foundation for a logical and
cost-effective for five years. The primary near term
applications are design support and maintenance
applications. Eight potential applications are developed
and evaluated: (I) computer aided preliminary design for
testability, (2) Smart Built-in Test, (3) Smart System
Integrated Test, (4) Box Level Maintenance Expert, (5)
System Level
Expert, (7)
Smart Bench
opportunities
workstations
designers.
Maintenance Expert, (6) Smart Maintenance
Automatic Test Program Generation, and (8)
Tester. All of these application
can be implemented with engineering
which are becoming available directly to
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85N26966# ISSUE 16 PAGE 2749 CATEGORY
NSWC/TR-84-326 CNT#: F66-512
UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
26 RPT#: AD-A152089
84/10/15 32 PAGES
UTTL: Production of Shaped Parts of NITINOL Alloys by
Solid-state Sintering
AUTH: A/GOLDSTEIN, D. M.
CORP: Naval Surface Weapons Center, Silver Spring, Md.
AVAIL.NTIS
SAP: HC A03/MF A01
CIO: UNITED STATES
MAJS: /*METAL WORKING/*NITINOL ALLOYS/*PLASTIC MEMORY/*SINTERING
MINS: / DEFORMATION/ EXTRUDING/ FITTINGS/ LOW TEMPERATURE/ PIPES
(TUBES)/ POWDER METEALLURGY/ SHAPES
ABA: GRA
ABS: Nitinol is an alloy of nickel and titanium which exhibits
a shape memory effect. The term shape memory effect (SME)
is used to describe the ability of certain alloys which,
if deformed at a low temperature, will recover their prior
shape when heated. A solid state sintering process has
been successfully adapted to consolidating Nitinol alloy
powders. Nitinol alloys are noted for their shape memory
properties. The sintering process is performed at
atmospheric pressure upon powders contained in an
evacuated glass container. Processing parameters are
reported. Tubes and tubular tees were were made as well
as solid round bars. Round bar stock was extruded and
swaged excellent shape memory properties were obtained.
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85N27576# ISSUE 16 PAGE 2851 CATEGORY
AFIT/GE/ENG/84D-53 84/12/00 367
DOCUMENT
63 RPT#: AD-AI51918
PAGES UNCLASSIFIED
UTTL: Diagnosis: Using Automatic Test Equipment and an
Artificial Intelligenc Expert System TLSP: M.S. Thesis
AUTH: A/RAMSEY, J. E., JR.
CORP: Air Force Inst. of Tech., Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.
CSS: (School of Engineering.) AVAIL.NTIS
SAP: HC A16/MF A01
CIO: UNITED STATES
MAJS: /*ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE/*DATA BASES/*EXPERT
SYSTEMS/*F-15 AIRCRAFT/* SOFTWARE ENGINEERING
MINS: / AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE/ CIRCUIT BOARDS/ CODING/ COMPUTER
PROGRAMS/ ELECTRONIC MODULES/ PERFORMANCE TESTS/ PROBLEM
SOLVING
ABA: GRA
ABS: This reviews three different expert systems (ATEOPS,
ATEFEXPERS, and ATEFATLAS) created to direct automatic
test equipment (ATE). Although related, each expert
system uses a different knowledge base or inference engine
and base their testing on the circuit schematic, test
requirements document (TRD), or ATLAS code. Implementing
generalized modules allows the expert systems to be used
for any unit under test. Because of numerous errors in
the ATLAS code and problems with the actual hardware
connection, a fully operational system was not developed.
These expert systems provide insight into the necessary
knowledge bases and inference engines needed by an expert
system to direct ATE. Using converted ATLAS to LISP code
allows the expert system to direct any ATE using ATLAS.
The CP-FRL allows the expert system to expand its control
by creating the ATLAS code, checking the code for good
software engineering techniques, directing the ATE, and
changing the test sequence as needed.
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85N27936.# ISSUE ]7 PAGE 2909 CATEGORY 18 RPT#: NASA-CR-175881
NASA 1.26:175881 CSI/85-01CNT#: NAGW-629 85/02/25 142
PAGE UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
UTTL: Automation and Robotics for the National Space Program
CORP: California Univ., San Diego. CSS: (Automation and
Robotics Panel.) AVAIL.NTIS
SAP: HC A07/MF A01
CIO: UNITED STATES
MAJS: /*AUTOMATIC CONTROL/*ROBOTICS/_SPACE STATIONS/*TECHNOLOGY
UTILIZATION
MINS: / COMPUTER SYSTEMS DESIGN/ EXPERT SYSTEMS/ NASA PROGRAMS/
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
ABA: E.R.
ABS: The emphasis on automation and robotics in the
augmentation of the human centered systems as it concerns
the Space Station is discussed. How automation and
robotics can amplify the capabilities of humans is
detailed. A detailed developmental program for the space
station is outlined.
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86A18037.# ISSUE 6 PAGE 701 CATEGORY 18 85/12/00 7 PAGES
UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
UTTL: Verification Tests of Durable Thermal Protection S?stem
Concepts
AUTH: A/SHIDELER, J. L.; B/WEBB, G. L.; C/PITTMAN, C. M.
PAA: C/{NASA, Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA)
CORP: National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Langley
Research Center, Hampton, Va.
CIO: UNITED STATES (AIAA, Thermophysics Conference, 19th,
Snowmass, CO, June 25-28, 1984, AIAA Paper 84-1767)
Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets (ISSN 0022-4650), vol.
22, Nov.-Dec. 1985, p. 598-604. Previously cited in
issue 17, p. 2439, Accession no. A84-37493.
MAJS: /*HEAT RESISTANT ALLOYS/*HONEYCOMB STRUCTURES/*REUSABLE
HEAT SHIELDING/* SPACE TRANSPORTATION/*THERMAL PROTECTION
MINS: / ACOUSTIC MEASUREMENT/ AEROTHERMODYNAMICS/ ATMOSPHERIC
ELECTRICITY/ CARBON-CARBON COMPOSITES/ ENVIRONMENTAL
TESTS/ INCONEL (TRADEMARK)/ TITANIUM/ VACUUM TESTS/
VIBRATION TESTS
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86A35709 ISSUE 16 PAGE 2401 CATEGORY 61CNT#:
86/04/00 II PAGES UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
F33615-83-C-1003
UTTL: VHDL - Feature Description and Analysis
AUTH: A/AYLOR, J. H.; B/WAXMAN, R.; C/SCARRATT, C. PAA:
A/(Virginia, University, Charlottesville); C/(IBM Corp.,
Federal Systems Div., Manassas, VA)
CIO: UNITED STATES IEEE Design and Test of Computers (ISSN
0740-7475), vol. 3, April 1986, p. 17-27.
MAJS: /*COMPUTER AIDED
LANGUAGES/*VHSIC (CIRCUITS)
DESIGN/*HARDWARE/*PROGRAMMING
MINS: /ARCHITECTURE (COMPUTERS)/ CRM (COMPUTERS)/ IN COMPU-
TERIZED SIMULATION/ DESIGN ANALYSIS/ DOCUMENTATION/
HEIRARCHIES/ INTERFACES/ USER REQUIREMENTS
ABA: M.S.K
ABS: Features of the modern hardware description language for
VHSIC devices (VHDL) are described and compared with the
features of eight other current languages and to the
requirements of a VHDL language. The criteria for
flexibility of design-acceptable VHDL are applications,
semantics independent of any particular language
implementation, user-friendliness, and parts with a
programming language orientation. Each requirement is
expanded in detail, and comparisons are made with the
interactive design language (IDL), the computer design
language (CDL), the TI hardware description language
(TI-HDL), a hardware programming language (HPL), the ZEUS
hardware description language, the consensus language
CONLAN, the test generation and simulation language
(TEGAS) and the instruction set processor specifications
(ISPS). The discussion shows that only VHDL permits
user-controlled conversion and alternative interface.
Both inertial and transport explicit interface, and no
syntactic and semantic extensions to the language. *
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86A40591# ISSUE 19 PAGE 2859 CATEGORY 66 RPT#: AIAA PAPER
86-1183 86/00/00 5 PAGES UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
UTTL:
AUTH:
Anomaly Detection and Resolution System
A/FERNEYHOUGH, D. G., JR. PAA: A/(IBM Corp.,
Systems Div., Gaithersburg, MD)
Federal
CIO: UNITED STATES
IN: Space Systems Technology Conference, San Diego, CA, June
9-]2, ]986, Technical Papers (A86-40576 19-12). New York,
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1986,
p. 106-110.
MAJS: /*EXPERT SYSTEMS/*SPACECRAFT DESIGN
MINS: / COST REDUCTION/ LIFE CYCLE COSTS/ MILITARY TECHNOLOGY/
TELEMETRY
ABA: Author
ABS: The traditional approaches to anomaly detection and
resolution for modern weapons systems, spacecraft, and
complex ground installations are inadequate to meet the
requirements incumbent upon future systems. Expert system
technology appears to offer a solution, but new types of
expert systems will be required. IBM has developed and
implemented a concept for such a system. This paper
describes that concept, its potential applications, and
some of the implications that this general approach has
for the design of future spacecraft.
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86N19060# ISSUE 9 PAGE 1490 CATEGORY 63 RPT#: AD-AI60863
AFHRL-TR-85-7 CN T#: F33615-82-C-0013 85/10/00 85 PAGES
UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
UTTL: Artificial Intelligence in Maintenance: Synthesis of
Technical Issues
TLSP:
AUTH:
Interim Report, Jan. 1984 - Jan. 1985
A/RICHARDSON, J. J.; B/KELLER, R. A.;
D/POLSON, P. G.; E/DEJONG, K. A.
CORP: Denver Research Inst., Colo. CSS: (Social Systems
Research and Evaluation Div.) AVAIL.NTIS
C/MAXION, R.;
SAP: HC AO5/MF AOI
CIO: UNITED STATES
MAJS: /*ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE/* AUTOMATIC CONTROL/*
DETECTION/* EXPERT SYSTEMS/* HUMAN BEINGS/*
MAINTENANCE/*MAN MACHINE SYSTEMS/* MANAGEMENT
ORGANIZATIONS/* PROBLEM SOLVING/* SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE
MINS: / ARMED FORCES (UNITED STATES)/ CYCLES/ FAILURE/ IMPACT/
MILITARY TECHNOLOGY/ NATURAL LANGUAGE (COMPUTERS)/
POLICIES
ABA: GRA
A: The principle subdisciplines of AI (e.g., expert systems,
problem solving, planning and natural language
understanding) are presented as well as the larger systems
engineering issues. In a chapter devoted to automate
sysytems for managing systems for managing hardware
failures, the components of the failure cycle (detection,
diagnosis, and repair) are described in tandem with
machine approaches and applicable AI methodology. In this
report, effective improvement in military maintenance is
viewed to be dependent not only on automated systems but
also on the development of human resources and the
organizational context of maintenance. Evidence and
information are provided to support the recomendation that
it is possible to build more effective less costly
automated diagnostic systems only if these systems exploit
human problem-solving capabilities. Four hypothetical
examples of advanced systems and a comparison of human vs.
machine strengths and weaknesses as problem solvers are
outlined. Five research and development recommendations
for the use of AI in maintenance conclude that: (I) there
is a good match between the need for improved maintenance
and the emerging science of AI, (2) AI research should be
guided by a policy of integrated diagnostics, (3) field
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evaluations of AI applications should focus on
organizational impact as well as technical issues, (4)
programs should be targeted at both fielded systems and
systems under development, and (5) basic research should
investigate cooperative human-machine device diagnosis
problem solving and the coordination of the specification-
and symptom-based approaches.
86N27356# ISSUE 18 PAGE 2861 CATEGORY
UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT DCAF E003091
18 85/12/00 5 PAGES
UTTL: Features of the Solar Array Drive Mechanism For the Space
Telescope
AUTH: A/HOSTEMKAMP, R. G.
CORP: Dornier-Werke G.m.b.H.,
AVAIL.NTIS
Friedrichshafen (West Germany).
SAP: HC A]5/MF A01; ESA, Paris FF 150 or $18 Member States,
AU, CN, NO (+20% others) In ESA Second European and Space
Mechanisms and Tribology Symposium p 13-17 (SEE N86-27353
18-18)
CIO: GERMANY,FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
MAJS: /*HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE/*MECHANICAL DRIVES/*SOLAR ARRAYS
MINS: / DATA TRANSMISSION/ ELECTRIC POWER TRANSMISSION/ NITINOL
ALLOYS/ SYSTEMS ENGINEERING/ TORQUE
ANN: Spacecraft mechanisms; motors and actuators; tribology;
space stations; and mechanism analysis and testing were
discussed.
ABA: ESA
ABS: The Solar Array Drive Mechanism for the Space Telescope is
described. Power and signal transfer is achieved by a
flexible wire harness for which the chosen solution,
consisting of 168 standard wires, is described. The
torque performance data of the harness over its
temperature range is presented. The load system which
protects the bearings from the launch loads is based by a
trigger made from Nitinol, a memory alloy. The benefits
of memory alloy and the caveats for the design are
discussed.
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